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This dissertation develops the concept of embodied invention, an epistemology and 
design philosophy that treats multimodal media—such as comics and videogames—as heuristics 
for translating knowledges between bodies, communities, and cultures. In classical rhetoric 
invention refers to the art of discovering knowledge through the commonplaces—those opinions, 
beliefs, and values common to a particular time and place. Rhetors would train themselves in 
invention by studying commonplace books—texts that contained common expressions, phrases, 
and allegories of a particular community, region, or culture. Drawing on phenomenology, 
semiotics, and media theory, this dissertation puts forward an embodied account of invention, 
one that correlates knowledge of the world with one’s position or place in the world. The 
commonplaces, then, are as much bodily and sensory as they are social and cultural, and as such 
the notion of commonplace books needs to be expanded to include media that capture not just the 
common expressions and phrases of a particular time and place but the common sensations and 
sensory experiences of particular bodies and cultures. This novel understanding of invention 
sheds light on conceptions of embodiment, normalcy, and knowledge translation. Feminist and 
disability studies scholarship exemplifies how some places are—culturally, socially, and 
phenomenologically—more common than others, and that commonality (or lack thereof) 
facilitates or inhibits the movement of knowledge. Multimodal media afford people marginalized 
by what is held to be common or normal—such as women, LGBTQ persons, persons of colour, 
and persons with disabilities—with the means to convey the sensory and semiotic situation in 
which their knowledges are situated. Graphic autobiographies and memoirs—such as Cece Bell’s 
El Deafo and Paul Karasik and Judy Karasik’s The Ride Together: A Brother and Sister's 
Memoir of Autism in the Family—and (semi-)autobiographical videogames—such as Mainichi 
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and The Oldest Game—can be seen to represent both the sensory and socio-cultural 
commonplaces of their authors, fostering a form of invention that is capable of translating 
knowledges embedded within sensory, social, and cultural situations. In order to make this point 
effectively, and to demonstrate its applicability to design, a portion of this dissertation is argued 
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This dissertation is focused on developing a single concept: embodied invention, a 
sensory and rhetorical method for translating knowledges. Embodied invention is a critique of 
normative theories of communication that rely on a common or shared experience, but it is also a 
design philosophy, a method for creating tools that translate knowledges between bodies and 
places. These acts of knowledge translation reflect our capacity to understand, empathize with, 
and be by motivated by others, and as such I see embodied invention as a crucial component of 
creating and maintaining inclusive communities and cultures.  
To understand embodied invention the concept itself needs to be seen as an act of 
invention. In rhetorical theory invention refers to a method for discovering arguments based in 
the koine ennoia or ‘common ideas.’ To invent a persuasive argument one must first study the 
opinions, beliefs, and values common to a particular time and place. Rhetors grouped these 
common ideas into various places or topoi (the word ‘topos’ means ‘place’) and instructed 
students to study the koine topoi or ‘commonplaces.’ Students were aided in this process through 
commonplace books, texts that contained common phrases, aphorisms, arguments, and allegories 
grouped into various topics.  These books facilitated the discovery of knowledge on a range of 
topics, from morality to economics to law. This dissertation is itself a commonplace book— a 
collection of theories and concepts from the topics of rhetoric, phenomenology, feminism, 
disability studies, comics studies, and game studies. From these places I invent the concept of 
embodied invention, a method for translating knowledges and practices between bodies, 




In inventing the concept of embodied invention I engage in various acts of misprision, a 
creative, productive misinterpretation of a concept or theory. In fact, the crux of the dissertation 
turns on three principal acts of misprision. For example, I look at Aristotle’s definition of 
common sense (koine aisthesis) as that faculty by which one sense incidentally invokes or 
supplies another, and I creatively misinterpret this as a source of sensory enthymemes. An 
enthymeme is a rhetorical argument in which there is an implied but unstated premise; so long as 
the implied premise is familiar to the audience, they need not hear it spoken as the mind supplies 
it. The faculty of common sense functions in much the same way where if there is a sensation 
known to the perceiver it does not have to be sensed as the mind supplies it. This misprision of 
common sense (koine aisthesis) allows me to approach perception itself as a rhetorical 
phenomenon, opening up the possibility of including the body and the senses into the art of 
invention. After all, Aristotle defines a commonplace as a collection of enthymemes (Rhetoric B 
26, 1403a, 18-19); common sense, as a source of sensory enthymemes, would thus create a 
personal sensory commonplace from which embodied knowledge of the world is invented. 
These various acts of misprision allow foundational theories of rhetoric, perception, and 
epistemology to be merged with more contemporary scholarship on multimodal rhetoric, 
phenomenology, and positional epistemology. For instance, in a second major misprision I read 
the above understanding of common sense (koine aisthesis) into Giambattista Vico’s theory of 
sensory and artistic invention. For Vico, common sense, as a shared faculty of perception, creates 
a common sense of place or a sensory commonplace (topica sensible); Vico held that it was 
within this sensory commonplace that humans first discovered common knowledge and common 
knowledge-making practices. I go on to merge Vico’s theory of invention with contemporary 
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postmodernism, feminism, and disability studies, thereby pluralizing the notion of sensory 
commonplaces in order to account for a range of bodies and senses.  
Finally, this rethinking of invention precipitates a misprision of the commonplace book. 
Whereas the traditional commonplace book contained common topics—such as law, morality, or 
economics—in which one discovers various arguments, embodied invention looks to the 
common stories of particular persons and places in which one discovers various everyday or 
commonplace experiences. I approach these stories insofar as they are conveyed through various 
media, including as memoirs and autobiographies, but also autobiographical films, comics, and 
videogames. In this way I extend the heuristic role of the traditional commonplace book beyond 
the printed word to embrace more contemporary multimodal artforms. In doing so I demonstrate 
the benefits of sharing not only common ideas but common sensations and common sensory 
experiences. In order to demonstrate the heuristic potential here this dissertation is accompanied 
by a commonplace videogame—Allergies & Allegories. This food allergy awareness game 
represents a relatively uncommon place in society and seeks to translate the knowledges and 
practices situated therein by engaging the audience in an act of embodied invention. This game is 
supplemented with a study of autobiographical comics and videogames that already function as 
commonplace media, training the senses and minds of their readers to invent or discover 
knowledges situated in various sensory, social, and culture places.  
In lieu of a more comprehensive overview of this document I’d like to use the remainder 
of this introduction to make four brief clarifications before proceeding to outline the individual 
chapters. The first has to do with the nature of this dissertation. As a commonplace book that 
undertakes various acts of misprision, this document is decidedly more inventive and less 
expository. Readers looking for exegesis on the various theories and concepts discussed here 
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may be left wanting more. However, it is my hope that the assemblage of these theories and 
concepts from a range of disciplines and fields leads to novel insights that are best expressed 
through a more straightforward narrative. That said, I do delve into specifics insofar as they 
inform the current project and I do draw connections with texts and authors that expand the 
conversation on various topics. 
The second clarification is in regards the concept of a place or situation. By these terms I 
do not mean a specific geographical location. Instead, I define place as a product of the 
embodied subject utilizing various sensory and semiotic practices to situate the self in the world. 
Conventionally, these practices for making sense have been associated with common sense, in 
this case meaning a common or shared rationality; however, if we divest common sense from the 
notion of a common or ‘normal’ body, then we can recognize without judgement a plurality of 
sense-making practices and sensory situations or places in which those practices ‘make sense.’ 
One of the consequences of this approach is to reject the notion that we can occupy the situations 
or places of others and thereby accrue the same knowledges. These kinds of social, cultural, and 
body tourisms elide the embodied practices that individuals use to make sense of their place in 
the world. In order to understand that embodied knowledge it must first be translated. Thus, 
embodied invention breaks with theories of knowledge and experience founded on common 
sense and the notion that humans naturally sense, feel, or reason about the world in the same or 
similar ways.  
A third issue I’d like to address at the outset is how I talk about marginalized experiences 
in relation to normalcy. Throughout this document I shift between discussing the experiences of 
women, autists, persons who are Deaf, blind, and food-allergic. My aim here is not to 
equivocate—in fact, just the opposite: I want to and do speak about specific lived experiences 
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and actual everyday circumstances, emphasizing meaningful distinctions between individuals, 
communities, and cultures. My approach has been informed by feminist-pragmatism and I hold 
lived experience in the highest regard in respect to epistemology. However, I also want to 
address why certain experiences and knowledges appear to be more common (i.e. socially 
prevalent) than others. In fact, much of this dissertation involves distinguishing what is 
‘common’—as in personally familiar, ordinary, everyday—from what is ‘common’—as in 
normal, average, or even universal. Normalcy can be understood as the conflation of these two 
meanings, such that a ‘normal’ subject is one for whom what is familiar or ordinary 
experientially is reflected as ‘normal’ or average socially and culturally.  
One of the consequences of being considered ‘normal’ within a society is that most 
people will already be familiar with your sensory and semiotic practices—i.e. your ways of 
making sense. Neurotypical people, for instance, seem to prefer particular patterns that reflect 
uniformity and conformity, and these preferences can be seen to pervade Western culture in 
everything from the design of print media to the structure of buildings and public spaces. What 
many feminist disability studies scholars, such as Alison Kafer (Feminist, Queer, Crip) and 
Rosemarie Garland-Thomson (Extraordinary Bodies), have argued is that the familiarity that 
normalcy affords confers a measure of privilege and power that needs to be interrogate and 
deconstructed. It is with this imperative in mind that I carry out a critique of normalcy with and 
through marginalized experiences. 
Lastly, I’d like to clarify that a critique of normalcy is not a critique of anyone who 
conforms to the normate identity, such as myself. Rather, in interrogating the notion of what is 
‘common’ or ‘normal’ I want to emphasize the ways in which normalcy leads to prescriptive 
rather than descriptive accounts of the world. As disability scholar Tobin Siebers writes, “our 
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current theories of reality…are part of a rhetoric that exists less to explain how the body works 
than to make claims about how it ‘ought’ to work in the society we all apparently desire” (180). 
This normate rhetoric suggests that humans do or ought to share the same techniques and 
practices for making sense of the world. The result is that theories of reality often come to 
represent the situation of the normate, whose sensory acuity and able body leads him to conclude 
that aspects of his experience, such as visual fidelity and a freedom of movement, are hallmarks 
of experiencing the ‘real world.’ As disability scholars have made clear, humans are only 
temporarily able-bodied and able-minded beings; from birth until death our bodies and minds are 
in a state of transition, where our motility, perception, and cognition vary dramatically 
throughout any individual’s life. Normalcy identifies not only a particular moment in that 
process but also a particular subjectivity, favouring the able-bodied, white, male adult. In this 
regard we all stand to gain from critiquing normalcy and normate rhetoric as we will all benefit 
at one point or another from a diversification of the ways of making sense that circulate 
throughout our culture. With these clarifications in mind I will turn to briefly outlining the 
following chapters. 
 
Chapter 1—Embodied Invention 
In the first chapter I put forward a theory of embodied invention, a means of translating 
knowledges between bodies, communities, and cultures. I describe embodied invention as a 
variation of Giambattista Vico’s sensory invention. For Vico, invention begins with common 
sense (sensus communis) which creates a common sense of place or a sensory commonplace. 
Within our sensory commonplaces we discover various ways of making sense, what Vico calls 
poetic genera. At this point I introduce into Vico’s theory the concept of dissensus communis or 
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simply dissensus, meaning that humans sense or feel apart from one another. Dissensus 
encourages us to recognize that the faculty of common sense varies from person to person, such 
that we occupy intersecting but nevertheless distinct sensory places. It follows that while our 
personal ways of making sense are given to us through our own common sensory experience, the 
poetic genera of others must be invented or discovered through language, art, and culture. I then 
turn to Deaf studies and autistic studies, relating how rhetorical scholars working in these areas 
have posited discrete commonplaces, distinct places from which knowledge of the world is 
invented.  
This leads into the second part of the chapter, which is centered on the concept of the 
commonplace book. Conventionally, a commonplace book was a heuristic text used to train 
students in the art of invention. Such books contained various phrases, aphorisms, expressions, 
metaphors, allegories, and fables that could be studied in order to invent knowledge on a 
particular topic.  Following Vico’s suggestion that the poetic genera, or ways of making sense, 
give rise to “true poetic allegories” (75) or ‘true stories’ (“vera narration”) (311), I suggest that 
personal stories, such as autobiographies and memoirs, can be thought to convey the poetic 
genera of their authors. Furthermore, I suggest that authors working in multimodal media, such 
as comics and videogames, are creating novel forms of commonplace texts, one’s capable of 
conveying various ways of making sense using rhetorics that span numerous senses and 
modalities. This sets up the rest of the dissertation in which I argue for commonplace comic 
books (Chapter 2) and commonplace videogames (Chapter 3). 
 
Chapter 2—Commonplace Comic Books 
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In the second chapter I develop the notion that in sharing stories we are sharing ways of 
making sense. In taking this approach I am building on the work of Michel de Certeau who 
argued that stories collate the various tactics or techniques used throughout society. But rather 
than focusing on myths and fables, as de Certeau does, I look to autobiographies and memoirs, 
‘true stories’ of everyday or commonplace experiences of various persons. However, because the 
focus here is on dissensus, there is a need to study not just differences in language but in 
perception and experience as well. And so I look specifically to autographics, autobiographical 
comics or ‘true graphic stories.’ Autographics allow us to study ‘true stories’ told through a 
multi-sensory medium, thereby fostering the discovery of sense-making practices at work 
throughout and between the senses of various authors. In taking this approach I am following 
Vico’s suggestion that while classical invention encouraged students to study the social 
commonplaces through the discursive arts of speech and writing, invention based on the senses 
entails studying the sensory commonplaces through the perceptual arts of poetry and painting—
to which we can add contemporary arts of photography, film, comics, and videogames.  
Thus, what I am proposing is that we treat autographics as commonplace comic books. As 
already noted, the term commonplace book refers to a heuristic text that students were 
encouraged to study so as to refine their knowledge of a particular topic and develop their 
capacity for inventing things to say on that topic. What I suggest is that autographics take the 
same heuristic principle of a commonplace book and extrapolate it into various sensory 
modalities. That is to say, whereas commonplace books traditionally focused on common 
linguistic and discursive relationships, autographics, or commonplace comic books, convey 
common sensory and semiotic relationships. They are ideal texts, then, for conveying practices 
that permeate not just written or spoken language, but the senses themselves. Throughout the 
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chapter I look to comics like El Deafo, an autobiographical comic about growing up deaf, and 
The Ride Together, a memoir comic about autism, demonstrating how the cartoonists leverage 
the multimodality of the medium to convey various sense-making practices. 
 
Chapter 3—Commonplace Videogames 
 In the third chapter I put forward the notion of a commonplace videogame. What 
distinguishes commonplace videogames is that whereas stories convey ways of making sense, 
games are a means of generating stories. Commonplace videogames, then, are a means of 
procedurally generating accounts of sensory, social, and/or cultural places in the world. These 
accounts, in turn, teach players the sense-making practices or poetic genera that are inherent to 
those places. In this way commonplace videogames are a novel instance of didactic new media in 
the way that they train players to understand how knowledge of the world is situated through 
various places or positions in the world. In speaking of commonplace videogames I want to think 
of them as invitations for players to use the poetic genera inherent to a particular sensory, social, 
or cultural place to produce an account of that place. This reading is reinforced by noting that 
games function through procedural enthymemes (Bogost Persuasive Games), arguments 
completed through interaction. By enacting the procedural enthymemes in a commonplace 
videogame, players bring forth an account of that place that makes sense, situating their 
knowledge of the subject in the process.  
In the chapter itself I define commonplace videogames and provide an overview of their 
common features. I then describe how these games function rhetorically through procedural and 
participatory arguments that involve various senses. I go on to note how games are particularly 
suited to creating a common sense of place through their unique blend of play, place, and poiesis. 
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Videogames are, I suggest, topoietic media. The word poiesis, which is the root for poetic in 
poetic genera, means ‘to make or bring forth.’ Thus, to think of games as topoietic media is to 
note that they bring forth (poiesis) a sense of place (topos) and in doing so they foster the 
exchange of knowledges and practices situated in those places. 
 
Chapter 4—Allergies & Allegories 
In the final chapter I demonstrate how embodied invention can inform the creation of 
knowledge translation tools. Embodied invention seeks to foster the exchange of knowledges 
situated in bodies, communities, and cultures, and it conceives of media as commonplace texts 
capable of sharing the methods by which knowledges are situated. While I have looked at media 
that incidentally function in this way—such as commonplace comic books and commonplace 
videogames—in this chapter I explore what a commonplace text founded explicitly on the ideals 
of embodied invention might look like. I designed such a text in the form of Allergies & 
Allegories, a commonplace videogame that seeks to raise awareness of life with a serious food 
allergy. The game itself is based on interviews conducted with food-allergic children, as relayed 
in the paper “Illustrating Risk: Anaphylaxis Through the Eyes of the Food-Allergic Child” by 
Nancy Fenton et al. In Allergies & Allegories players are introduced to Mia, a young girl with a 
peanut allergy, who is also a composite of those children interviewed in the study. Players work 
with Mia to navigate various social situations related to her allergy. I go on to describe how the 
game came together, its design and mechanics, what it is like to play, and my overall objectives 




Chapter One: Embodied Invention 
 
In this dissertation I define and develop the concept of embodied invention—a form of 
situated knowledge translation that is rooted in the body and the senses. When talking about 
situated knowledges I mean knowledge of the world that has been embodied through a particular 
body and in respect to a particular perspective. Given that bodies and perspectives vary in 
accordance with age, gender, race, ability, sexual orientation, class, and many other factors, 
knowledges invariably differ from one another. I take it for granted that our capacity to translate 
these knowledges corresponds to our capacity to understand, empathize with, and, ultimately, be 
motivated by the various persons and perspectives that make up our communities. Nevertheless, 
if knowledges differ from one another, how is that we develop common knowledge?  
All theories of communication encounter the challenge of how disparate individuals, 
communities, and cultures communicate across and through their differences. One approach to 
this challenge is to assert that communication is a process founded on consensus. Such a premise 
suggests that understanding is achieved by revealing a fundamental similarity and commonality 
between dissimilar and uncommon subjects. This speaks to the literal interpretation of consensus, 
which means ‘to feel or sense together.’ The approach explored here is to develop a theory of 
communication founded not on consensus but dissensus, meaning to feel or sense apart or 
separately. Dissensus encourages us to recognize the dissimilarity and uncommonness between 
subjects, aspects of effective communication which are often disregarded when interlocutors 
seek only to find common ground. Thus, dissensus involves treating that which is uncommon as 
indicative of larger contexts in which knowledges attain meaning. Embodied invention, then, is a 
theory of how we discover such contexts. 
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In rhetorical theory invention refers to the art of discovering knowledge through the 
common topics or commonplaces (the word topic or topos means place). The commonplaces are 
those commonly held beliefs and opinions that have been discursively formed in a particular 
community or culture. Training in invention involves becoming familiar with the discursive 
commonplaces of one’s audience, for in doing so the rhetor is capable of making arguments that 
follow from commonly held beliefs. Traditional invention, however, does not account for the 
origins of these common beliefs. In The New Science Giambattista Vico put forward a theory of 
invention that situated common beliefs in the body and senses. Vico begins from the premise that 
humans share a common means of sensory perception, that is to say, a common sense or sensus 
communis. Common sense suggests that despite our social or cultural differences we 
nevertheless possess common relationships between the senses and as such all humans could be 
said to occupy the same sensory commonplace. In this way Vico puts forward the notion that 
sensory experience itself is a kind of invention. He held that by studying the sensory 
commonplace we discover poetic genera, common sensory techniques or tactics for making 
sense out of the world. Vico held that the poetic genera give rise to “true poetic allegories” (75) 
or ‘true stories’ (“vera narration”) (311), common or shared narratives that make sense out of 
the sensory world. We find these ‘true stories’ in the myths and fables that span across 
communities, cultures, and continents; their (apparent) universality is a testament to the fact that 
underneath the plurality of discourses there resides common ways of making sense. Based on 
this originary relationship between sense and knowledge, Vico held that the discovery of 
knowledge was fostered through sensory media, as typified by the arts of poetry and painting. 
Embodied invention is a variation of this form of sensory knowledge discovery. But 
whereas Vichian invention begins from the premise that there exists a sensus communis and thus 
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a sensory commonplace in which we discover common ways of making sense (i.e. common 
poetic genera), embodied invention follows from the premise of dissensus communis, meaning 
that there are a plurality of sensory commonplaces and thus numerous and varied ways of 
making sense (i.e. uncommon poetic genera).  Embodied invention looks to those ‘true stories’ 
that have been marginalized by conceptions of what is ‘common’ or ‘normal’ in search of poetic 
genera that are socially uncommon or unfamiliar. At the same time embodied invention retains 
the relationship between knowledge and the senses by approaching contemporary media, such as 
comics and videogames, as a means of conveying poetic genera across bodies, communities, and 
cultures. However, in learning these novel ways of making sense we are not so much discovering 
the basis of common knowledge but the means by which knowledges are situated in various 
practical positions or common places. Embodied invention, then, is a means of translating these 
situated knowledges, fostering our capacity to understand one another through our differences 
rather than despite them. 
To put all of this in terms of contemporary theory, dissensus communis or dissensus 
enables a rethinking of Vico’s humanist account of knowledge moving between like bodies and 
common places into a feminist disability studies theory of knowledge moving between unlike 
bodies and uncommon places.1 For example, dissensus encourages us to look at the formation of 
the discursive commonplaces (i.e. commonly held beliefs) of Western culture and see common 
relationships that are founded on a ‘common’ or ‘normal’ body—e.g. the common belief that 
reality is primarily a visual phenomenon or that speech is commensurate with intelligence or that 
                                                          
I It could also be said that embodied invention offers a posthumanist theory of communication as well, if by 
humanism one means an epistemology founded on the existence of a common human subject. In this way 
embodied invention is post-humanist in the sense that it offers a means of thinking beyond the limitations that 
humanism imposes on human subjects vis-à-vis the body, senses, mind, rationality, etc. Thus, readers may find a 
certain affinity between posthumanist scholarship and the present work. That said, both feminism and disability 




language is a disembodied medium. In this way, embodied invention recognizes that invention 
has historically been restricted to the commonplaces of the normate.  The normate refers to the 
culturally constructed notion of the normal or common human subject. In Western culture, the 
“normate position” is “masculine, white, nondisabled, sexually unambiguous, and middle class” 
(Garland-Thomson Extraordinary Bodies 64). To speak of the commonplaces as normative is to 
note that the discursive topoi of Western culture are based on the sensory topos of the normate—
i.e. they are based on a ‘normal’ or a ‘common’ mode of sensory experience. This is noteworthy 
given that the discursive commonplaces are those socially common or familiar places to which 
the mind goes when it seeks to discover knowledge about a particular topic. To recognize the 
discursive commonplaces as normative is to note that they inhibit the discovery of knowledges 
located in positions and experiences that have been marginalized by the construction of 
normalcy. As Jay Dolmage writes, “A normate culture… continuously re-inscribes the centrality, 
naturality, neutrality and unquestionability of [the] normate position” (22). Similarly, the 
discursive commonplaces have re-inscribed the ‘centrality, naturality, neutrality and 
unquestionability’ of the normative sensory experience and thus normative ways of making sense 
and as a consequence they reflect the biases of an able-bodied, neurotypical, masculine subject.  
In what follows I develop the concept of dissensus by combining disability studies 
critiques of normalcy with feminist standpoint theory. I then put this feminist disability studies 
epistemology in dialogue with Vico’s theory of invention, giving rise to the notion of uncommon 
places and discrete poetic genera. I then turn to Deaf studies and autistic studies, relating how 
rhetorical scholars working in these respective areas have each described discrete 
commonplaces, distinct places of invention. Inherent to these places are various sense-making 
practices, i.e. poetic genera used to make sense of one’s place or situation in the world. 
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Embodied invention ties our capacity to understand one another to our familiarity with various 
poetic genera. Thus, I end by suggesting that poetic genera are shared through commonplace 
books. Conventionally, a commonplace book was a heuristic text used to train students in the art 
of invention. Such books contained various phrases, aphorisms, expressions, metaphors, 
allegories, and fables that could be studied in order to invent knowledge on a particular topic.  
Following Vico’s suggestion that the poetic genera, or ways of making sense, give rise to “true 
poetic allegories” (75) or ‘true stories’ (“vera narration”) (311), I suggest that autobiographies 
and memoirs are the commonplace books of embodied invention in that they convey discrete and 
situated ways of making sense that need not conform to the consensus of all persons to be 
considered true. 2 
 
Consensus & Dissensus 
 In Western philosophy, common sense can refer to many things: common sensory 
perception (koine aisthesis), common notions or concepts (koine ennoia), common rationality 
(bon sens), common moral judgement (sensus communis), and/or common social knowledge 
(koine ennoia and sensus communis). These varied and overlapping definitions can be found in a 
variety of philosophies of the body, mind, and language, including those philosophies of 
perception (such as Aristotle and Husserl), rationality (Aquinas and Descartes), and rhetoric 
(Aristotle and Vico). When common sense is deployed in these philosophies it is often done so 
on the basis that there exists a shared sensus between human subjects. This sensus can refer to 
                                                          
2 Much has been written about autobiographies, memoirs, and truth. See, for instance, Philippe Lejeune’s “The 
Autobiographical Pact” or Sidonie Smith’s “Construing Truth in Lying Mouths: Truthtelling. In Women's. 
Autobiography.” For a more general overview of the subject, see Reading Autobiography: A Guide for Interpreting 
Life Narratives by Sidonie Smith and Julia Watson. In talking about truth and autobiography I mean something 
similar to Stanley Fish’s remarks that, “Autobiographers cannot lie because anything they say, however mendacious, 
is the truth about themselves, whether they know it or not”(“Just Published: Minutiae Without Meaning” New York 
Times, Sept. 7th,  1999). That said, my focus here is primarily on how truth is conveyed and not necessarily whether 
an author is being truthful. 
16 
 
the body, through perception, or to the mind, through rationality, or to language, through 
rhetoric. When it is paired with the notion of communis, or commonality, this sensus is often 
taken to be transcendental. As a consequence, it exists above and beyond any individual 
instantiation—i.e. any individual body, mind, or rhetoric. This allows common sense, as a 
concept, to function as a prescriptive norm; it gives rise to the possibility that one should 
perceive, think, or be persuaded of this or that. 
Such an understanding of sensus communis is captured by C.S. Lewis in his history of the 
phrase ‘common sense’ (Study in Words). Lewis notes that the word ‘common’ can be 
interpreted as ‘generic’ or even ‘banal.’ “But common may also contrast the sensus of humanity 
in general, favourably, with what is thought or felt by the irrational, the depraved, the sub-
human. Common, so taken, has no association with vulgar. It is the quod semper, quod ubique, 
the normal and indeed the norm” (Lewis 149). In fact, this correlation between common sense 
and normalcy is recurrent throughout history. Summarizing Lewis’s work on common sense, 
Bugter relates four principal interpretations of the phrase in Western philosophy: “1. The 
elementary mental outfit of normal man,” “2. Sensus communis as social virtue,” “3. Sensus 
communis as common wit,” and “4. Sensus communis…[as] the collection of all the sensus that 
we have in common, because they are ‘normal.’” (83).  
In drawing attention to normalcy and common sense I want to focus on the ways in which 
knowledge and reason have, historically, been situated in the experience a ‘common’ or ‘normal’ 
individual. Feminist disability studies scholar Rosemarie Garland-Thomson refers to this 
‘normal’ figure in Western discourse as the normate. She writes that “The term normate usefully 
designates the social figure through which people can represent themselves as definitive human 
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beings” (Extraordinary Bodies 8). 3 Common sense, in the above formulations, clearly 
participates in this process, as it allows for the validation of one’s own body (and mind) as 
rational, moral, and, ultimately, human, through its marking of others as “irrational,” “depraved, 
and “sub-human” (Lewis 149). Garland-Thomson goes on to write that the normate constitutes 
“the veiled subject position of cultural self, the figure outlined by the array of deviant others 
whose marked bodies shore up the normate’s boundaries” (8). Similarly, common sense can be 
thought of as that ‘veiled’ sensory and cognitive faculty that derives its meaning and privilege—
its commonality—through its contrast with ‘uncommon’ senses, bodies, and minds.  
Part of what maintains the ‘veil’ surrounding common sense is the belief that humans 
possess a common means of perception. In the above definitions the notion of common sense as 
common wit is attributed to Vico  who sought to correlate common ideas—what the Stoics 
referred to as koine ennoia—with common perception—what Aristotle called koine aisthesis. For 
Vico the common ideas are first discovered or invented through common perception, a move that 
suggests that a ‘common’ or ‘normal’ body is not only the basis for a common or shared 
understanding, but it is the foundation for Western knowledge and discourse.4 Rather than 
simply critiquing the normative foundation of Vico’s philosophy I’d like to engage in an act of 
misprision by creatively misinterpreting its foundational claim. Thus, where Vico sees a common 
basis for human knowledge and understanding in our (supposedly) common bodies and senses, I 
see an explanation of how the bodies and senses of culturally ‘normal’ subjects—i.e. the 
normate—became the foundation of Western discourse. At the same time I see the act of 
recognizing bodies and senses that differ from the normate as commensurate with the recognition 
                                                          
3 On a similar note, disability scholar Lennard Davis has argued that disability arises from the active and passive 
(re)construction of what is normal (Enforcing Normalcy), leading him to suggest that disability studies is, in many 
ways, a form of normalcy studies.  
4 Vico goes on to argue that the sensory discovery of common ideas precedes the creation of mythology, 
philosophy, and science (The New Science). 
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of distinct situations in which knowledges and rational practices inhere. In the next section I 
examine the former claim in detail, before moving on to the latter. 
 
From Perception to Reason 
In using common sense to connect sensory perception with cognitive comprehension 
Vico is building on a long-standing association in Western philosophy. As van Holthoon notes, 
from Greco-Roman antiquity onward common sense follows a “journey from perception to 
reason” (101). This journey, I suggest, also charts the process by which the sensory perception of 
normative individuals (i.e. able-bodied and able-minded) becomes the foundation for reason 
regardless of one’s body or mind. That is to say, by assuming the existence of a common or 
normal perceiving subject, reason itself comes to transcend the body, even as it remains closely 
tied to it. 
This journey from perception to reason begins with Aristotle’s definition of common 
sense as koine aisthesis or common perception. In De anima Aristotle argues for the existence of 
a faculty by which the disparate senses supplement one another in order to form a unified 
experience of the world. Common sense (koine aisthesis) is that means by which the senses share 
information with one another such that we perceive multi-sensory objects as unified entities. Put 
differently, common sense (koine aisthesis) is the faculty by which we observe the parts but 
perceive the whole. This understanding of common sensory perception then gets taken up by 
philosophers in the Middle Ages. For instance, in A Commentary on Aristotle’s De anima 
Thomas Aquinas translates koine aisthesis as ‘sensus communis,’ aligning Aristotle’s sensory 
concept with the Roman tradition in which common sense referred to common social knowledge 
and, indeed, a kind of common rationality. In fact, Aquinas goes on to treat sensus communis as 
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a synonym for reason (van Holthoon 100), 5 such that the capacity to ‘observe the parts but 
perceive the whole’ becomes that process of observing parts but perceiving the whole truth. At 
this point common sense becomes less of a sensory faculty and more of a cognitive one, a move 
that works to divest knowledge and reason from the embodied subject such that common sense 
moves towards more abstract and universal notions of reason. 
Viewed in this way, the journey from perception to reason reaches its conclusion in 
Cartesian philosophy where common sense becomes ‘good sense’ (bon sens). Not only is ‘good 
sense’ seamlessly equated with reason, but it marks a definitive break with the body and the 
senses—Descartes saw sensory perception not as a source of truth but potential deception. For 
him, common sense or bon sens is a form of reason that is naturally and normally conferred upon 
the mind, not something that propagates upwards from one’s sensory experience. This can be 
seen in the opening paragraph of Descartes’ “Discourse on the Method”: 
Good sense (bon sens) is the best distributed thing in the world: for everyone thinks 
himself so well endowed with it that even those who are the hardest to please in 
everything else do not usually desire more of it than they possess. In this it is unlikely 
that everyone is mistaken. It indicates rather that the power of judging well and of 
distinguishing the true from the false—which is what we properly call “good sense” or 
“reason”—is naturally equal in all men, and consequently that the diversity of our 
opinions does not arise because some of us are more reasonable than others but solely 
because we direct our thoughts along different paths and do not attend to the same things. 
(“Discourse on the Method” 5) 
                                                          
5 The shift in Aquinas from sensory common sense to reason is in line with other philosophers of the Middle Ages, 
such as Bartholomaeus Anglicus, who hypothesized a ratio sensibilis, a kind of reason of the senses (Summers 
“Optics and the common sense” 158). 
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Indeed, Descartes inherits the work of his predecessors, especially Aquinas, who diminished the 
role of the senses in relation to reason. As Lewis observes,  
there is no need to distinguish sens from le bon sens or le sens commun, nor sense from 
‘good sense’ and ‘common sense’. Whatever the idea (or ideas) of a common sense 
contributed to the final flavour of the brew, it is now indistinguishable. Thus Descartes 
opens his Discourse on Method with a definition of le bon sens ou la raison; but by the 
second paragraph it has changed into la raison ou le sens. Descartes does not notice the 
change. With or without bon, sens is a synonym for raison. (Lewis 153)  
Van Holthoon summarizes (a little too uncritically) the role ‘good sense’ plays in Cartesian 
philosophy: “The bon sens, the right insight, equivalent to the ‘ratio,’ with which nature 
endowed everybody equally, will reveal to everybody the true and false. This bon sens is 
normative, and dominates all our knowing and acting, individually and collectively” (126).  
Ultimately, the journey from perception to reason reflects two important conflations. The 
first is the conflation of sense (sens, sensus, aisthesis)—as in meaning made from embodied 
sensory experience—with reason—as in a disembodied means of sensing or discerning truths 
from falsehoods. But there is also the conflation of common (commun, communis, koine)—
originally a reference to the shared role of the senses in making perceptual meaning—with that 
which is ‘natural’ or ‘normal’—as in that which is common or given to all or “equal in all men.” 
In this way whatever common perception (koine aisthesis) contributes to an individual’s capacity 
to ‘make sense’ of the world it is either already common or shared by all rational subjects or it is 
uncommon and potentially irrational.  
In this context Vico’s philosophy, in which common social knowledge originates in and 
is conveyed through common perception, proves useful insofar as it maintains the relationship 
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between bodies and knowledges. Vico, it’s worth noting, was a staunch anti-Cartesianist.6 He 
felt that the Cartesian method—which valued solitary contemplation—risked cutting students off 
from the community, inhibiting their capacity to communicate with the public. Furthermore, 
Vico’s belief that sensory perception was itself a form of thinking and reasoning and therefore 
sensory media had a role to play in conveying knowledge was wholly at odds with the Cartesian 
method which viewed the senses as potentially misleading and held that clear logical proofs 
were, in a manner of speaking, the language of reason. Thus, Vico’s philosophy moves the 
conversation closer to discussing a non-normative form of knowledge translation, one that 
acknowledges and respects the role of the body and the senses in the production and 
dissemination of knowledges. However, there remains Vico’s reliance on a common or shared 
faculty of common sense which could be seen to shift the universalizing or normalizing tendency 
from the rational mind to the body and the senses. Both posit a consensus—either a rational 
consensus or what all reasonable people would agree to be true, or a sensory consensus or what 
all able-bodied and able-minded people perceive in common. Either way there is little room to 
acknowledge, let alone come to terms with, those ways of making sense that do not conform to 
that which is ‘common’ or ‘normal.’ Thus, a second misprision is in order, one that bases Vico’s 
theory of sensory invention not on sensus communis but dissensus communis. 
 
Dissensus 
The word dissensus means disagreement or dissent. It combines the Latin ‘dis,’ meaning 
apart or away, with an abbreviation of consensus. The word consensus literally means ‘to feel or 
sense together.’ Thus, dissensus communis means a common difference in feeling or sensing. As 
                                                          




J. F. Lyotard notes, dissensus is as a means of critiquing epistemologies and politics founded on 
common sense and consensus. For Lyotard, common sense asserts a “transcendental sensus” 
(“Sensus Communis” 7)—that is, a way of transcending one’s own embodied situation in order 
to imagine and evaluate the perspectives and knowledges of other persons.7 By interrogating the 
transcendental sensus Lyotard is, as one scholar put it, forwarding a critique of “transcendental 
intersubjectivity and normative consensus” (Beardsworth 44). As another scholar notes, the core 
issue with transcendental intersubjectivity is that it assumes that “[h]uman beings can enter into 
the potential standpoints of others—they can share the world with others through the faculty of 
judging what is held in common” (Visker 2). The project here is an attempt to come to terms 
with the epistemological implications of dissensus in light of the fact that many of our theories of 
communication and rhetoric are founded on common sense. 
In exploring the relationship between dissensus and communis I mean to recognize 
fundamental differences in bodies, minds, languages, and rhetorics. For this reasons I associate 
dissensus with disability studies, and its various critiques of cultural normalcy surrounding the 
body and the senses. But dissensus also incorporates feminist epistemology through standpoint 
theory, which holds that knowledge is situated in respect to one’s position or place in the world. 
As standpoint theorists such as Donna Haraway and Sandra Harding have argued, there are 
numerous and intersecting positions in respect to gender, race, class, culture, sexuality, and 
ability, and thus there are necessarily numerous and intersecting bodies of situated knowledges. 
In this regard, dissensus can be seen to emerge from the incongruity between standpoint theory 
and common sense. In the context of standpoint theory common sense and its implicit notion of a 
shared consensus suggests a transcendental perspective, a means of perceiving that which one 
                                                          
7 Following Lyotard, scholars such as Jacques Rancière (Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics) and Rudi Visker 
(“Dissensus Communis: How to Keep Silent ‘after’ Lyotard”) have developed the postmodern notion of dissensus 
into the concept of dissensus communis, thereby furthering the critique of common sense. 
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has not (and perhaps cannot) experience directly. Haraway calls this the “god’s eye view,” a 
“[way] of being nowhere while claiming to see comprehensively” (584).  Like postmodern 
dissensus, standpoint theory rejects the false objectivity of a god’s eye view or a transcendental 
sensus. But standpoint theorists go further by proposing an alternative objectivity, that of 
embodied, socio-historically situated experience—what Haraway calls feminist objectivity or 
what Harding calls strong objectivity. Strong objectivity involves locating or situating 
knowledges in those contexts in which they have practical meaning. For instance, Harding 
describes strong objectivity as constituting “a rigorous ‘logic of discovery’ intended to maximize 
the objectivity of the results of research and thereby to produce knowledge that can be for 
marginalized people (and those who would know what the marginalized can know) rather than 
for the use only of dominant groups in their projects of administering and managing the lives of 
marginalized people” (54). 
What is missing from these theories, however, is a method for translating knowledges 
between situations or places. Here the concept of invention—as the means of discovering 
knowledges through studying various places—proves useful. As noted above, I want to begin 
with Vico’s notion of sensory invention. However, this theory is based on sensus communis and 
so it conceives of knowledge discovery on the basis that all persons share a common sensus (i.e. 
a shared way of situating knowledge). However, in practice, this sensus allows one to forgo the 
various and divergent ways in which bodies and senses vary in favour of a ‘common’ or ‘normal’ 
body. By adopting the notion of dissensus, I aim to articulate a theory of embodied invention that 
recognizes as meaningful various and divergent ways of making sense. Vico called the common 
ways of making sense poetic genera and he held that they were invented or discovered in the 
sensory commonplace. Dissensus suggests a plurality of sensory commonplaces and thus it 
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posits numerous poetic genera, various ways of making sense of the world. Sharing poetic 
genera, then, is the key to translating knowledges in embodied invention. 
 
Poetic Genera 
The phrase poetic genera refers to common or familiar ways of making sense. The word 
poetic comes from poiesis meaning ‘to make or bring forth.’ In a manner of speaking, the poetic 
genera are the means by which we bring forth knowledge of our place in the world. They are 
fundamentally bodily and sensory in nature, referring to the relationships between our various 
senses insofar as they work in concert to produce meaningful interpretations of the world. We 
use our poetic genera whenever we measure distance in relation to our bodies or time in relation 
to our sense of motility or space in relation to our sense of sight or sound. In portraying poetic 
genera in this way I am deviating from Vico’s original conception of the term but in a way that (I 
think) allows the concept to function productively within contemporary philosophy. That said, I 
want to draw on Vico’s original articulation of the poetic genera and so it is worth providing his 
definition here. 
In The New Science Vico sets out to account for the origins of language, culture, and 
truth. He starts with the ‘first humans’—pre-linguistic peoples who experienced the world 
through sense and feeling alone. Vico proceeds to describe how the first humans used their 
senses to “hew out topics” or places, a process that “has the function of making minds inventive” 
(166-7). Within those sensory places the ‘first humans’ invented the poetic genera. The first 
poetic genus arose by attributing the sound of thunder to the god Jove. In this act Vico held that 
humans created the first sensory metaphor, transforming for the first time perceptual data into 
something more coherent and descriptive. This originary act of invention begins a process 
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through which humans first began to reason and think with the senses. As Vichian scholar 
Donald Phillip Verne notes, the poetic genera involve “regarding sensibility, feeling, or 
expression as a form of thought” (92). And as John D. Schaeffer observes, the poetic genera 
constitute a “metaphorical translation” one that allowed the ‘first humans’ to “make sense out of 
their sensations, to objectify them in ways that both constellate a meaningful interpretation of 
external reality and generate a level of self-consciousness of sensation itself” (89). In this way 
sensory invention “creates human self-consciousness by suspending the flux of sensation, fixing 
sensation in time and projecting it onto external reality” (Schaeffer 90). In a manner of speaking, 
nonsense (i.e. the din of rumbling thunder) begins to ‘make sense’ (i.e. Jove is the source the 
storm) and since humans (supposedly) share the same senses, this also becomes a common sense, 
a common way of making sense out of the world.  
Vico goes on to argue that over time the sensory metaphors gave rise to linguistic 
metaphors, words that could recall common sensations. Through common language there arose 
myths, collective stories that make sense of the natural world, such as the myth of Jove whose 
temperament could help explain the volatility of the weather. Myths, for Vico, naturally give 
way to philosophy, and philosophy to science and this is the basis for his eponymous “new 
science.” All, however, owe their origins to the originary acts of invention and the poetic genera 
that emerged in first making sense of the world. 
 
Invention 
Invention, then, is crucial to understanding how poetic genera, or ways of making sense, 
are discovered and shared. In rhetorical theory, invention is the first of the five canons of 
rhetoric. It is concerned with the initial formation of an argument. Classical rhetoricians such as 
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Aristotle and Cicero wrote extensively on the subject of invention and its central role in the 
discovery of persuasive arguments. Both approached invention as that formative process that 
instructs rhetors where to begin assembling an argument. Rhetors refer to these starting places as 
the topics—a word that literally means place (topos). Aristotle’s Topics, for instance, makes 
reference to numerous categories in which one finds various templates for constructing 
arguments. Similarly, Cicero’s Topica sets out various loci or locations in which a rhetor might 
look to discover various forms of argumentation depending on the occasion.  
In both cases the art of invention is closely associated with a sense of place. At times this 
is meant abstractly, such as when the topoi or loci are treated as various headings or topics in 
which similar forms of argumentation are grouped—such as topoi based on cause-and-effect (see 
Cicero’s Topica) or those based on past and future (see Aristotle’s Rhetoric). Rhetoricians also 
distinguish between common and special topics. Aristotle refers to the commonplaces (koine 
topoi), for example, meaning general or generic forms of argumentation. But the topics can also 
refer to places in the geographical, social, and cultural sense as well. Aristotle, for instance, treats 
invention as the means of discovering arguments based in commonly held beliefs and opinions 
(endoxa).8 Thus, studying the commonplaces involves examining the common language and 
discourse of various communities, societies, and cultures, for in doing so the rhetor learns the 
common associations between words, ideas, and values that will become the basis of his or her 
argument. In rhetorical theory these common associations are referred to as enthymemes. 
Formally, an enthymeme is a syllogism with an implied but unstated premise where “if 
one of [the premises] is known, it does not have to be stated, as the hearer supplies it” (Aristotle 
Rhetoric 1.2 1357a). Aristotle defines a topic or topos as “something under which many 
                                                          
8 The opening line of Topics reads: “Our treatise proposes to find a line of inquiry whereby we shall be able to 
reason from opinions that are generally accepted about every problem propounded to us” (Topics i.2 100a18-25). 
27 
 
enthymemes fall” (Rhetoric B 26, 1403a, 18-19). The classic example of an enthymeme is: 
‘Socrates is human, therefore Socrates is mortal.’ The implied but unstated premise being: ‘All 
humans are mortal.’ Less formally, an enthymeme is an argument that draws on common or 
likely relationships between thoughts, ideas, beliefs, and values. This is nominally present in the 
word ‘enthymeme’ itself which literally means ‘from the mind’; enthymematic arguments draw 
from the minds of the audience in order to complete the act of persuasion. In fact, Aristotle held 
this quality to be “the body of persuasion” (Rhetoric l.1 1354a15), meaning that persuasion is 
fundamentally related to this process of drawing on the familiar and known in order to introduce 
the unfamiliar or unknown. Indeed, part of what makes the enthymeme an effective form of 
communication is that the audience becomes involved in the act of completing or making sense 
of the argument itself by supplying implied but unstated knowledge. This can all be brought to 
bear on our understanding of invention, which involves studying the commonplaces, where a 
commonplace is a collection of enthymemes or common relationships. Thus, in studying various 
commonplaces the rhetor discovers arguments based in common semiotic relationships for in this 
way the rhetor learns which words, concepts, and premises do (and do not) need to be stated as 
the minds of one’s audience will supply them. 
 
Sensory Commonplaces & Sensory Enthymemes 
With this understanding of invention in mind we can return to Vico’s notion of sensory 
invention noted above. For Vico common sense creates a shared or common sense of place or 
simply a sensory commonplace in which one finds common sensory relationships. Expressed in 
the language of invention Vico is asserting the existence of sensory enthymemes, common 
relationships between the senses. His theory of invention states that in studying the sensory 
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commonplace—the common sensory world we all inhabit as human beings—one discovers 
sensory enthymemes and through them various techniques for making sense, i.e. the poetic 
genera: “The first founders of humanity applied themselves to a sensory topics [topica sensible], 
by which they brought together properties or qualities or relations of individuals and species 
which were, so to speak, concrete, and from these created their poetic genera” (The New Science 
166). For Vico the sensory world can be considered a commonplace by virtue of common sense, 
which can now be understood as that faculty by which we possess common relationships 
between the senses. In this way common sense suggests common or universal sensory 
enthymemes. This understanding of perception as enthymematic becomes clearer by engaging in 
another act of misprision, in this case creatively misinterpreting Aristotle’s concept of common 
sense (koine aisthesis) as a source of sensory enthymemes. 
 In De anima, Aristotle argues that there exists a sense that is common to all the senses—
koine aisthesis. He arrives at this concept after examining the five senses of sight, sound, touch, 
taste, and smell, concluding that there are properties of sensory experience that cannot be 
accounted for by the individual senses alone. One of those properties is that perception yields 
complex sensations in which various senses appear simultaneously and incidentally: 
The senses perceive each other’s special-objects incidentally, not in so far as they are 
themselves but in so far as they form a unity, when sense-perception simultaneously takes 
place in respect of the same object, e.g. in respect of bile that is bitter and yellow (for it is 
not the task of any further [perception] at any rate to say that both are one); hence too one 




What Aristotle’s description of koine aisthesis clarifies is the role common sense plays not just in 
binding sensations to one another but how such relationships contribute to a whole or unified 
experience.9 For instance, he describes how bile is perceived as—at once—a bitter and yellow 
substance. Thus, to look at bile is to see something that already tastes bitter, such that one sense 
incidentally invokes or supplies another, creating a more comprehensive multimodal perception 
of the object in the process.  
I say supplies here in order to invoke the language Aristotle uses to describe the 
enthymeme, a kind of argument where “if one of [the premises] is known, it does not have to be 
stated, as the hearer supplies it” (Rhetoric 1.2 1357a, emphasis added). Similarly, common sense 
(koine aisthesis), as described above, suggests that if a sensation is known it does not have to be 
(directly and immediately) sensed as common sense supplies it. To provide another example, in 
looking at a glass of water I perceive how to grasp it; the visual sense supplies an analogous 
tactile sense, both of which appear all at once in my perception of the glass. In fact, just as the 
discursive enthymeme involves the mind in the act of completing or making sense of verbal 
arguments, sensory enthymemes involve the mind in the act of completing or making sense of 
perceptual arguments. A key point here is that this would cast perceptual experience itself (i.e. 
‘reality’) as an argument, one in which we are always-already persuaded of the legitimacy and 
veracity of our own embodied experiences as we draw from our own personal sensory 
commonplaces in completing—subjectively speaking—our perception of the world.  
This misprision of common sense (koine aisthesis) as the source of sensory enthymemes 
sets up the need to recognize the distinct persuasive relationships various bodies and minds have 
                                                          
9 As scholars have noted, this aspect of koine aisthesis appears in contemporary psychology and neuroscience as 
cross-modal binding—that process by which one sense becomes bound to another through sensory perception. 




with the world—that is to say, the need to recognize distinct sensory topoi from which 
knowledge of the world is invented. This follows from the realization that if the sensations that 
the mind supplies follow from common sense binding one sense to another, and if bodies and 
senses differ, then so too do sensory enthymemes, suggesting that the world brought forth 
through perception varies between persons. What might be thought of as reality, then, is in fact 
various dissimilar worlds or uncommon places through which each of us brings forth a particular 
body of knowledge.10  
Consider, for instance, the following remarks from Jim Sinclair: “Autism is a way of 
being. It is pervasive; it colours every experience, every sensation, perception, thought, emotion, 
and encounter, every aspect of existence” (Loud Hands). Or consider Paddy Ladd’s statement 
that, “Deaf children and adults have their own epistemologies, their own ways of thinking about 
and constructing the world” (403). What I want to suggest here is that these remarks are 
indicative of distinct, often unrecognized places or sites of invention in which various poetic 
genera inhere. When Ladd speaks of Deaf epistemologies, for instance, such ways of “thinking 
about and constructing the world” are indicative of d/Deaf11 poetic genera. But what does this 
mean, practically speaking? In the following section I turn to Deaf culture and the notion of a 
d/Deaf commonplace as a way of describing the relationship between a sensory commonplace 
and poetic genera. Given Vico’s example of the originary poetic genera in which the sound of 
thunder becomes a metaphor for Jove, d/Deaf culture presents perhaps the most striking 
affirmation that poetic genera exist outside of the ‘normal,’ able-bodied commonplace. 
                                                          
10 Conversely, normalcy involves constructing and enforcing a supposedly common or shared world in which 
knowledge of the world supposedly originates. 
11 In the Deaf community the lower-case ‘deaf’ is meant to refer to the physiological condition of being hard-of-
hearing or deaf. In contrast, the upper-case Deaf refers to one’s membership in Deaf culture, typically in 
conjunction with one’s fluency in sign language. Because I am interested in the relationship between the senses 





In Understanding Deaf Culture Paddy Ladd remarks that with the emergence of Deaf 
culture “one is confronted with the inescapable conclusion that there exists a ‘Deaf Way’, or 
ways, of thinking, of viewing the world; in short, Deaf epistemologies” (18).12 Ladd describes 
these epistemologies as “Deaf ways of being in the world, of conceiving that world and their 
own place within it (both in actuality and in potentiality)” (81). What I want to suggest here is 
that Deaf ways of being in the world follow from a d/Deaf instantiation of common sense (koine 
aisthesis), one that forges enthymemes or common relationships through d/Deaf experience. And 
just as the hearing use common sense to “hew out the topics” or places of the hearing world, 
finding therein various ways of making sense, so too do d/Deaf persons create a place in the 
world in which poetic genera emerge. These d/Deaf poetic genera, I suggest, are synonymous 
with Deaf ways of thinking and viewing the world and they form the basis of d/Deaf rhetoric. 
Furthermore, they are not present within the commonplaces of the hearing; rather the hearing 
come to understand d/Deaf experience by engaging with Deaf culture and discovering therein 
d/Deaf ways of making sense. Delving into Ladd’s history of Deaf culture can help make this 
point clearer. 
In providing an overview of Deaf culture Ladd also sets out to define a Deaf identity, 
what he calls Deafhood. In a manner of speaking, Deafhood exchanges the generic—and 
arguably normalizing—concept of personhood for a specifically Deaf identity. In defining 
Deafhood Ladd goes to great lengths to assert its relation to Deaf culture as opposed to medical 
discourse. The medical perspective has very little concern for what it means to be Deaf—that is, 
                                                          
12 This sentiment has been expressed by other scholars as well, see for instance Owen Wrigley, The Politics of 
Deafness: “Deafness is less about audiology than it is about epistemology” (1). 
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one’s identity as a member of a community with its own language and discourse—and is instead 
fixated on what it means to be deaf—that is, to have no hearing or partial hearing. As Ladd 
remarks, “Deafhood is not…a ‘static’ medical condition like ‘deafness’. Instead, it represents a 
process—the struggle by each Deaf child, Deaf family and Deaf adult to explain to themselves 
and each other their own existence in the world” (3). The point in defining a Deaf identity is not 
to definitively or reductively assert what being Deaf means in its individual specificity, but 
rather, and quite simply, “[Deafhood] affirms the existence of a Deaf sense of being” (4). As 
Ladd relates, this common sense of being Deaf is reflected in a recurrent theme in Deaf 
discourse, one that “insists on the commonality between all Deaf people, no matter where they 
live” (59). And so, just as Vico looked upon the commonalities of the discursive commonplaces 
and traced them to an underlying sensory commonplace, Ladd carries out a similar project, 
connecting Deaf discourse with a shared sensory commonality or sensory commonplace amongst 
d/Deaf persons. 
This connection between Deaf discourse and the commonplaces is made more explicit in 
the work of rhetorical scholar Brenda Jo Brueggemann. In Deaf Subjects: Between Identities and 
Places Brueggemann sets out to write a “commonplace book on ‘the deaf subject’” (9). She 
envisions the various chapters as different topoi for inventing arguments regarding the place of 
the modern deaf subject. In the first chapter, for instance, she talks about a sensory technique or 
strategy that is endemic to her experience as someone who is deaf. She calls this think-eye, a way 
of making sense of the world that combines the personal, thinking subject and the ocular means 
by which that subject locates herself or himself in the world. Think-eye, I submit, is one of the 
d/Deaf poetic genera, a way of making sense of experience that discovers a d/Deaf place in the 
world, and thus is instrumental in bringing forth and translating knowledge situated in that place.  
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Think-eye, like all poetic genera, emerges from a sensory topos, and thus Brueggemann 
writes that, “deaf space is a visual space, an ‘eye’ space. It is also, I submit, an I-space. We still 
have a lot to learn from each ‘I’ and each ‘eye.’ Perspective (‘eye’) really matters; the personal 
(the ‘I’) experience really matters, as well” (24). This definition of “deaf space” as ‘eye/I’ space 
speaks to variances in the sensory commonplaces, i.e. to the ways in which the senses establish 
various sensory and semiotic relationships, and thus distinct enthymemes. For instance, think-eye 
can be seen to manifest itself in the ways in which visual cues inform communication between 
d/Deaf persons. Facial expressions, lip-reading, contextual awareness, and attention to hand 
gestures—either as reinforcing speech or more directly through sign language—all serve 
instrumental roles in Deaf discourse. Ladd, for instance, remarks that “Deaf people place huge 
cultural weight both on visually presented information and discussion, and on being able to 
observe and digest other Deaf people’s sign language…” (54). And this tends to be distinct from 
the kind of occularcentrism found in hearing discourse, especially in regards to practical, 
everyday experience.13 
And yet, despite the significance of d/Deaf topoi, Deaf history is pervaded by the hearing 
asserting the proper place for Deaf subjects. That place was seen as integrated, socially 
productive, vocal members of society, a belief that led educators to ban the teaching of sign 
language in 1880. These educators—none of whom were deaf—saw the oral practices in society 
as incontrovertible ways of making sense, thus substantiating the belief that deaf persons should 
be compelled to adopt speech and to refrain from developing languages that were more resonant 
with how d/Deaf persons themselves made and shared sense. The decision to ban sign language 
education had a profound impact on the place of d/Deaf persons—both in the sensory and 
                                                          
13 See also Deaf Gain: Raising the Stakes for Human Diversity, edited by H-Dirksen L. Bauman, Joseph J. Murray, in 
which deafness is considered not from the ableist perspective as a loss but from cognitive, linguistic, and cultural 
perspectives in which deafness is a creative and generative way of being and thinking.  
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discursive senses. As Carol Padden notes, “There are very few ‘places’ Deaf people can call their 
own. For most of their history in the United States, they have occupied spaces built by others and 
largely controlled by others” (169). There are two valences here: explicitly, Padden is referring 
to the institutional, recreational and social places in which Deaf persons may congregate, 
socialize, and converse, places that have often been created and administered by the hearing. But 
there is also the sense in which the sensory places of d/Deaf persons have also been built and 
controlled by others—namely, persons in positions of authority, such as teachers, instructors, law 
makers, medical professionals, and laypersons, who have authorized themselves to define the 
sensory place of the d/Deaf as a diminutive or lesser variation of the (supposedly) proper or 
common place of the hearing. In effect, these decisions have ensured that not only is d/Deaf 
experience uncommon or unfamiliar to the rest of society, it is in a sense uncommon even to deaf 
persons themselves, who have been denied the right to explore their own place in the world. 
However, now that sign language has re-entered schools Deaf culture is expanding and so are the 
conversations and stories surrounding d/Deaf experience. 
 
Uncommon Sense 
At this point it is worth asking and clearly answering: what is at risk when poetic genera, 
such as think-eye, are socially uncommon or unfamiliar? Put differently, what is at stake when 
various ways of making sense remain at the margins of popular discourse and culture? Well, if 
the poetic genera are the means by which we make sense of not only our own experiences but 
those other persons, then the risk is a perpetuation of misunderstandings and miscommunications 
between persons, communities, and cultures. The stakes are continued lapses in justice, 
omissions in the creation and enforcement of policies and laws intended to recognize the 
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practical realities various people face. This is especially pressing in regards to persons with 
disabilities. As disability scholar Tobin Siebers writes, “the most urgent issue for disability 
studies is the political struggle of people with disabilities, and this struggle requires realistic 
conceptions of the disabled body” (“Disability in Theory” 180). Engaging with various kinds of 
poetic genera, I suggest, brings us closer to the realism of bodies, to their common places. Think-
eye for instance can bring us closer to the practical, lived experiences of d/Deaf persons. 
Similarly, the notion of crip time (Gill; Zola) can bring us closer to the lived experiences of 
persons with disabilities, where crip time reflects the temporality experienced by those who 
require additional time to move from one location to the next or to navigate ableist barriers.14 
While these poetic genera are familiar to those who use them in their everyday lives they remain 
outside of popular discourse, constraining thought and action to speculation and preconceived 
biases. 
Thus, there is a need to look critically at normate culture and the limitations it imposes 
over what we can and should know about ourselves and each other. Normate culture puts at the 
centre of all discourse the common ways of making sense of able-
bodied/masculine/white/heterosexual experience. Faith in the centrality and supremacy of these 
sense-making techniques and practices precludes the recognition of the practical experiences of 
those marginalized by normalcy. For example, in the essay “Disabling Attitudes,” Elizabeth F. 
Emens remarks on the influence of generally accepted opinions on legal interpretations of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Emens writes that “When the ADA eventually reached 
the courts, it encountered prevailing societal attitudes towards disability. Judges interpreted it 
more narrowly than the advocates expected. Because the law was out ahead of common sense, 
                                                          
14 Additionally, Alison Kafer expands this conversation on crip temporality in Feminist, Queer, Crip. 
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the courts did what they often do in such moments: they narrowed the law to better fit their 
common sense” (Emens “Disabling Attitudes” 43). Emens goes on to ask, 
So what is that common sense about disability? It is commonly assumed that disability is 
unfortunate, even tragic, and at the same time very costly for employers and for society. 
Under this view, disability should be avoided at most costs and accommodated only at a 
very limited cost. There is little sense that disability can have benefits (to the person with 
the disability or those around her), or that accommodations benefit more than the 
individual who requests them. Disability is, in this view, something we should just keep 
hoping will eventually go away if science and medicine get good enough to cure or 
eliminate it. In the meantime, this common sense might say, ‘we’ (the nondisabled 
people, or sometimes just ‘people’) should be good enough, moral enough, to do some 
things to help disabled people, but not too much, lest we drag down society or the 
economy. (43) 
What Emens identifies here are the ways in which disability is approached not as a collection of 
diverse and unique experiences, each deserving of its own consideration, but rather disability is 
understood only insofar as it comports with what is already known about persons with 
disabilities from a normative perspective. Here it could be said that by being unfamiliar with the 
poetic genera of persons with disabilities those tasked with upholding their rights are incapable 
of making sense of the law. 
Rod Michalko approaches this issue in The Difference Disability Makes. There he sets 
out to interrogate what disability means—i.e. what difference it makes—in Western culture and 
how that meaning is predetermined by normative biases. Throughout the text he draws on his 
own experience of being blind and how it is often ‘seen’: “while we [sighted and blind] see 
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things differently, I am wrong and ‘they’ are right. The difference our difference makes is that I 
am different. Even though ‘we’ claim to see differently from one another, only my difference 
counts as such” (93). He goes on to identify the ‘difference-of-disability’ which “makes no 
difference to the world of the normal” (98), writing that  
The ‘view’ from blindness or from a wheelchair makes no difference since it has no 
value. The ‘sighted world’ sees blindness as distortion and the ‘walking world’ sees 
wheelchair use as confinement. Both are seen as misfortune. Blindness is understood as 
‘impotence’ with respect to ‘normal seeing’ and the same holds true for wheelchair use 
with respect to ‘normal walking.’ (98) 
Ultimately, this leads disability to count only as a “useless-difference” (99). However, if the 
everyday practices and tactics of those who are blind or who use wheelchairs were to become 
well-known and commonplace in the discursive sense, then those who see or who walk would 
have the means to ascertain how a difference makes a meaningful, practical difference. This 
relates back to common sense as a means of forging enthymemes between sensations, thoughts, 
and ideas. What difference a difference makes is first and foremost a matter of experience; in 
order to share the ways in which bodies are situated in the world differently, we require ways of 
supplying those differences in accordance with the situation of another. So long as normate 
culture is indifferent to the difference disability makes, there is little opportunity for meaningful 
change. That said, the poetic genera are persuasive and they have the effect of dis-placing the 
normate from his supposedly central location in culture. In the following section I turn to another 





In the essay “Autism and Culture” Joseph N. Straus sets out to “understand autism as a 
way of being in the world, a world-view enshrined in a culture…” (467). At the centre of his 
essay is the notion of an “autistic sensibility,” that is “a distinctly autistic cognitive style and 
creative imagination” (467). What I want to explore in this section is the idea that an autistic 
sensibility constitutes an autistic common sense. Following Vico, common sense is that faculty 
by which we “hew out topics” and discover therein poetic genera or ways of making sense. Thus, 
when Paul Heilker and Melanie Yergeau refer to the commonplaces or topoi of autists (“Autism 
and Rhetoric”), I want to think of these as sensory commonplaces. And when Straus goes on to 
define several traits common to autistic experience, I want to conceive of these as autistic poetic 
genera.  
In their essay “Autism and Rhetoric” Heilker and Yergeau put forward the notion that 
autism constitutes its own rhetoric and thus autists possess their own commonplaces. Here both 
authors are drawing from personal experience. Yergeau is herself autistic, while Heilker’s son is 
autistic. For her part, Yergeau talks about “my commonplaces—repetitive hand movements, 
rocking, literal interpretation, brazen honesty, long silences, long monologues, variations in 
voice modulation—each its own reaction, or a potentially autistic argument, to a discrete set of 
circumstances” (488). Heilker offers a different perspective, relating that he has gained a better 
understanding of his son through attending to his commonplaces:  
When he returns to his obsessive topics of interest, as people on the spectrum tend to do, 
talking about America’s Funniest Videos, homestarrunner.com, or SpongeBob 
SquarePants, for instance, understanding autism as a rhetoric lets me see that he is 
returning to his favorite inventive universes, that he wants to share topoi in those 
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universes which he continues to find valuable over long stretches of time, that bear 
repeated usage. (488) 
These topoi, I suggest, reflect unique sensory commonplaces that norms and conventions 
regarding the body and mind have historically disregarded or disparaged. In a manner of 
speaking, whereas traditional humanist inquiry sought to discover in the commonplace of the 
human a proper or refined way of thinking and knowing—invention for Vico is the “art of 
regulating well the primary operation of our mind by noting the commonplaces” (166)—Yergeau 
and Heilker demonstrate that by recognizing the topoi of autists as distinct but equally as 
meaningful we can come to understand how the mind operates outside of the narrow confines of 
normalcy.  
What, then, might be considered autistic poetic genera? In the aforementioned essay, 
Straus identifies several autistic traits. He remarks that these traits “can be found operating…in 
the daily lives of people with autism, what I think of as the culture of the everyday” (476). That 
is to say, in the commonplaces of autists. He arrived at such traits by studying autistic high-
culture—that is, the writing, art, and music of autists—and he names them local coherence, fixity 
of focus, and private meanings.  These traits, I submit, are autistic poetic genera, various ways of 
bringing into being an autistic reality or world view. Understanding these poetic genera can help 
neurotypicals understand how “[a]utism…colours every experience, every sensation, perception, 
thought, emotion, and encounter, every aspect of existence” (Sinclair Loud Hands). In 
connecting the concept of poetic genera with autistic traits it can be seen how each trait 
influences how sensory enthymemes are formed, thus guiding what sensations are brought forth 
or supplied by the mind in completing or filling in perception.  
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For instance, in terms of local coherence, Straus describes a process in which “[o]bjects 
are apprehended in their full discrete and concrete individuality rather than as members or 
representatives of a larger subsuming abstract category” (467). Local coherence is distinct from 
the more neurotypical style of ‘global’ coherence in that it marks “a refusal to subsume 
perceptions into a hierarchy” (468). Here Straus draws evidence from the memoirs of Temple 
Grandin and Gunilla Gerland. Grandin, for instance, writes that,  
Unlike those of most people, my thoughts move from video-like, specific images to 
generalization and concepts. For example, my concept of dogs is inextricably linked to 
every dog I've ever known. It's as if I have a card catalog of dogs I have seen, complete 
with pictures, which continually grows as I add more examples to my video library…My 
memories usually appear in my imagination in strict chronological order, and the images 
I visualize are always specific. There is not a generic, generalized Great Dane. (Grandin 
Thinking in Pictures 11).  
For Grandin there is an order to her thoughts that differs from that of neurotypicals. Whereas 
neurotypicals discover or invent hierarchies amongst perceptions and memories, such that an 
individual object might bring forth the notion of its general type, Grandin indicates that time and 
specific instances constitute the formative means of relating one thing to another.  
The second tactic Straus identifies is what he refers to as fixity of focus, likening it to 
what Oliver Sacks calls the “gift for mimesis” (241) that many autists possess. Fixity of focus 
reflects the ways in which autists can remember and recall minute details and distant memories 
with great clarity and precision. Straus remarks that this trait translates into the “autistic 
cognitive and artistic style [which] often involve[s] doing one single thing with great intensity, 
again and again” (468). Fixity of focus indicates what Heilker noted above as his son’s unique 
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topics of interest, places that he returns to repeatedly. Fixity of focus can be seen to forge strong 
relationships between various sensations and signs, such that the recollection of one things 
readily brings forth many others. In contrast, neurotypicals seem to forge weaker bonds, and thus 
they struggle to recall particular details. In fact, even in immediate sensory perception 
neurotypicals tend to prioritize certain aspects of the environment over others.  
Lastly, Straus singles out private meanings as a distinct trait of autistic experience. These 
private meanings refer to idiosyncratic associations made through experience that are meaningful 
for individuals but may not be as readily meaningful to others. Here Straus directs us to Kristina 
Chew and her remarks that, “Autistic language is a fractured idiom, its vocabulary is created 
from contextual and seemingly arbitrary associations of word and thing, and peculiar to its sole 
speaker alone…Autistic language users think metonymically, connecting and ordering concepts 
according to seemingly chance and arbitrary occurrences in an ‘autistic idiolect’” (qtd. on 469). 
Perhaps even more clearly than the previous traits, private meanings emphatically demonstrate 
that neurotypicals and autists differ in how they correlate the senses with one another. Whereas 
neurotypicals often rely on and assume relatively stable and common associations between 
sensations, words, and objects, autists exemplify that such commonalities are predicated on a 
narrow set of conventions.  While these conventions facilitate understanding between 
neurotypicals, they can also obscure meaningful differences as well. 
Taken together, these autistic traits or poetic genera indicate various ways of making 
sense of the world that while irreducible to the sensory experience of a normative, neurotypical 
individual, are nevertheless equally as meaningful and inventive. What’s more, Straus’s method 
of examining autistic culture art, including life writing by autists, indicates a means of sharing 
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poetic genera across bodies and neurologies. Such a method can be better understood by looking 
at the function of commonplace books within the history of invention.  
 
Commonplace Books 
So far I have described how common sense (koine aisthesis) creates a common sense of 
place in which we discover poetic genera—common or familiar ways of making sense. We use 
our poetic genera to bring forth knowledge of our place in the world. I based this epistemology 
on dissensus, meaning that we sense or feel apart from one another. Dissensus encourages us to 
recognize that knowledge is situated in a plurality of sensory and embodied places, meaning that 
there are distinct poetic genera.  What I want to turn to now is how we share such poetic genera 
through media. In fact, a precedent already exists here in the concept of the commonplace book. 
Conventionally, commonplace books contained various phrases, aphorisms, metaphors, 
allegories, and fables under different headings. By studying these texts readers developed their 
capacity to invent arguments on certain themes or issues. The commonplace book, in other 
words, was a heuristic for invention; a text for training the mind to discover knowledge of a 
particular topic or place (topos). What I put forward here, and elaborate on throughout the 
remainder of this dissertation, is an expanded definition of the commonplace book, one that 
encompasses more contemporary multimodal media such that web pages, comics, films, and 
videogames, among other forms of media, can be thought of as heuristics for embodied 
invention.  
At the core of this expanded definition is the correlation scholars saw between text and 
world that the commonplace book captured. As Ann Moss relates, the commonplace book was, 
in its simplest form, an “information retrieval system” (53), one that facilitated the reader’s 
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capacity to invent arguments on a particular topic. But commonplace books aspired towards a 
much higher ideal. As Moss relates, the commonplace book can be seen to follow from the 
concept of the Book of Nature that emerged in the Middle Ages. The Book of Nature was a 
means of thinking of the natural world itself as a text, where all phenomena are signs to be read 
and interpreted (52). Moss goes on to note that,  
the commonplace book…make[s] rhetoric’s most cogent claim to be considered an 
adequate representation of the true nature of things.  Some, if not all proponents of 
commonplace books contended that the places, or heads, into which the books were 
divided were not at all arbitrary or conventional, but did indeed represent the ‘forms and 
rules of things deep-seated in nature.’ (54).  
What I want to suggest here is that commonplace books can be read as representations not of ‘the 
natural world’ per se but of particular embodied places in the world. The discoveries we make 
through commonplace books are various means of interpreting the world from particular 
positions or places. In fact, in the following chapters I go on to argue that with the emergence of 
media such as comics, films, hypertext, and videogames, our capacity to represent our 
commonplaces and thus share our potentially unique poetic genera have grown exponentially. 
What I want to do in the remainder of this chapter is describe in general terms how 
commonplace texts facilitate our capacity to share poetic genera and thus to invent or discover 
knowledges situated in the experiences of other persons, communities, and cultures. This begins 
by recognizing the relationship between poetic genera and rhetoric.   
Rhetoric, I suggest, is a poetic phenomenon in that it is a way of bringing forth meaning 
through signs—the word poiesis means ‘to make or bring forth.’ In thinking of rhetoric as poetic 
I have in mind C.S. Peirce’s notion of speculative rhetoric. In the essay “Ideas Stray and Stolen” 
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Peirce introduces speculative rhetoric as a form of semiotic inquiry into the sciences. Speculative 
rhetoric seeks to “ascertain the laws by which in every scientific intelligence one sign gives birth 
to another, and especially one thought brings forth another” (CP, 2.229). While Peirce has a very 
specific context in mind here, his phrasing aptly captures the enthymematic and poetic quality 
that rhetoric plays in our everyday lives. For instance, the differences between autistic rhetoric 
and neurotypical rhetoric could be characterized as differences between the ways in which signs 
and thoughts supply or bring forth one another in accordance with the neurology of the embodied 
subject. In this way when a rhetor tailors an argument to the common associations of their 
audience, they engage in a form of speculative rhetoric.15 That is to say, rhetors must speculate 
about the laws or rules by which their words, sounds, images, gestures, etc. bring forth or supply 
different meanings for different audiences and audience members. In fact, this can be pushed 
even further here by noting that such an understanding of rhetoric can also refer to the way that 
one sense brings forth another. As noted above, common sense (koine aisthesis) forges common 
relationships between the senses; when a related sensation is implied but absent the mind 
supplies that sense. In this way perception itself has a rhetorical and enthymematic quality to it; 
to speculate about the rhetoric of another is, thus, to speculate about how distinctly embodied 
subjects bring forth sensations, thoughts, and signs that create a common or familiar sense of 
place in the world.  
A commonplace text then, regardless of its medium, seeks to capture some aspect of that 
common sense of place such that the implied but absent sensation, thought, or sign that 
completes perception of the mediated representation is analogous to the implied but absent 
                                                          




sensation, thought, or sign that completes the embodied subject’s perception of the world.16 In 
this way we can understand commonplace texts as works of mimesis. In Mimesis: The 
Representation of Reality in Western Literature Erich Auberbach refers to the titular concept as 
the “[i]mitation of reality” which is also the “imitation of the sensory experience of life on earth” 
(191). As already noted, sensory experience is not merely the perception of individual sensations 
but a poetic and generative process where common sense (koine aisthesis) brings forth or 
supplies that which fills in or completes experience. Mimesis, then, seeks to capture not a 
definitive, accurate depiction of the world (whatever that might be) but the ways in which a 
representation brings forth a particular situation in the world. Within this process rhetoric is that 
which coordinates language with our ways of bringing forth (i.e. our poetic genera) such that our 
representations come to be mimetic, persuasive, and in a sense, real. 
However, by introducing Peirce here we not only add a poetic understanding of rhetoric, 
but a theory of signs as well. In semiotics a sign is any discrete unit of meaning, such as a 
thought, an idea, a gesture, an image, a sound, etc. Semioticians hold that signs have meaning not 
in and of themselves but because they relate to other signs. For Peirce, the founder of semiotics, 
the relationships between signs begin in the body and develop through embodied experience. For 
instance, we witness cars stopping at a traffic light and discover that a red light means stop. 
Peirce held this to be a rhetorical relationship, insofar as rhetoric refers to the process by which 
“one sign gives birth to another, and especially one thought brings forth another” (CP, 2.229). 
Subsequently, the next time we approach an intersection and see a red light it brings forth or 
                                                          
16 For instance, while watching a cartoon hearing individuals supply the implied but absent relationship between 
the audible voices and the indistinct movement of a character’s lips. Thus, despite the fact that voices rarely 
coincide with vocal animations, the mind unifies these sensations, creating a cohesive experience. In contrast, for 
those who are deaf or hard-of-hearing reading the lips of the animated characters often fail to bring forth or 
supply the words they are speaking. Artists who wish to have accessible animations, be them in cartoons, CGI 
films, or videogames, would do well to keep these various relationships in mind. 
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supplies the idea of stopping. In fact, like Vico and his quest for universal sensory enthymemes, 
Peirce was interested in ascertaining common or fundamental relationships between signs. He 
conceived of his aforementioned speculative rhetoric as part of an inquiry into how  
every picture, diagram, natural cry, pointing finger, wink, knot in one’s handkerchief, 
memory, dream, fancy, concept, indication, token, symptom, letter, numeral, word, 
sentence, chapter, book, library, and in short whatever, be it in the physical universe, be it 
in the world of thought, that, whatever embodying an idea of any kind (and permit us 
throughout to use this word to cover purposes and feelings), or being connected with 
some existing object, or referring to future events through a general rule, causes 
something else…to be determined to a corresponding relation to the same idea, existing 
thing, or law. (“Ideas, Stray or Stolen, about Scientific Writing” EP 2:23, 326). 
This notion of laws or rules governing the relationships between signs can be seen as the very 
ambition of rhetorical invention, which, generally speaking, seeks to discover knowledge 
through common or familiar relationships. Similarly, Moss described the commonplace book as 
that which seeks to “represent the ‘forms and rules of things deep-seated in nature’” (54).  
However, unlike Vico, Peirce does not rely on the faculty of common sense for the origin 
of these relationships. Rather, he proposed the notion of a semiotic trivium. In medieval 
philosophy the trivium referred to a scholastic method for discovering knowledge through the 
senses; it is composed of grammar, logic, and rhetoric. In the traditional understanding of the 
trivium grammar refers to “the art of inventing symbols and combining them to express 
thought”; logic refers to “the art of thinking”; and rhetoric “is the art of communicating thought 
from one mind to another” (Joseph 3). With these historical antecedents in mind, Peirce provides 
a similar account with his semiotic trivium, in which he proposes a physiological grammar that 
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first differentiates signs from one another, a logic that correlates signs with the objects to which 
they refer, and a rhetoric that describes how signs bring forth or supply one another. By basing 
rhetoric in physiology Peirce was recognizing the body’s influence over how sensations, signs, 
and thoughts come to be related to one another. In this way the semiotic trivium is similar to 
common sense but unlike Aristotle’s account of koine aisthesis where common sense supplies 
sensations that unify or complete one’s perception of the world, the semiotic trivium constitutes 
a process by which the mind brings forth signs in order to complete a particular representation of 
the world. In this process rhetoric, as a bodily and sensory phenomenon, is that which guides our 
representations such that they cohere with our embodied experience.   
What Peirce’s poetic rhetoric establishes is that in sharing rhetorics, we are, in fact, 
sharing the various ways in which we represent reality. A commonplace book, then, as an 
“adequate representation of the true nature of things” (54), is a text that shows in various ways 
how a particular rhetoric can be used to construct a true or accurate representation of the world. 
This can be related to Vico’s claim that the poetic genera give rise to “true poetic allegories” (75) 
or ‘true stories’ (verra narratio) (311). A commonplace book could be thought of as a collection 
of these ‘true stories’ from a particular subject on various topics. But in what way are these 
stories true? In Vico’s philosophy truth has a praxical connotation to it, in that he argues that 
doing (factum) or making (poiesis) is the basis of knowing; to make (sense of) something is to 
truly understand it. However, the notion of sensus communis leads Vico to think of the true 
poetic allegories as common or shared stories for making sense of the world; they are true in the 
universal sense of the concept. Viewed in this way it would be conceivable to produce a 
commonplace book that transcribed the Book of Nature, such that it contained all of the ‘true 
stories’ of humankind.  
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But I want to approach commonplace books, and invention in general, from the premise 
of dissensus, meaning that the poetic genera are potentially uncommon or discrete and that ‘true 
stories’ vary between bodies, communities, and cultures. Put differently, because our bodies and 
senses differ, so too do our ways of making sense and these differences (or perhaps différances) 
are reflected in our stories. Thus, by true stories I do not mean universal, as this would entail a 
transcendental sensus, but rather true in the sense of strong objectivity—these stories are true 
because they describe a “limited location” (Haraway 583) and thus present their knowledge of 
the world as situated within that location. Furthermore, there could not be one comprehensive 
commonplace book but a plurality of books, each containing its own ‘true stories.’ This sets up 
the possibility that poetic genera, and the means for situating knowledges, are shared not through 
rote scholastic texts containing phrases, allegories, and fables, but as more diverse personal 
stories, as seen in diaries, memoirs, and autobiographies.17 Such collections of ‘true stories’ 
facilitate the discovery of poetic genera, the poetic practices or rhetorical techniques of their 
authors, just as Straus above derived numerous traits from the memoirs of autists.  
In thinking of commonplace books in this way I’m drawing inspiration from Michel de 
Certeau when he argues that stories record the various tactics endemic to a society. Tactics, in de 
Certeau’s usage, are various means of organizing the world in practical, productive ways; they 
appear in mundane activities, such as how we talk, read, move, walk, shop, and cook (xix). He 
goes on to write that the stories of particular communities or cultures “participate in the collation 
of these tactics” (23); they are “living museums of…tactics, the benchmarks of an 
                                                          
17 In fact, this relates to an existing sub-genre: the personal commonplace book. These texts were not unlike 
diaries or journals in which authors collected various personal discoveries on a range of topics. Notable personal 
commonplace books were written by the likes of John Milton and Thomas Jefferson. That said, I want to think of 
commonplace books more as descriptions of one’s common places (i.e. common experiences) and less like the 
tomes of facts and statements that typified the conventional commonplace book genres—Milton’s personal 




apprenticeship” (23). What I want to suggest here is that stories also record sensory and 
rhetorical tactics, i.e. poetic genera. The implication here is that in reading stories we are not 
only sharing tactics or “ways of operating” (30) but poetic genera or ways of thinking and 
making-sense. For instance, de Certeau argues that we can treat “the stylistic effects” of stories—
the “devices and ‘figures,’ alliterations, inversions and plays on words” (22)—as tactics, I would 
suggest that such styles reflect the kinds of rhetorics that the poetic genera give rise to.  
Consider, for instance, the poem “Apologia” by Jim Ferris. The text begins by stating 
that, “This poem/does not need/to march/across the page,” where each break indicates a point at 
which the words are offset from those that came before. In fact, the poem as a whole adopts a 
style that positions the words as continually cascading off and to the side. In this way the poem 
parallels Ferris’s own irregular gait. In the essay “The Enjambed Body” Ferris remarks that “If 
my meters are sprung, if my feet are uneven, if my path is irregular, that's just how I walk. And 
how I write.” This brings to mind de Certeau’s observation that, “Just as in literature one 
differentiates ‘styles’ or ways of writing, one can distinguish [tactics or] ‘ways of operating’—
ways of walking, reading, producing, speaking, etc.” (30). In “Apologia” Ferris utilizes the way 
that each step in his gait brings forth another to give shape to the way each word brings forth 
another—“This poem/is free/to lean/and limp/and lurch”—and in so doing he is demonstrating a 
poetic relationship between the body and language.  
At this point I want to bring this chapter to a close by raising the issue of normalcy in 
relation to commonplace books.  As Moss observes in her aforementioned discussion, 
commonplace books could be thought of as a means of recording and perpetuating various 
norms. This connection becomes clearer by noting that commonplace books were part of a 
pedagogy used to educate the ruling class. This leads Moss to ask,  
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Is their popularity within an education system serving a power élite (and serving it very 
ably) to be explained by the fact that [commonplace books] could be made to inhibit new 
thought? This was, perhaps, because they implied that every new text, every new 
discovery had to find a place in the corpus of received wisdom, so that, in effect, they 
contained the consensus, and even possibly connived with the doxae of the dominant 
political and social power structure. (57) 
Drawing from the preceding conversation, I want to build on this recognition by suggesting that 
such texts not only contained a consensus on social, cultural, or political topics, but on sensory 
ones as well. This is owing not only to the regnant cultural biases regarding the body and the 
mind but also to the media themselves insofar as commonplace books relied on the printed word 
which contains its own implications about the body and the senses. When this is paired with the 
inaccessibility of publishing methods to those outside of a certain socio-economic class, there are 
grounds for seeing invention as a form of knowledge discovery and translation that has 
historically been constrained and limited. In contrast, the contemporary media ecology in which 
publishing through the web is relatively accessible (though by no means universally so) and the 
modalities through which one can publish—visual, acoustic, haptic, tactile, and proprioceptive 
media are all prevalent or becoming so in Western culture—are significantly more diverse, then 
there is reason to believe that invention is perhaps poised for a resurgence.18  
Nevertheless, Moss’s observation should bring into even sharper focus the complications 
that accompany a normative, and normalized culture, one that limits the circulation of stories, 
representations, and rhetorics to that of the most ‘common’ or ‘normal’ subjects and their topics. 
This is especially pernicious given that rhetoric has, historically, privileged the ‘normal,’ able-
                                                          
18 In this respect, Gregory Ulmer’s approach to computational media as constituting a “new…logic of invention” 
(Heuretics 20) is particularly noteworthy. See Heuretics. 
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bodied subject. As Jay Dolmage writes, rhetoric has been “canonized…as a normate, 
normalizing force” (Dolmage 83). He notes that “efforts to define rhetoric have so often denied 
and denigrated the body” (Dolmage), in part, because the body needs to operate in a culturally 
idealized way in order for persuasion to function as anticipated. This normativity is especially 
apparent in the rhetorical canon of delivery: the means of persuasively and eloquently 
communicating one’s argument. For instance, the ability to speak is often considered a 
prerequisite for one to be proficient in rhetorical delivery, as is the capacity to control and direct 
one’s body for the purposes of presentation. Conversely, “those without the ability to speak and 
those without the ability to ‘control’ their bodies have been omitted from considerations of 
rhetorical capacity” (Dolmage 25). Similarly, Brueggemann has remarked that the emphasis on 
delivery in rhetoric has privileged a particular body while marginalizing those bodies that differ 
from that ideal. She writes, that, “Through its more than twenty-five-hundred-year history, 
rhetoric has never been particularly friendly to ‘disabled,’ ‘ deformed,’ ‘deaf,’ or ‘mute’ people, 
the ‘less than perfect’ in voice, expression, or stance” (“Delivering Disability, Willing Speech” 
18). She looks to the beginnings of rhetoric, noting the start of a “historical march of rhetoric's 
descriptions and prescriptions for the canon of delivery, the performance of a speaker, and the 
normalization of speaker's bodies” (18).  
In focusing on commonplace texts I want to critique not so much limited conceptions of 
delivery—the fifth canon of rhetoric—but invention—the first canon of rhetoric. What I want to 
suggest here is that just as Moss sees the lack of diversity in commonplace books as “inhibit[ing] 
new thought[s]” (57),the lack of diversity in popular media and discourse more broadly inhibits 
our ability to make sense of experience outside of an able-bodied, masculine, heterosexual way 
of being. Consider, for instance, Hélène Cixous’ “Laugh of the Medusa” in which she describes 
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the constraint exerted by a pervasively masculine discourse. She writes that, “Nearly the entire 
history of writing is confounded with the history of reason…[and] it has been one with the 
phallocentric tradition” (879). In contrast, she puts forward the notion of écriture feminine—a 
form of writing that reproduces the feminine body and difference in language. In a manner of 
speaking écriture feminine is a kind of feminine mimesis, a way of representing the sensory 
experience of women. Cixous describes écriture feminine as a way of “bring[ing] women to their 
senses and to their meaning in history” (875-6) for “By writing her self, woman will return to the 
body which has been more than confiscated from her” (880). What I want to suggest is that when 
Cixous tells her audience, “Write your self. Your body must be heard” (880) she is imploring 
women to listen to and express the way their bodies think and feel, to explore their poetic genera 
and to reproduce those ways of bringing forth in the rhetoric of the language. 
Indeed, écriture feminine gestures towards a larger point here; namely, the need to foster 
the discovery and exchange of all forms of rhetoric. By rhetoric here I do not mean Aristotle’s 
notion of the available means of persuasion, but rhetoric as that poetic process whereby 
sensations, thoughts, or signs bring forth or supply one another in creating a unified sense of 
place. In this way there is a correlation to be drawn between the plurality and diversity of 
rhetorics circulating within a culture and the capacity for members of that culture to locate or 
situate one another. In this way a diminished quantity of rhetorics shares many of the same 
complications that accompany what Wayne Booth refers to as a diminished quality of rhetoric: 
The quality of our lives, especially the ethical and communal quality, depends to an 
astonishing degree on the quality of our rhetoric…Unless we pay more attention to 
improving our communication at all levels of life, unless we study more carefully the 
rhetorical strategies we all depend on, consciously, unconsciously, or subconsciously, we 
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will continue to succumb to unnecessary violence, to loss of potential friends, and to the 
decay of community. (xxii) 
What I have been arguing throughout this chapter is that there are distinct kinds of rhetorical 
strategies, various tactics or poetic genera that are inherent to our own embodied places in the 
world. This can be seen in the breadth of intersecting rhetorics, a short list of which might 
include feminist rhetoric (Koss and Griffin), African American rhetoric (Atwater), autistic 
rhetoric (Heilker & Yergeau), d/Deaf rhetoric (Brueggemann), mental disability rhetoric (Price), 
and queer rhetoric (Morrison; Brand). Through commonplace texts, our own personal ‘true 
stories,’ we share these rhetorics with one another and in so doing we share the means of 
translating that which is uncommon or unfamiliar to others into something that makes sense. In 
the following chapters I delve into these commonplace texts, examining how authors are using 





Chapter Two: Commonplace Comic Books 
 
Last chapter I put forward the notion of embodied invention, a means of translating 
knowledges between bodies, communities, and cultures. I described embodied invention as 
beginning with common sense (koine aisthesis) which creates a common sense of place or a 
sensory commonplace. Within our sensory commonplaces we discover poetic genera—common 
or familiar ways of making sense. We use poetic genera to make or bring forth knowledge of our 
place in the world. I based this epistemology on dissensus, meaning that we sense or feel apart 
from one another. Dissensus encourages us to recognize that knowledge is situated in a plurality 
of sensory places, meaning that there are distinct poetic genera or various ways of bringing forth 
knowledge. Thus, while our personal ways of making sense are given to us through our own 
common sensory experience, the poetic genera of others must be invented or discovered through 
language, art, and rhetoric. This set up the notion of commonplace texts as a means of sharing 
poetic genera. Commonplace texts, I suggested, are a means of representing our commonplaces; 
they foster the discovery of poetic genera located in various positions or places in the world.  
In this chapter I want to focus on a particular kind of commonplace text, what I call the 
commonplace comic book. In defining this genre I want to make two key alterations to the 
conventional sense of a commonplace book. The first is that while commonplace books typically 
contain various phrases, aphorisms, metaphors, allegories, and fables, I want to think of 
autobiographies and memoirs as constituting their own personal commonplace books. The 
second change I want to suggest is that commonplace texts need not be restricted to print. In fact, 
because dissensus refers to differences not just in language but in perception and experience as 
well, I want to look at a variety of multimodal media, including comics, as texts that provide 
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rhetorical instruction through a plurality of semiotic modes. This follows from the recognition 
that while classical invention encouraged students to study the social commonplaces through the 
discursive arts of speech and writing, embodied invention entails studying the sensory 
commonplaces through the perceptual arts of poetry, photography, film, comics, and 
videogames. Commonplace comic books allow us to study the commonplaces of their authors as 
told through a multimodal medium, thereby fostering the discovery of various rhetorics and 
rhetorical techniques at work throughout and between the senses.  
In the following sections I outline my approach to media, multimodality, and rhetoric. I 
then go on to examine a particular medium, relating how comic books facilitate sharing poetic 
genera through multimodal rhetoric. I illustrate these arguments through two commonplace 
comic books—El Deafo an autobiography by Cece Bell and The Ride Together: A Brother and 
Sister’s Memoir of Autism in the Family by Paul Karasik and Judy Karasik—demonstrating how 
their use of d/Deaf rhetoric (Brueggemann) and autistic rhetoric (Heilker & Yergeau), 
respectively, facilitate the discovery of poetic genera. 
 
Media and Situated Practices 
In placing emphasis on multimodality and the role of media in fostering understanding 
across bodies and between cultures I am building on the work of the New London Group. This 
diverse collective of scholars espouses a new pedagogy founded on the notions of multiliteracy 
and multimodality (“Pedagogy of Multiliteracies”). They argue that “all meaning-making is 
multimodal” (81) and that our literacy in various modalities is instrumental in learning how to 
successfully navigate the contemporary multimedia world. The New London Group goes on to 
argue that these literacies facilitate our capacity to Design—a concept that reflects that “we are 
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both inheritors of patterns and conventions of meaning and at the same time active designers of 
meaning” (65). Design is a three-part process, beginning with Available Design—resources for 
meaning-making, such as grammars of semiotic systems and discursive conventions. Available 
Design enables Designing—semiotic activity that involves using Available Design to represent 
some aspect of the world. As the New London Group note, “Designing transforms knowledge in 
producing new constructions and representations of reality” (76). The culmination of this process 
is the Redesigned, which reflects those newly constructed representations of reality; the 
Redesigned provides additional resources for Designing, such that this process is both iterative 
and generative.  
There are a number of connections here between Design and embodied invention that are 
worth drawing out. This begins with a shared objective between the two projects. As the New 
London Group states, “The challenge is to make space available so that different lifeworlds—
spaces for community life where local and specific meanings can be made—can flourish.” (70). 
Lifeworlds, in this context, could be considered analogous to those commonplaces in which 
‘local meanings’ or common sensory and semiotic relationships inhere. In turn, Available Design 
can be thought of as the poetic genera that are endemic to our commonplaces. In this way the 
poetic genera are similar to what the New London Group’s call Situated Practice, which “draws 
on the experience of meaning-making in lifeworlds, the public realm, and workplaces” (65). If 
Available Design varies between bodies, communities, and cultures, then so too does Situated 
Practice. Embodied invention describes that process by which we discover and exchange these 
practices situated in our various commonplaces. When we employ these practices we engage in a 
form of Designing that transforms knowledges situated in various bodies and places thereby 
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“producing new constructions and representations of reality” (76) that are themselves situated 
perspectives on the world.  
Embodied invention ascribes to media the role of sharing these situated and multimodal 
practices, a process that allows us to invent or discover knowledges situated in various contexts 
or places. In fact, this can be drawn out further. As the New London Group remarks, 
human knowledge, when it is applicable to practice, is primarily situated in sociocultural 
settings and heavily contextualized in specific knowledge domains and practices. Such 
knowledge is inextricably tied to the ability to recognize and act on patterns of data and 
experience, a process that is acquired only through experience, since the requisite patterns 
are often heavily tied and adjusted to context, and are, very often, subtle and complex 
enough that no one can fully and usefully describe or explicate them. (84) 
Mediated representations of the commonplaces—i.e. commonplace texts—provide these 
contexts, these situations or places in which the subtle complexities of experience can be 
discovered, providing audiences with new perspectives on the world. 
In this regard it is worth connecting the New London Group’s notion of Situated Practice 
with Haraway’s work on situated knowledges. Using vision as a metaphor for limited, partial 
perspectives, Haraway argues that knowledge is inherently positional—that is to say, knowledge 
describes and is characterized by a particular location or situation in the world that shapes and is 
shaped by the practices of those who occupy such positions or standpoints.19 Haraway notes, for 
instance, that “Positioning is…the key practice in grounding knowledge organized around the 
imagery of vision, and much Western scientific and philosophic discourse is organized in this 
way. Positioning implies responsibility for our enabling practices” (Haraway 587). These 
                                                          
19 This is echoed in the multiliteracies manifesto when the authors write: “Our view of mind, society, and learning 
is based on the assumption that the human mind is embodied, situated, and social. That is, human knowledge is 
initially developed not as ‘general and abstract,’ but as embedded in social, cultural, and material contexts” (82). 
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connections between positioning, perspective, and responsibility are key here as they 
demonstrate that the movement of situated knowledges relies on familiarity and facility with 
various situating practices. As Haraway notes, “Struggles over what will count as rational 
accounts of the world are struggles over how to see” (Haraway 587, emphasis in original). In a 
manner of speaking, our capacity to perceive the truth is contingent on the various ways we’ve 
learned how to perceive, i.e. the various practices that we have discovered that expand “what 
counts as a rational account of the world” (587), both for ourselves and others. In fact, Haraway 
goes so far as to suggest a kind of topology of practices: “Boundaries are drawn by mapping 
practices…” (595). Similarly, the boundaries of our commonplaces can be drawn by mapping 
our everyday practices, i.e. our various sensory and semiotic tactics, or simply our poetic genera. 
These practices are then shared across bodies, communities, and cultures by representing our 
commonplaces. 
But Haraway adds a particularly crucial observation to this conversation: namely, that 
practices are enabled or disabled in accordance with the distribution of power and privilege 
across social, cultural, political, and technological dimensions. Thus, when the practices of some 
subjects and communities are socially and culturally more common or familiar than others—as 
are the practices of the able-bodied, white, heterosexual, and/or masculine subjects—that 
subject’s account of the world is more readily perceived as rational, legitimate, and, ultimately, 
truthful. Furthermore, given that these practices draw on sensory and semiotic resources endemic 
to the subject’s position (i.e. Available Design) their cultural prevalence facilitates the re-
construction and re-presentation of reality as experienced by a normative individual. Thus, as the 
New London Group notes, the challenge is to open up the exchange of practices and knowledges 
between situations, and as Haraway emphasizes this needs to take place by recognizing those 
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systems that have historically and continue to inhibit the exchange of marginalized practices 
while facilitating the movement of normative practices.  
 
Inventing Phenomena 
With these formative observations on multimodality and situated practices in mind, I’d 
like to look specifically at how media exchange such practices through blending phenomenology 
with rhetoric. While there are a number of ways to broach this subject I want to pick up on an 
observation made by Haraway in her aforementioned essay. “Situated Knowledges” opens with 
Haraway setting the stage for a conversation on objectivity, knowledge, and science. In doing so 
she draws attention to the social constructionist critique of scientific objectivity as being more 
rhetorical than objective:  
…social constructionists might maintain that the ideological doctrine of scientific method 
and all the philosophical verbiage about epistemology were cooked up to distract our 
attention from getting to know the world effectively by practicing the sciences. From this 
point of view, science…is rhetoric, a series of efforts to persuade relevant social actors 
that one's manufactured knowledge is a route to a desired form of very objective power. 
(577) 
 She goes on to note that from such a perspective “artifacts and facts are parts of the powerful art 
of rhetoric” (577) and that “[p]ractice is persuasion” (577). Ultimately, this critique “insist[s] on 
the rhetorical nature of truth, including scientific truth” (577).  
While rhetoric here is meant to function pejoratively, scholars such as Aristotle, 
Quintilian, and Vico have argued earnestly regarding the rhetorical nature of truth. In terms of 
Vico, his maxim—‘the true and the made are interchangeable’ (verum et factum convertuntur)—
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attests to the notion that practice is persuasion if only because the truth is praxical—which is to 
say, the truth ‘makes sense.’ In this way poetic genera or situated practices reflect that meaning-
making and sense-making are also truth-making and that these process are themselves deeply 
persuasive. Thus, as John D. Schaeffer observes, “…Vico conceives [of] the mind as rhetorically 
situated in an existential way” (164). Rhetoric, at least to a certain degree, is ontological and 
phenomenological as well as epistemological. So while the truth is rhetorical, rhetoric is also 
instrumental in conveying truths.  
Rhetoric becomes problematic when we fail to recognize that different minds (and 
bodies) are rhetorically situated in different ways. In other words, it is important to recognize the 
situatedness not only of practices and knowledges but bodies and rhetorics as well. Rhetoric, in 
its poetic form, refers to that process whereby sensations, thoughts, or signs bring forth or supply 
one another in creating a unified sense of place. Media, I want to suggest, have the capacity to 
represent these places and thus foster the discovery of situated practices, knowledges, and 
rhetorics. This is accomplished, in part, because media are capable of reproducing everyday 
phenomena located in various rhetorical situations. In this way I conceive of media as 
phenomenotechniques.   
The concept of phenomenotechniques comes from Gaston Bachelard20 who deploys the 
term in the context of the sciences, arguing that scientific instruments are “materialized theories” 
(qtd. in “Instrument as Embodied Theory” 377) that create the phenomena they seek to discover. 
As Bachelard notes, “new phenomena are not simply found, but invented, that is, thoroughly 
constructed” (qtd. in “Gaston Bachelard and the Notion of ‘Phenomenotechnique’” 315). 
Bachelard’s point here is that the discourse that precedes the invention anticipates and gives 
                                                          
20 Much of Bachelard’s work on phenomenotechniques has yet to be translated into English. In this respect “Gaston 
Bachelard and the Notion of ‘Phenomenotechnique’” by Hans-Jörg Rheinberger offers a succinct summary and 
translation of key passages. 
61 
 
shape to the discovery itself. To provide a contemporary example, it could be said that the idea 
of the Higgs-Boson led to the invention of the Large Hadron Collider, an instrument that 
materializes the theoretical particle such that it can be ‘discovered’ in reality. In naming 
scientific instruments phenomenotechniques Bachelard does not mean the term pejoratively; 
rather, phenomenotechniques are a means of realizing some aspect of reality that human 
perception alone cannot realize.  
Once again I want to engage in an act of misprision here and creatively misinterpret the 
concept of the phenomenotechnique as referring to media in general. Television, film, radio, 
poetry, comics, videogames—all are phenomenotechniques in which designers and audiences 
collaborate to invent various phenomena. But whereas scientific phenomenotechniques set out to 
discover phenomena outside of the realm of human perception (i.e. outside of the collective 
human sensory topos), media help us invent phenomena within and across bodies, communities, 
and cultures (i.e. within various sensory, social, and cultural topoi). That is to say, television 
shows, comic books, and videogames, as cultural artifacts embedded in the senses and 
sensibilities of various social groups, foster embodied invention—the discovery of knowledges 
rooted in various sensory and semiotic places. When such media are autobiographical and 
mimetic—where mimesis is the “imitation of the sensory experience of life on earth” (Auerbach 
191)—they capture in the process that rhetoric that grounds perception and knowledge in one’s 
situation or place in the world. Thus, when Bachelard notes that with scientific instruments, 
“phenomena must…be carefully selected, filtered and purified” (qtd. in “Instrument as 
Embodied Theory” 377), there is a similar selection process in autobiographical mediations 
where various phenomena are selected and filtered in accordance with the most salient aspects of 
an author’s commonplace experiences.  
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Treating media as phenomenotechniques addresses an outstanding question facing any 
theory of communication founded on dissensus—namely, how do we discover knowledges and 
practices situated in the experiences of other human beings if we do not share a common or 
shared means of perceiving and knowing? The answer is through various forms of mediation, 
each of which demonstrate that “new phenomena are not simply found, but invented, that is, 
thoroughly constructed” (qtd. in “Gaston Bachelard and the Notion of ‘Phenomenotechnique’” 
315).  From this perspective the audience is, first and foremost, in a position of deferral as they 
collaborate with the mediation in order to construct various places in which different phenomena 
manifest themselves. But whereas in the sciences “instruments are just materialized theories” 
(Bachelard qtd. in “Instrument as Embodied Theory” 377), mediations of the commonplaces are 
materialized poetic rhetorics—practical theories of how one sense, thought, or sign brings forth 
or supplies another. In engaging with such mediations audiences learn how such rhetorics can 
help situate knowledges and practices. As Haraway notes, “Technologies are skilled practices” 
(Haraway 587).21 That is to say, the medium itself is a practice which assists in the reproduction 
of phenomena.  
Viewed in this way the act of engaging with a mediation is not unlike Roland Barthes 
description of reading a text. Barthes refers to the act of reading itself as a playful practice which 
seeks to reproduce the meaning of a text: “‘playing’ must be understood…in all its polysemy: the 
text itself plays…and the reader plays twice over, playing the Text as one plays a game, looking 
for a practice which re-produces it…” (Barthes 162). From the perspective of dissensus, the 
practice that reproduces the meaning of a text is one situated in various sensory, social, and 
cultural contexts; engaging with various mediations teaches us these practices and facilitates our 
capacity to reproduce phenomena endemic to various positions or places. Just how media do this 
                                                          
21 Like Bachelard, Haraway is speaking of scientific instruments here but the point aptly applies to all technologies. 
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is, I argue, an extension of that multisensory and enthymematic process enacted by common 




Last chapter I argued that rhetoric follows from the body and the senses. I based this 
claim in a misprision of common sense in which I creatively misread Aristotle’s definition of 
koine aisthesis or ‘common perception.’ For Aristotle, common sense binds senses to one 
another such that sensations come to invoke one another. I (mis)read this as a testament to the 
enthymematic quality of perception. For instance, Aristotle notes that a verbal enthymeme occurs 
when “if one of [the premises] is known, it does not have to be stated, as the hearer supplies it” 
(Rhetoric 1.2 1357a).  Common sense (koine aisthesis) operates on the same principle such that 
if a sensation is familiar to the observer it need not be perceived for the mind supplies it. In this 
way the perceiving mind fills in those implied but absent aspects of sensory perception in order 
to create a unified and persuasive experience of the world. Furthermore, this is a pre-linguistic 
process, one in which there is always-already a rhetorical and enthymematic character to the 
senses that persuade us of the legitimacy and veracity of our own embodied experiences. Media, 
I suggest, extend this process, putting common sense into play by prompting the mind to bring 
forth or supply sensory and semiotic information that unifies, closes, or completes perception 
from a particular perspective or position. 
In art and media theory this act of unifying perception is referred to as closure—that 
process by which a representation is closed or completed by the mind’s capacity to fill in implied 
but absent details. To refer to closure as multimodal is simply to emphasize the range of senses 
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and modalities that produce closure. By associating closure with common sense (koine aisthesis) 
I mean to demonstrate that 1) the same or similar enthymematic processes are at work in both 
mediated and unmediated experience and 2) that media extend the range of potential experiences 
we might have beyond our embodied and unmediated situations. From this perspective different 
ways of closing or completing perception can be treated as equivalent to different poetic 
rhetorics such that multimodal closure facilitates the dissemination of various ways of bringing 
forth situated knowledges and practices. After all, if closure involves implied but absent sensory 
and semiotic information, and if poetic rhetoric relates to the way that sensations, thoughts, and 
signs bring forth or supply one another, then multimodal closure can be used to draw forth 
particular sensations, thoughts, and signs, effectively instructing the audience in the ways in 
which the creator brings forth knowledge of their situation in the world. 
Perhaps the most provocative scholar on the subject of closure and media is Marshall 
McLuhan. McLuhan argued that each medium prompts its own form of closure in response to the 
unique sensory properties of the mediation. He defines the latter as the “structural impact” (SI) of 
the medium, which “refers to sensory impressions as they affect the beholder or audience” 
(Report on Project in Understanding New Media 25).22 These sensory impressions, in turn, prompt 
“subjective closure” (SC) which “concerns the effect of this impression as it is processed by the 
audience” (25). The distinction here is meant to highlight that the modalities employed by a 
medium (e.g. a primarily visual vs a primarily audile mode of communication) do not constitute 
the experience of a particular mediation—“The [sensory] impression is not the experience” (26). 
Rather, the various mediated modalities prompt the mind to add in or supply absent but implied 
modes of embodied experience. In this way all media can be treated as multimodal, whether they 
                                                          
22 Report on Project in Understanding New Media is the name of a commissioned report McLuhan wrote for the 
National Association of Educational Broadcasters in 1960. It is, in many ways, a more accessible expression of the 
ideas McLuhan would latter publish in his seminal Understanding Media.  
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explicitly (structural impact) or implicitly (subjective closure) invoke specific modalities. As 
McLuhan notes, “the SC of many visual presentations is not visual at all any more than the SC of 
radio’s SI is auditory” (26). For instance, when we see a character in a novel (SI) speaking in all 
capital letters we hear their voice speaking loudly (SC). And when we hear a familiar voice on 
the phone (SI) we see their face in our minds (SC).  
In this way media at once draw on the enthymematic quality of common sense (koine 
aisthesis) but also extend that quality beyond the limitations of unmediated experience by 
presenting audiences with novel situations, unexperienced (and in some cases un-experienceable) 
positions, perspectives, and circumstances. This, in turn, confers on media the capacity to 
enhance our capacity to understand ourselves and each other. To be clear, this is not an 
inherently emancipatory process—media can just as easily reinforce biases as deconstruct 
them—but it does indicate the potential for various forms of representation (i.e. poetry, music, 
film, radio, comics, videogames) to engage audiences with experiences and knowledges beyond 
those apparent in everyday experience, meaning that a plurality of media and content producers 
is indispensable in the process of translating knowledges between bodies, communities, and 
cultures.  
Such an understanding of media can be brought to bear on the notion of invention by 
recognizing the capacity for media to represent various bodily, social, and cultural 
commonplaces. In such instances authors, artists, cartoonists, game designers, etc. craft sensory 
impressions through the various modalities of the medium in such a way that when the audience 
closes or completes the experience they do so in a manner that creates a situation that is 
analogous to that of the creator. In this way the ‘new phenomenon’ produced by the mediation 
“[is] not simply found, but invented” (qtd. in “Gaston Bachelard and the Notion of 
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‘Phenomenotechnique’” 315), such that the mind participates in a multimodal act of situated 
knowledge discovery.  
For example, perhaps that aforementioned character speaking in all capital letters is not, 
in fact, yelling but rather the person to whom he is speaking has a migraine; the sensory 
impression of reading all capital letters is thus meant to invoke a subjective closure in which the 
reader becomes situated in a place or position of discomfort and auditory sensitivity. Thus, the 
capitalized text (itself merely a visual perception) implies a connection between sound and 
volume that accompanies a migraine where even moderate sounds appear loud, jarring, and 
painful. For someone with chronic migraines this might be considered a commonplace 
experience, a sensory and semiotic situation that informs their knowledges and practices—i.e. 
when they know a migraine is imminent they might engage in various practices that mitigate 
loud sounds and bright lights, practices that ‘make sense’ based on subjectively commonplace 
sensory relationships. Thus, when audiences participate in reconstructing these common places 
or situations, such as through reading about them, they discover practices located in the sensory, 
social, and cultural relationships common to that place. In this way knowledges and practices 
situated in particular places can move between uncommon bodies and dissimilar positions as the 
mediation guides the audience to close or complete the representation in accordance with the 
situation of a particular embodied subject. 
This process—whereby multimodal closure facilitates the transfer of knowledges and 
practices—is obliquely present in McLuhan’s media theory as well. For instance, he observed 
that, “Those who experience the first onset of a new technology, whether it be alphabet or radio, 
respond most emphatically because the new sense ratios set up at once by the technological 
dilation of eye or ear, present men [sic] with a surprising new world, which evokes a vigorous 
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new ‘closure,’ or novel pattern of interplay, among all of the senses together” (Essential 
McLuhan 118). The word ‘ratio’ comes from the Latin rērī, meaning ‘to think or reason.’ The 
novel sense ratios established by media are, in effect, various ways of reasoning, thinking, or 
making sense. And as patterns of interplay between all of the senses they attest to the fact that 
“all meaning-making is multimodal” (New London Group). In this way the sense ratios are 
analogous to the poetic genera of embodied invention. As Verene notes, the poetic genera 
involve “regarding sensibility, feeling, or expression as a form of thought” (92). Media, then, 
allow us to share various poetic genera by creating situations in which varying ratios amongst the 
senses prompt us to think or reason in particular ways.  
For example, film relies on various ratios between sight, sound, distance, and time. 
Consider a scene taking place on a busy street; many of the events we perceive make sense to us 
because as viewers we are filling in implied but absent sensory information in accordance with 
the ratios amongst our senses. Thus, we hear the distant staccato sound of a car horn and we 
imaginatively see an irate driver somewhere off-screen. Or we witness a pedestrian crossing the 
street and when the camera suddenly cuts to a speeding car, we perceive that the pedestrian is in 
danger of being hit, even though we see neither person nor car on screen at the same time. In 
both cases the mind—or more specifically common sense (koine aisthesis)—strives to maintain a 
balanced ratio amongst the senses, supplying what perception merely implies.  
All media rely on these sense ratios, these ways of making sense that draw on common or 
familiar relationships between the senses. In fact, McLuhan ascribes to art and artists the role of 
teaching us new ratios, new forms of closing or completing perception (Project 69 25). What 
embodied invention explores is the potential for closure to convey various and novel ways of 
making sense (i.e. various poetic genera) between bodies, communities, and cultures. After all, 
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those who are d/Deaf, autistic, blind, those with chronic migraines, those who use wheelchairs or 
walk with a limp—all possess ratios amongst their senses that cohere with their bodies and 
minds, i.e. with their embodied experiences. In what follows, I look to a medium that relies quite 
explicitly on closure—comics—and demonstrate how cartoonist use closure to convey various 
ratios between bodies and cultures.  
 
Commonplace Comic Books 
The term commonplace book refers to a heuristic text that students were encouraged to 
study so as to refine their knowledge of a particular topic and develop their capacity for 
inventing things to say on that topic. Traditionally, commonplace books were composed of 
various phrases and expressions that through repeated study one could memorize and deploy 
tactfully. But from a contemporary perspective commonplace books are rather simplistic in how 
they represent various commonplaces, such that they could find new life in more contemporary 
media, such as comics and videogames. We could think of a commonplace comic book, then, as 
a text that conveys not only common linguistic and discursive relationships, but through its 
various modalities, common sensory and semiotic relationships as well. More specifically, I 
conceive of commonplace comic books as collections of non-fictional stories or anecdotes by a 
particular subject on a variety of topics. Comics scholars refer to these texts as autographics. 
On the face of it the term autographics simply refers to graphic life writing. However, 
Gillian Whitlock, who coined the concept, notes that autographics is as a way of recognizing 
“the distinctive technology and aesthetics of life narrative that emerges in comics” (965). The 
term autographics asserts that “[c]omics are not a mere hybrid of graphic arts and prose fiction, 
but a unique interpretation that transcends both, and emerges through the imaginative work of 
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synthesis that readers are required to make between the panels on the page” (968-69). 
Autographics can be seen to function as commonplace comic books in that they are texts that 
engage in “cross-cultural translation” (978) and “[u]nique mediations of cultural difference” 
(965). Furthermore, just as commonplace books make particular demands of their readers—e.g. 
that they are studious and attentive—autographics ask more of their readers as well in that they 
seek to cultivate a visual-verbal literacy that would allow audiences to “do more than consume 
these images as passive spectators” and instead “move on to recognize the norms that govern 
which lives will be regarded as human…” (966). While Whitlock has memoirs of trauma and 
conflict in mind here, the same principle can be extended to other autobiographical comics as 
well, such as those by persons with disabilities who are often treated as less-than-human by 
prevailing ableist norms and biases. In fact, this can be considered one of the defining qualities 
of commonplace comic books—that they move readers beyond norms and conventions towards 
various commonplace experiences of the sensory, social, cultural, and political world. 
In the table below I have listed several notable autographical works that function as 
commonplace comic books. The list itself isn’t intended to be comprehensive in any way but 
more so to represent the breadth of topics. In what follows I describe the unique affordances that 
allow comics to be treated as multimodal commonplace books. I then go on to examine two 
comics from this list—El Deafo and The Ride Together—demonstrating how they help readers 
memorize and deploy d/Deaf rhetoric and autistic rhetoric, respectively.  
Title Description 
El Deafo Cece Bell recounts her experience becoming deaf at a young age, including 
the recurrent misunderstandings of her friends, classmates, and teachers in 
regards to her sensory perception. 
Epileptic David B describes his complicated upbringing with his brother whose violent 
temperament and epileptic seizures defined both their lives. 
Fun Home Alison Bechdel describes her troubled childhood with an abusive father and 
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an emotionally distant mother. 
Maus Weaving together past and present, Art Spiegelman tells the story of his 
father’s survival of the Holocaust and how that shaped the rest of his life. 
My New York 
Diary 
Julie Ducet relates her move to New York City, a formative time in her career 
as a cartoonist but also one defined by anxiety over her craft, her epilepsy, 
and her turn towards self-medication. 
Palestine Joe Sacco chronicles his various encounters with Palestinians and Israelis 
during his time in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in the early nineties. 
Persepolis Marjane Satrapi relates her upbringing in Iran, a childhood that was marked 
by violent conflict, punk music, and feminism. 




Judy Karasik and Paul Karasik describe how their lives were influenced by 
their autistic brother David. 
Table 1. Commonplace comics. 
Multimodal Closure and Comics 
In light of the preceding discussion I want to examine how cartoonists use multimodal 
closure to represent various commonplaces and thus foster embodied invention. Comics have 
been selected here, in part, because they illustrate multimodal closure perhaps better than any 
other medium. Consider, for instance, the following three-panel illustration in which the 
cartoonist has created various sensory and narratological gaps (See Fig 1). Closure names that 
process by which such gaps are filled in, producing a meaningful representation in the process. 
In fact, such gapes are part of the grammar of the medium. As Gillian Whitlock observes:  
The vocabulary of comics represents figures and objects across a wide iconic range from 
the abstraction of cartooning to realism; its grammar is based on panels, frames, and 
gutters that translate time and space onto the page in black and white; and balloons both 
enclose speech and convey the character of sound and emotion. This grammar makes 
extraordinary demands on the reader to produce closure. (968) 
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By closure here Whitlock means “the work of observing the parts but perceiving the whole” 
(969) such that “comics require the reader to become a collaborator, engaging in an active 
process of working through. As a medium of expression and communication, comics uses 
closure like no other” (969-70).  
 
Fig. 1 - This sequence ideally captures the concept of closure as readers need to fill in the 
interceding actions (including momentum, gestures, and sounds) in order for the comic to make 
sense. In the left-most panel Charlie Brown is seen running. In the final panel Charlie Brown 
lands on his back with the word ‘Wump!’ to signify his landing. (Schulz Peanuts Sept. 28th 
1969). 
While I take my primary definition of closure from McLuhan—where closure works to 
maintain a ratio between the sensory impression and the perceptual experience of a mediation by 
filling in or supplying implied but absent sensory and semiotic information—there are a number 
of similarities with the concept as used by comics theorists and scholars. Whitlock’s definition, 
for instance, notes the liminal space closure occupies by defining it as that which operates 
between observing the parts and perceiving the whole. This echoes McLuhan’s emphasis that 
“The [sensory] impression is not the experience” (Project 69 26); rather the sensory impression 
(i.e. observing the parts) of a mediation invokes a subjective closure whereby the mind 
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completes an experience (i.e. perceives the whole) by adding in the implied but absent 
information. Furthermore, both Whitlock and McLuhan conclude that closure makes the 
audience a collaborator in the act of mediation, providing media with unique communicative 
affordances.23  
It is also worth noting that Whitlock’s approach to comics and closure is grounded in the 
work of Scott McCloud. In Understanding Comics—a comic illustrating how the medium 
functions—McCloud dedicates an entire chapter to closure. He too defines the concept as “[t]he 
phenomenon of observing the parts but perceiving the whole” (63) and holds that it is so central 
to the medium that “in a very real sense, comics is closure” (67, emphasis in original).24 He goes 
on to note that, “In our daily lives, we often commit closure, mentally completing that which is 
incomplete based on past experience” (63). This is because “All of us perceive the world as a 
whole through our senses. Yet our senses can only reveal a world that is fragmented and 
incomplete” (62), such that “closure allows us to…mentally construct a continuous, unified 
reality” (67).  
Such a description of closure recalls the definition of common sense given last chapter 
where Aristotle defined koine aisthesis as the means by which “The senses perceive each other’s 
special-objects incidentally, not in so far as they are themselves but in so far as they form a 
unity” (De anima 425a30). More simply put, common sense is that faculty by which we observe 
the parts but perceive the whole. In this context closure is simply the name given to that 
                                                          
23 “The beholder must collaborate in creating the illusions of space, as of time.” (McLuhan Project 69 26) 
24 In looking to McCloud and his work on comics and closure I do not mean to draw on his larger theories regarding 
the medium, including his general definition of comics or his general understanding of how they communicate. 
McCloud is, however, the most cited author on the subject of closure and comics. That said, other comics scholars 
have written about closure as well. Groensteen (The System of Comics), for example, names closure as one of six 
functions of the frame (39) and he associates closure with the act of reading comics (32). But for Groensteen 
reading comics is best understood through arthrology, a process in which meaning is made through the 
relationships between panels, images, and icons. For the present conversation, however, I find closure to be an apt 
concept for understanding comics in part because of its resonance with McLuhan’s understanding of media in 
general as operative through closure, as noted above. 
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enthymematic process by which common sense supplies implied but absent sensory information. 
It should come as no surprise then that comics, as a medium equated with closure, is also one 
that has been recognized as explicitly enthymematic as well.  
As J. Anthony Blair observes, “Visual arguments are typically enthymemes—arguments 
with gaps left to be filled in by the participation of the audience” (Blair 52). In “Beyond Visual 
Rhetoric” Dale Jacobs notes that Blair’s remarks aptly apply to the medium of comics as the 
dividing line or gutter between panels acts as a visual demarcation that encourages the reader to 
supply the implied but absent information. But, as the title of Jacobs’ essay suggests, comics are 
not constrained to just visual arguments. Rather, it is a multimodal medium, meaning that the 
enthymemes employed by comics “combine multiple semiotic modes” (502) in order to produce 
meaningful representations. This can be seen in the way that comics create relationships between 
various perceptual modes, such as sight, sound, motion, distance, and time. For instance, a 
cartoonist could depict a character as being far away by drawing a small figure whose speech is 
written in miniature letters. In a series of panels that character could then be shown moving 
closer by increasing the size of the figure as well as enlarging the lettering, suggesting his or her 
voice is getting louder. Lastly, how many panels the cartoonist uses to depict this event allows 
for a representation of time—more panels would draw out the sense of time passing, while fewer 
would suggest less time has passed. For these reasons Jacobs argues that comics make use of 
multimodal rhetoric—persuasive communication that takes place in and across various semiotic 
modes. Through multimodal rhetoric comics create “complex rhetorical environments in which 
persuasion occurs through a variety of means” (Jacobs 512).  
What I want to suggest here is that these rhetorical environments are representations of 
sensory commonplaces. A sensory commonplace, it is worth recalling, is a collection of common 
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sensory relationships from which the mind draws in enthymematically completing perception. 
Within our sensory commonplaces we discover poetic genera, common or familiar ways of 
making sense of our place in the world. Comics, as already noted, make use of sensory 
enthymemes through multimodal rhetoric such that the sensations, thoughts, and signs that they 
imply bring forth or construct a common sense of place or a sensory commonplace. Thus, from 
this perspective, comics can be thought to guide readers to various commonplaces and thus foster 
the discovery of knowledges and practices that are situated therein. Whitlock notes a similar 
process when she remarks that meaning in comics is “produced in an active process of 
imaginative production whereby the reader shuttles between words and images, and navigates 
across gutters and frames, being moved to see, feel, or think differently in the effort of producing 
narrative closure” (978). Viewed in this way, closure has the capacity to ‘move us’ to different 
situations or places, thereby encouraging us to “see, feel, or think differently.” When a comic 
operates between different bodies, communities, and cultures, the closure of the mediation can 
offset the habitual closure enacted by common sense (koine aisthesis) which, to borrow 
McCloud’s phrasing, sees us “mentally completing that which is incomplete based on past 
experience” (63). Instead, the experiences of the author mediated through the comic form can 
lead the reader to complete that which is incomplete based on the past and present experiences of 
the cartoonist. Put differently, comics supplement our own embodied experiences with 
enthymemes that are endemic to the experiences of others, such that they effectively function 
like commonplace comic books, allowing readers to invent or discover knowledges and practices 
situated in various sensory, social, and cultural places.  
This is especially true of autobiographical comics where the multimodal rhetoric of the 
text can be thought of as an invitation to readers. By invitation here I mean to invoke Koss and 
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Griffin’s invitational rhetoric which “constitutes an invitation to the audience to enter the 
rhetor's world and to see it as the rhetor does” (5). Commonplace comic books, I suggest, invite 
readers “to enter the [cartoonist’s] world and to see it as the [cartoonist] does” (5). In entering 
these worlds and completing their sensory and semiotic arguments we learn the relationships and 
poetic genera of that place or situation. Thus, within graphic life writing closure is less a generic 
means by which humans engage with media (as McLuhan might suggest) and more specifically a 
heuristic for how particular individuals fill in or complete their own everyday experiences.  
Within the broad range of commonplace comic books I focus specifically on those that 
relate to disability. Commonplace comic books written or informed by persons with disabilities 
have the potential to leverage the emancipatory capabilities of autographics. As G. Thomas 
Couser writes, “Autobiography…can be an especially powerful medium in which disabled 
people can demonstrate that they have lives, in defiance of others’ common sense perceptions of 
them” (401). Similarly, Susan Squire writes that comics have the capacity to “move us beyond 
the damaging discourse of…normalcy into a genuine encounter with the experience of disability” 
(86). This is not to say that commonplace comic books are not without their complications. 
Indeed, as Dale Jacobs and Jay Dolmage observe, “Traditional memoirs of disability also bear 
the burden of challenging a normative culture as they confront (and sometimes embrace) the 
normative tendencies of narrative” (84). But commonplace comic books do offer some of the 
most compelling invitations to enter the world of a person with a disability and see it as they see 
it. In the following sections I look at two commonplace comic books and I examine how the 





El Deafo & d/Deaf Rhetoric 
In the autobiographical comic El Deafo, Cece Bell recounts her childhood starting from 
the moment she partially lost her hearing. The comic is a blend of personal memories and 
instructional moments as Bell conveys to her readers the lessons she learned adjusting to her 
modified sense of hearing. What I will focus on here are the ways in which El Deafo embodies 
d/Deaf rhetoric to convey the poetic genera or ways of making sense that Bell discovered during 
her childhood. El Deafo begins by introducing us to Cece, a “regular little kid” (1) who watches 
TV with her siblings (1), rides a bike with her father (1), and who sings to herself (1). Cece, like 
all the characters in El Deafo, is drawn as an anthropomorphic rabbit. This gives the comic an 
aesthetic not unlike that of a children’s cartoon. At the same time the elongated ears of the 
rabbit-like characters emphasize the impending focus on hearing, for within the first few pages 
Cece contracts meningitis and as a side effect partially loses her sense of sound. From this point 
onward Cece can only hear sounds through a hearing aid. The hearing aid, we are told, amplifies 
sounds but does not necessarily clarify them, meaning that she will need to learn to recognize 
other cues in order to interpret what she hears. El Deafo follows Cece as she becomes familiar 
with this new sensory relationship to the world. At the same time, we see her family, friends, 
teachers, and classmates becoming familiar with Cece. 
Given how her hearing aid functions, Cece could be described as hard-of-hearing; that is 
to say, with the hearing aid she can hear sounds but those sounds require careful attention in 
order to be understood. Similarly, disability scholar Brenda Jo Brueggemann refers to herself as 
hard-of-hearing. She tells us that “As far as anyone knows, I have been deaf from birth; I have 
been a rhetorician about that long, too. Some days I do not call myself ‘deaf’—some days I'm 
‘just hard-of-hearing,’ the term I grew up with, and other days I’m quite ‘hearing’” (1). This 
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situation—between deaf and hearing—leads Brueggemann to characterize herself as existing 
between places. In many respects, El Deafo illustrates Brueggemann’s description of being in 
between places—between deaf and hearing and between personally familiar and culturally 
unfamiliar. In this way, the comic can be read as an account of Cece transitioning between 
commonplaces and her ensuing desire to have others understand her relatively novel place in the 
world. This is reflected in the content of El Deafo where various events in Bell’s childhood are 
depicted as didactic situations that impart upon the reader what Bell wishes her friends and 
family understood about her way of being in the world. Put differently, El Deafo can be read as a 
commonplace comic book, one that utilizes the multimodality of the medium to represent the 
sensory commonplaces of its author.  
At this point it is important to note that the commonplaces of the hearing are not 
reducible to those commonplaces of the deaf or hard-of-hearing. As we will see, Bell’s comic 
demonstrates that these topoi are distinct from one another. That is to say, there is a dissensus 
here, and thus something uncommon. Brueggemann has characterized this uncommonness as 
incommensurateness: “Are the rhetorics between Deaf and Hearing—the arguments and therein 
the ways of knowing and being in the world—no more or less than those Khunian 
‘incommensurate paradigms’?” (Lend Me Your Ear 191). As these remarks indicate, rhetorics 
reflect the dissensus that exists between different bodies and senses—they indicate the 
incommensurate nature of embodied experience. But at the same time they offer a means of 
learning new ways of experiencing. The word incommensurate, after all, does not mean 
unknowable but rather a different way of knowing, evaluating, and measuring. It is the 
providence of rhetorics to help us translate these different ways of knowing and ultimately being.  
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With that in mind I want to explore how El Deafo participates in communicating d/Deaf 
rhetoric through its representation of think-eye. As noted last chapter, think-eye is 
Brueggemann’s way of describing the unique visual and personal relationships that d/Deaf 
persons tend to possess. Think-eye appears throughout El Deafo in the way that sight is used 
tactically to foster comprehension.25 For Cece, as someone hard-of-hearing, this involves various 
means of correlating visual cues with sounds. In this respect, Bell uses the medium to great 
effect. Throughout the comic sounds are depicted differently depending on who’s speaking, 
whether or not Cece can see the speaker, and whether or not she is wearing her hearing aid. 
Without the hearing aid, the text within speech balloons appears either faded or nonexistent. The 
faded text indicates that the speaker is difficult to hear, whereas the empty balloons demonstrate 
that Cece hasn’t heard the speaker at all.  
In one particular panel both techniques are employed as Cece tries on the hearing aid for 
the first time and the words fade in to the page (Fig. 2). In this panel Bell also employs a second 
technique—ambiguous phonetic groupings, which represent that Cece can hear the sounds but 
they are not resolving into distinct and recognizable words. Taken together, the panel uses visual 
illegibility (through faded text) to demonstrate acoustic clarity, while simultaneously deploying 
ambiguous phonemes to demonstrate verbal comprehension. Through the first technique readers 
can appreciate the relationship between sight and sound that resides at the core of the comic as 
the visual legibility of the text stands in for the acoustic perception. It is within this 
relationship—between sight and sound—that Brueggemann arrives at the concept of think-eye: 
“I arrive doubly hyphenated (hard-of-hearing), with a lot going on in those multiple hyphenated 
between spaces. I come, I suppose, thinking between—thinking in another kind of between space 
                                                          
25 Think-eye also gives new meaning to what Whitlock calls the ‘seeing I’ of autobiographical comics, 
“Autographics: The Seeing ‘I’ of Comics.” 
79 
 
between think-deaf and think-hearing: think-eye” (24). Cece finds herself in a similar position—
between, one might say, a hearing commonplace (and that of her past) and a hard-of-hearing 
commonplace (that of her present). In the aforementioned panel we witness this transition 
between places as the text transitions from transparent to opaque. 
 
Fig. 2. Cece uses a hearing aid for the first time. In this panel unintelligible words fade into view 
as the doctor (left) adjusts the hearing aid for Cece (middle-right) as her parents reassure her 
(right). (El Deafo 19). 
Indeed, from this scene onwards we see Cece coming to terms with her in-betweenness, a 
process that entails learning how to think with her eyes. This is reflected in the second technique 
mentioned above—the ambiguous phonemes. On the next page we see Cece thinking to herself, 
“I can hear! But what are they saying?” (20). Meanwhile, behind her row upon row of letters 
stack up, an apparent but illegible transcript of the conversation currently taking place between 
the doctor and her parents. Here the sounds are, quite literally, background noise as they do not 
resolve into intelligible words. In the following panel we see Cece looking at the doctor as he 
deliberately addresses her with the words, “Can. You. Hear. Me?” To which she responds by 
thinking to herself, “I understood that! Wow!” (21).  
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From this point onward sight takes on a new role in her life. As readers we accompany 
Cece as she attends a school with other children who also wear hearing aids. There she learns 
basic scholastic skills, but also the art of understanding speech through sight. While this is 
typically referred to as lip-reading, Bell utilizes the multimodality of the medium to emphasize 
that this art entails a more expansive sense of space than simply staring intently at the speaker’s 
lips. In a series of panels we see Cece dressed up as a detective as her teacher walks her through 
the various sensory tactics she will want to employ in understanding speech with the hearing aid. 
Here we see three tactics:  
• Visual clues—“what do you see when a person talks to you?” (30). 
• Context clues—“where are you while a person talks to you? What is going on around you 
during the conversation?” (30). 
• Gestural clues—“What does a person do with her hands and body while she talks to you? 
What kinds of faces does she make?” (30). 
Each clue is accompanied by a drawing that illustrates the strategy it refers to. For instance, next 
to the gestural cues we see her teacher saying “A pear” while rubbing her stomach and licking 
her lips. In the next panel we see her saying “A bear,” mouth agape, arm outstretched, pointing 
and shaking. This series of panels can be read as a set of introductory instructions to think-eye—
i.e. to developing that eye-space that is at one and the same time an I-space, a blending of the 
visual and the personal that is distinct from the kind of sensory awareness that is commonplace 
for hearing individuals. For those readers unfamiliar with this type of sensory awareness, El 
Deafo provides the kind of sensory and imaginative instruction needed for invention to occur 
between subjects and places.  
81 
 
It is worth pointing out that the sensory tactics depicted in El Deafo could be said to 
address sensations and perceptions that are common for both hearing and deaf subjects. The 
illustrations, however, demonstrate that the process of recognizing and retaining those sensations 
varies between hearing and deaf subjects. The movement of someone’s lips or the gestures made 
with their hands, despite both being seen, may nevertheless bring forth different meanings. This 
brings to mind Brueggemann’s remarks that,  
In sign language and Deaf culture, facial expressions are often referred to as the 
‘grammar’ of the language. Much as deaf people (and other ESL users) tend to struggle 
with the grammatical nuances of standard English, hearing people who learn sign 
language reportedly often do not ‘get’ the intricacies of sign language grammar, 
expressed on the face. ‘They have stone faces,’ one Gallaudet student and sign language 
instructor told me. (Lend Me Your Ear 235) 
At the same time, although hearing people may not perceive the expressive potential of facial 
expressions, they can still learn to appreciate how such signs can be considered useful and 
persuasive, especially when such tactics are drawn out for them. In this regard, El Deafo is a very 
inviting comic for hearing readers, as Bell’s artfully drawn illustrations invite “the audience to 
enter [her] world and to see it as the [she] does” (Koss and Griffin 5, emphasis added). 
Immediately following the clues given to Cece by her teacher we learn several more that 
she has developed through her own commonplace experience. She presents these personal 
lessons as written on large cards that she holds before a scene illustrating what they convey. She 
mentions that, “Must see person’s face at all times!” (31), “Exaggerated mouth movements are 
confusing!” (32), “Shouting is not good!” (32), “Mustaches and beards are bad news! (Sorry, 
Dad.)” (33), “Hands in front of mouths are also bad news!” (33), “When it gets dark, give up!” 
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(33), and “Group discussions are impossible to understand” (33). Here the multimodal 
affordances of comics comes into play as the medium facilitates demonstrating the visual, 
contextual, and gestural aspects of Cece’s new commonplace. 26 For instance, readers are able to 
see how various everyday events—speakers who talk to people with their backs turned (31) or 
the way that some people who are upset speak with a hand over their mouth (32) or what kind of 
television shows and actors are easy to lip-read (74-8)—bring forth or supply distinct meanings, 
depending on one’s embodied situation. In one chapter we see Cece happily playing with other 
children at a sleepover. For her friends it is commonplace to end a sleepover by turning off the 
lights and talking before going to sleep. Here we see how the lesson “When it gets dark, give 
up!” plays out in a regular, everyday event in Cece’s childhood, where sleepovers are important 
moments for forming friendships. With the lights out she can no longer think and hear with her 
eyes. She can, however, make out the laughter of her friends as they talk amongst themselves. 
Feeling excluded, Cece slips out of the room and calls her mother for a ride home (97). 
This incident, and others like them throughout El Deafo, demonstrates that the challenges 
Cece faces often have less to do with her own perception and more to do with the misperception 
of her experience. Classmates who upon learning she is deaf are shown talking down to Cece 
(67, 89, 104) or speaking too loudly (32, 64) and in these instances she is at her most anxious and 
troubled. Often in these moments she retreats into her thoughts, taking on her titular alter-ego—
El Deafo. Cece created El Deafo after realizing that her hearing aid, with its accompanying 
wireless microphone, gave her the ‘superpower’ to listen in on conversations and events 
whenever her teachers would forget to switch off the mic. More broadly, though, El Deafo 
                                                          
26 This didactic approach is also used by Matt and Kay Daigle in the webcomic series, That Deaf Guy. Matt Daigle is 
deaf, while his partner, Kay, is a sign language interpreter. The webcomic is semi-autobiographical and covers a 
broad range of topics, some of which include entries under the headings of “Do’s & Don’ts suggested by That Deaf 
Guy – Be Deaf Wise!” and “Deaf Culture 101.”  
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represents the confident, empowered, and assertive version of Cece; whenever she encounters 
especially trying situations she imagines what her alter-ego would do. In two imaginary 
sequences it is El Deafo who stands up to those at the slumber party who excluded her (99) and it 
is El Deafo who stands up to her friend who talks down to her (69-70). In many ways, El Deafo 
reflects Cece’s desire for those closest to her to understand her experience, a desire she has 
trouble communicating herself because her friends and family are all well-meaning, good 
intentioned people who nevertheless rely on assumptions rooted in their own perceptions. In a 
manner of speaking, El Deafo—the book—becomes a means of addressing those assumptions 
that trouble communication across and between different ways of perceiving and thinking. While 
this reinforces the notion that El Deafo can be treated as a commonplace comic book—in that it 
functions as a didactic text providing multi-modal instructions on common topics—it also 
exemplifies how  autographics themselves “free us to think and imagine differently” (Whitlock 
967). There is, for instance, a world of difference between the experiences represented in comics 
like El Deafo and those that can be derived solely from a hearing perspective. To take the latter 
approach, as one scholar observes, risks creating and perpetuating biases and stereotypes: 
It is not hard to see how a disinterested observer…might arrive at the stereotypes with 
which we stigmatise Deaf people, and the conclusion that their plight is therefore 
desperate. It comes from an extrapolative leap: to imagine what deafness is like, I will 
imagine my world without sound. A terrifying prospect, and one that conforms quite well 
with the stereotype we project onto those in the Deaf community. I would be isolated, 
disoriented, uncommunicative and unreceptive to communication. (481). 
Disability scholar Tobin Siebers has described this distinction as the difference between a 
personal, subjective imagination and a cultural, intersubjective imagination (“Disability and the 
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Theory of Complex Embodiment”). As Siebers notes in regards to disability simulators, they fail 
to convey “embodied knowledge contained in disability identities” (292) because users 
“experience their body relative to their usual embodiment” (292). As a consequence they 
communicate “emotions of loss, shock, and pity at how dreadful it is to be disabled” (292). In 
contrast, commonplace comic books like El Deafo utilize artistic representation and multimodal 
rhetoric to foster the reader’s capacity to translate embodied knowledges rather than to 
(misguidedly) seek to embody them directly through one’s own experience. 
 
Rhetoric and Imagination  
Before moving on to a second commonplace comic book, I want to briefly unpack this 
relationship between rhetoric and imagination as I see these two concepts working in concert in 
embodied invention. Another way of describing embodied invention is to refer to it as rhetorical 
empathy, where empathy is defined as “[the] imaginative reconstruction of another’s experience, 
without any particular evaluation of that experience” (Nussbaum Upheavals of Thought 302). 
Within this empathetic process poetic rhetoric is that which guides imagination such that it 
brings forth particular perspectives, positions, or places. In learning various forms of rhetoric we 
gain various instructions for bringing forth sensations, thoughts, ideas, images, sounds, etc. in 
accordance with the lived experiences of others. For instance, knowing the important 
relationships between sight and thought captured in the concept of think-eye and represented in 
comics such as El Deafo allows hearing persons to better imagine how their own practices might 
be perceived by persons who are Deaf. In face-to-face interactions, for example, d/Deaf rhetoric 
conveys that effective communication means ensuring that one’s lips can be read and that one’s 
face is expressive. It’s easier for hearing persons to imagine why these practices are necessary 
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when they understand how d/Deaf persons use such practices to make sense of their own 
experience. Such an understanding can only come about by engaging with d/Deaf rhetoric. 
Embodied invention seeks to apply this same principle to all inter-cultural forms of 
communication.  
The notion that rhetoric can work in concert with imagination also brings together the 
philosophies of two central figures in this dissertation, Vico and Peirce. For instance, 
imagination plays a prominent role in Vico’s theory of sensory invention. As a synonym for 
poetic genera, Vico used the phrase imaginative universals, common ways of imagining our 
place in the world. But here it is important to note that his usage of the term imagination or 
fantasia is distinct from the contemporary understanding of a fanciful or whimsical creation. 
Rather, as Verene notes, imagination “is not simply picturing something to oneself as though one 
could see it; it is the creation or bringing into being of something” (Verene 92). That is to say, in 
Vico’s usage, imagination is not a means of deviating from reality but is in fact an integral 
process through which reality is constructed. Again, as Verene notes, “The fundamental work of 
fantasia is the active formation of reality” (Verene Speculative Philosophy 94). This 
understanding of imagination can be thought of in relation to common sense (koine aisthesis) and 
its rhetorical capacity to bring forth or imagine sensations that while not immediately perceived 
nevertheless fill in or complete our perception of the world. If we recognize that different bodies 
and senses make for distinct sensory enthymemes, then we can see how reality is imaginatively 
constructed in various ways while nevertheless remaining true or objective for those imagining it 
as such.  
As with Vico, imagination serves a crucial purpose in Peirce’s philosophy as well. As 
John Kaag observes, “the most puzzling concepts of Peirce’s system can be best understood as 
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dependent on the creative imagination” (Kaag Thinking Through the Imagination 14). In Kaag’s 
characterization, “Peirce develops an imaginative epistemology and ontology” (15); that is to 
say, his is a method of discovering knowledge and being through imagination. This can be seen 
in Peirce’s semiotics where imagination plays a central role in discovering the relationships 
between signs. Except here imagination is subsumed under another concept—as one scholar 
notes, “Vico’s theory of fantasia and Peirce’s conception of the function of signs could…be 
understood in their true context: rhetoric” (“Vico’s and Peirce’s ‘Sensus Communis’” 71). Thus, 
that process by which reality is constructed is itself an imaginative and rhetorical one, suggesting 
that in sharing rhetorics we facilitate our capacity to imaginatively reconstruct the experiences of 
other persons and thus empathize with them. 
However, this also suggests that the inverse is true; that the absence of poetic rhetorics 
limits our capacity to imagine how the world appears to others and as such curtails our capacity 
to empathize with one another. What I want to suggest here is that this is the case in a normate 
culture. Consider, for instance, one of the central arguments made by Lennard Davis in 
Enforcing Normalcy. There he describes how disability emerges through the “construction of the 
normal world” (Davis 22). That is to say, disability arises by positioning all persons within that 
place that is brought forth or imagined by able-bodied subjects, an act that dis-places those 
marginalized by what is ‘common’ or ‘normal’ from the practical realities in which they live. In 
this way the normate is often guilty of positioning deaf persons within an originarily audile 
world, or the blind within an originarily visual world, or autists within an originarily neurotypical 
world. In a normate culture, reality begins and ends in the imagination of the normate. And thus 
the normate attempts to understand others through his own imaginative universals, i.e. his own 
ways of making sense of the world. As Davis notes, “disability [to the normate] seems so 
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obvious—a missing limb, blindness, deafness. What could be simpler to understand? One simply 
has to imagine the loss of the limb, the absent sense, and one is half-way there” (xvi).  
This distinction—between what the normate imagines and what the person with disability 
actually experiences—was noted above in Siebers distinction between personal and cultural 
imagination. Siebers highlights this difference by looking at the contentious use of disability 
simulations as tools to “raise the consciousness” (292)—i.e. develop the capacity to empathize—
of those in the field of occupational therapy and rehabilitation science. These simulations have 
students use a wheelchair for a day or walk around with a blindfold on. “The idea,” Siebers 
writes, “is that students may stand for a time in the places occupied by disabled people and come 
to grasp their perspectives” (292).27 Here we can recognize the logic of sensus communis and its 
transcendental sensus that was noted last chapter. From the perspective of dissensus, one cannot 
simply “stand for a time in the places occupied by [others]” because the variances in our bodies 
and senses always-already constitute unique places, distinct sensory topoi in which we find our 
own sense-making techniques. Siebers makes a similar observation when he notes that such 
simulations  
fail to give the student pretenders a sense of the embodied knowledge contained in 
disability identities. Disability simulations of this kind fail because they place students in 
a time-one position of disability, before knowledge about disability is acquired, usually 
resulting in emotions of loss, shock, and pity at how dreadful it is to be disabled. Students 
experience their body relative to their usual embodiment, and they become so 
preoccupied with sensations of bodily inadequacy that they cannot perceive the extent to 
which their “disability” results from social rather than physical causes. (292). 
                                                          
27 Here we can recognize the presence of common sense and its transcendental sensus, noted above, which 
substantiates the belief that “Human beings can enter into the potential standpoints of others” (Visker 2). 
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Siebers concludes that such simulations constitute “an act of individual imagination” rather than 
“an act of cultural imagination” (292).  
This distinction between individual and cultural imagination gestures towards a 
fundamental difference between sensory topoi, imaginative universals, and rhetorics. When we 
engage in cultural imagination we are borrowing the rhetorics of that culture to assist in our 
capacity to imagine how the world appears from that position or place. For this reason empathy 
can be thought of as a rhetorical phenomenon insofar as we rely on rhetorics to imaginatively 
reconstruct the real, lived experiences of other people. We learn these rhetorics, and foster 
empathy, by engaging with the representations of other people, by listening to their ‘true stories.’ 
In these instances we can almost ‘hear’ the rhetoric that guides how they construct such 
representations.  
In this way embodied invention makes use of what Krista Ratcliffe calls rhetorical 
listening. Rhetorical listening describes how we ‘hear’28 differences across communities and 
cultures. Ratcliffe defines the concept as a “code of cross-cultural contact…[it] signifies a stance 
of openness that a person may choose to assume in cross-cultural exchanges” (1) . Within 
embodied invention rhetorical listening is that which asks us to ‘listen’ to the rhetoric of the 
‘speaker’ so that we may ‘hear’ their poetic genera, their ways of bringing forth knowledge of 
their place in the world. Rhetorical listening encourages us to allow the thoughts, ideas, 
sensations, feelings, words, etc. of other subjects to bring forth one another in accordance with 
how they have experienced the world and thus to refrain from judging or evaluating such 
associations insofar as they relate to our own experiences. It also requires that we are open and 
willing to defer to the rhetorics of those around us. To borrow a phrase from Gemma Corradi 
                                                          
28 I have placed single quotes around those words that relate to the senses to emphasize that I do not mean 
specifically hearing as a sensory phenomenon but the general idea of listening as being open and receptive to what 
others are communicating. 
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Fiumara, rhetorical listening asks us to become “apprentices of listening rather than masters of 
discourse” (The Other Side of Language 57). Thus, it is important when ‘listening’ to other 
people that we ‘hear’ those enthymematic relationships in language that can and do bring forth 
sensations and thoughts that are potentially uncommon to our own experiences. And we must 
acknowledge the persuasive character of our own perspectives, which encourages us to omit 
differences in favour of similarities. This process of rhetorical listening and cultural imagination 
can be seen at work in the following memoir comic, The Ride Together. 
 
The Ride Together & Autistic Rhetoric 
With El Deafo commonplace comic books can be seen to train readers to recognize 
potentially distinct poetic genera. What is less clear so far is how people use such sensory tactics 
in their daily lives to locate other subjects. One genre that offers some guidance here are those 
memoirs written from the perspective of family members of persons with disabilities. These texts 
have the capacity to reflect how tactics and rhetorics are shared through observation and 
attention. Such an exchange of rhetorics can be seen in The Ride Together: A Brother and 
Sister's Memoir of Autism in the Family, an award-winning memoir29 by Paul Karasik and Judy 
Karasik about their experience growing up with David, their autistic brother. The text blends 
chapters of prose, written by Judy, with chapters of comics, drawn by Paul. Together they co-
construct what might be thought of as the Karasik commonplace—that is, they represent various, 
                                                          
29 Best Literary Work of the Year, Autism Society of America. Despite the critical and scholarly praise directed at 
this text, I’d like to note that it is not without its complications. For instance, the book prefaces its representation 
of autism with a medical account, playing into troubling narratives in which disability is pathologized through 
medical discourse. We are shown drawings of neurons and told that, according to the prevailing medical theory, 
autism is related to drug and alcohol use during pregnancy, prompting the footnote from the authors: “So don’t 
drink or use drugs while pregnant!” This erroneous and outmoded theory is at odds with the award conferred 
upon the text by the Autism Society of America, which could be seen as an endorsement of that medical theory. At 
the very least it hopefully serves as a cautionary lesson against incorporating pathologizing discourse founded 
upon prevailing medical knowledge.  
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everyday experiences within the Karasik family. What I’d like to do here is focus on the ways in 
which The Ride Together show Judy and Paul learning David’s autistic tactics or ways of making 
sense. This occurs through representations of what is referred to as “David’s world” (33).30  
The Ride Together first introduces readers to David’s world through a general account of 
autism as a neurological and multisensory condition. In one panel we see an anonymous autistic 
child sitting before a television, a clock in hand which has captured the boy’s attention. Behind 
the child his mother gently touches his shoulder as she has a plate of food she wishes to share 
(Fig. 3). In the following panel the scene is redrawn in a style intended to reflect the child’s 
unique sensory experience, and it ideally exhibits the multimodal affordances of the medium 
(Fig. 4). Here much of the background is absent while various environmental factors are 
exaggerated. For instance, the mother’s body is replaced by a large speaking mouth, emphasizing 
the sound of her voice and the visual source of that sound. The finger touching his shoulder is 
exaggerated in size, emphasizing its tactile affect. The sun, which in the previous panel was a 
distant object, is now enlarged, its long, wavy rays an apparent source of warmth. As Sarah Birge 
writes of this panel, “By presenting this scene in a single frame with no internal borders, the 
author conveys the flood of sensations that bombard the boy: depictions of a blazing sun, smells, 
and voices from both television and someone in the room compete for attention and fill the 
scene, held at bay only by the boy's attention to his clock” (Birge 8-9). The caption on the panel 
reads: “Because information goes through their brains via non-standard pathways, the world can 
appear confusing” (15).  
                                                          
30 While the focus here will be on the relationship between neurotypical family members with their autistic sibling, 





Fig. 3 A panel from the opening preface to the The Ride Together (14). Here a boy sits on the 
floor before a television, his gaze fixed on a clock. His mother, with a plate of food in hand, taps 
him on the shoulder and says, ‘Honey?’ to get the boy’s attention. 
 
Fig. 4. This panel immediately follows the one above, emphasizing the sensory differences 
between the two. Here we see the same boy from before, clock in hand, but aspects of his 
surroundings are more prominent. The sun is larger, the figure on the television is enlarged, 





What I’m interested in here, however, is not how to represent the ‘confusing world’ of 
David and other autists, but rather I want to treat David’s world as his sensory commonplace in 
which resides various strategies that he uses to situate himself in the world. Indeed, on the 
following panel we are told that, “What appears as compulsively repetitive behavior can be the 
autistic approach to putting the world in a more comfortable and understandable order” (15). 
How David approaches ‘putting the world in a comfortable and understandable order,’ I would 
argue, is commensurate with his own personal poetic genera or ways of making sense. And here 
it is important to note that while the normative and neurotypical order of the world is rather well 
known and represented in Western culture, how autists organize sensations and thoughts into 
something familiar or common is not. As Judy Karasik remarks further on in the text, “[David] 
had hundreds of tricks that we didn’t understand to organize the world” (140). Some of those 
tricks relate to the autistic tactics identified last chapter—local coherence, fixity of focus, and 
private meanings. Only now we see them depicted through the multi-modality of the comic 
medium, facilitating our capacity to understand, to a certain degree, how David organizes his 
world. For instance, in the above panels we see both local coherence and fixity of focus 
represented. In terms of the former, we see that the child can recall the exact position of the dials 
on the stove as opposed to the more abstract recollection of a stove in general. At the same time 
we see fixity of focus as he is engaged with a clock that has clearly commanded much of his 
attention. 
In approaching David’s world as his sensory commonplace I am building off of Yergeau 
and Heilker’s emphasis on approaching autism itself from the perspective of rhetoric. The 
authors observe that, “If we can come to see our autistic students through the lens of rhetoric 
more than through a stock and overdetermined lens of autism, we might come to better 
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appreciate what they do have to offer instead of fixating on what they do not. Indeed, if we give 
them the opportunity, we might get a chance to learn how they see themselves” (496). Rhetoric, 
in a manner of speaking, is a means of looking past abstract generalizations and seeing practical, 
situated subjects as they orient themselves in the world. In The Ride Together we see David’s 
brother Paul learning his rhetoric, which then gets depicted through Paul’s imaginative (and 
graphic) construction of David’s world. 
For instance, in the chapter “The Stooges” Paul and David embark on an outing together 
to the movies. How Paul—the cartoonist—represents his experience in this chapter and how he 
represents that of his brother is instructive. At the opening of the chapter we learn that Paul—at 
this point a young adult—has planned a solo outing to the movies. But at the behest of his 
mother she persuades him to take David along with him. In the ensuing series of panels we see 
that neither Paul nor David is particularly enthused about the idea of going to the movies with 
each other. For Paul, this is because “[he’s] never gone out alone with [David] before” (122), an 
observation we are privy to through Paul’s inner monologue, as depicted as a thought balloon. 
Repeatedly these thought balloons make clear Paul’s apprehension at being seen in public with 
David. In contrast, we are not privy to David’s thoughts, and so his apprehension is depicted in a 
more sensory fashion. Upon being invited to the movies, we learn that David would rather stay 
home to perform his regular re-enactments of television shows. He tells his mother, “Now, 
now…I’m doing ‘Superman’ at 4:30 and ‘Face the Nation’ at 5” (122). When his mother insists, 
the absence of an inner monologue leaves us as readers to deduce his frustration as implied 
visually, through gestures, and audibly, through sounds. When it becomes clear that he should go 
with Paul, David begins tapping his fingers on his head, with the capitalized words, “CLAP-
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CLAP-CLAP” hovering over him, while his expression and posture indicate frustration and 
annoyance. 
In these panels we can recognize Susan Squier’s observation that “Rather than leaving 
the disabled person unable to narrate or represent his full experience…comics make that 
narrative most fully possible because they include its pre-verbal components: the gestural, 
embodied physicality of disabled alterity in its precise and valuable specificity” (86). Because 
Paul is representing both experiences—his own and that of his brother—there is a risk of seeing 
David as simply an entity in Paul’s world. But the medium allows for distinct styles and modes 
of representation that can accentuate aspects of lived experiences depending on the subject. 
Thus, without presuming to know his brother’s thoughts, Pau allows David to speak for himself 
through gestures. And we, as readers, are encouraged to ‘listen’ to these gestures. This ‘listening’ 
is distinct from how we ‘listen’ to Paul simply because the inner monologue tells us what he is 
thinking and feeling in various situations. When it comes to Paul, we as readers are less engaged 
in that enthymematic process by which we supply that which is implied to the senses—in this 
case, that he is apprehensive and even embarrassed. In contrast, the absence of an inner 
monologue for David encourages us as readers to attend more fully to his actions in order to 
derive from them the emotional state they imply, emphasizing the role of the body in interpreting 
David’s experience. 
That said, David is often vocal, though not always in conventional ways. Throughout The 
Ride Together he is shown engaging in echolalia—the repetition of particular words and phrases. 
For David this most often involves recalling the names of the various barbers at a shop used by 
the Karasik family. As Yergeau and Heilker observe, echolalia is not unlike the recitation 
encouraged by rhetors in the studying of commonplace texts: 
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Let us consider, for instance, echolalia, a characteristic kind of language use among 
autistics, in which they repeat stock words and phrases verbatim that they have heard 
other speakers use. Typically, this behavior is seen as an impairment, a deficiency that 
needs to be alleviated. But if we listen rhetorically, this repeated use of stock material 
starts sounding more like a traditional and valued kind of invention. In the middle ages 
and early Renaissance, students were trained to keep what were known as 
“commonplace” books, large journals in which they meticulously copied down, verbatim, 
words, phrases, sentences, and even entire dialogues and passages from other speakers 
that they thought noteworthy. And they were likewise trained to deploy this stock 
material regularly as they composed. (491) 
But David doesn’t simply recite the words himself. Rather, he frequently begins a list or phrase, 
only to pause and ask those around him for the next word in the sequence. If rhetoric is thought 
of in the enthymematic sense of one word bringing forth another, then these moments in which 
David invites those nearby to supply the next word in a series could be interpreted as moments of 
sharing enthymemes, of inviting others into a common place.  
How echolalia is depicted in the comic reinforces this interpretation. In fact, comics, as 
an explicitly enthymematic medium, are ideally suited to representing the ways in which 
echolalia bring forth more than just words. In this case, seeing David engage in echolalia in a 
visual, verbal, and gestural medium allows us, as readers, to perceive the various senses involved 
in this situating practice. What’s more, Paul illustrates this bringing forth in such a way that it 
realizes a distinct commonplace for David than it does for Paul. This can be seen when David 
and Paul first enter the movie theatre, at which point David prompts Paul to finish the sentence, 
“Today, on ‘Face the Nation’ I’m going to do secretary of state Henry M…who?” (123). 
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Through Paul’s inner-monologue we know that he’s embarrassed by this, and as such he’s 
slouched, collar propped up so as to conceal his face from the nearby ticket attendant. But when 
the attendant replies, “Kissinger?”  we see David gleefully repeating the word, “KISSINGER!!” 
He once again drums his fingers on his head but this time he’s smiling, his posture indicating 
excitement. In these panels we, as readers, clearly see how sharing in enthymemes makes David 
more at ease and comfortable with where he is. Paul, caught up in his emotional state, is less 
aware of this.  
But as the film starts and David moves on to a new set of stock words—this time a phrase 
he derives from the movie—Paul begins to accept that he’s projected his embarrassment beyond 
his own experience. As David gleefully exclaims, “Moe…Larry…CHEESE!!”, Paul shushes him 
emphatically, only to be rebuked by another movie goer who sternly says, “Ahem, perhaps you 
should be quiet, young man…”(126). Paul reacts in his inner-monologue, “Geez, what a 
grump…But he’s right…Nobody cares about David’s outbursts…Nobody but me!” (126). As 
Paul comes to accept that his experience is not one shared by others the actions between the 
panels begin to influence one another. A pie thrown on screen by one of the stooges strikes the 
audience. Soon the stooges themselves emerge from the screen, causing comedic mayhem. In 
this moment we are encouraged to see this as David’s world—indeed, his commonplace, in 
which films and television shows are far more engaging, immersive, and compelling.  
This scene recalls Paul Heilker’s interpretation of his son’s commonplaces: 
When he returns to his obsessive topics of interest… understanding autism as a rhetoric 
lets me see that he is returning to his favorite inventive universes, that he wants to share 
topoi in those universes which he continues to find valuable over long stretches of time, 
that bear repeated usage. When he recites long strings of stock discourse—reciting the 
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entire script of the movie Toy Story, as he did once on a long vacation car ride—I 
understand that he is choosing to repeat—to inhabit for a short time, in a world that is 
endlessly in flux—a very familiar and comforting rhetorical structure. (488) 
Paul Karasik seems to have arrived at a similar observation. On the ride home from the movies, 
David recites the words, “Moe…Larry…” and before he can finish Paul chimes in, “…Cheese!” 
Then altogether they both happily recite the entire phrase.  
In these and various other ways The Ride Together shows us, as readers, how David 
constructs his world as understood by his brother and sister. This construction exhibits numerous 
rhetorical strategies—in this case relating to an autistic rhetoric—that work to situate David in a 
commonplace. By demonstrating that rhetoric through the multimodal process of reading a 
comic, the authors train their audience to recognize those strategies. The audience can, in turn, 
deploy that rhetoric to guide their own constructions of autistic experience. That rhetoric is at 
once necessary in that it makes empathetic imagination accountable to the lived experience of the 
subject but it is also fallible, always subject to revision in regards to individual instances and new 
information. 
Ultimately, what El Deafo and The Ride Together demonstrate is a novel kind of 
commonplace book, one that leverages the multimodal affordances to convey the various and 
diverse ways in which people make sense of their place in the world. In the next chapter I look at 





Chapter 3: Commonplace Videogames 
 
In the first chapter I argued that our bodies and senses produce a common sense of place 
or a sensory commonplace. Within our sensory commonplaces we discover poetic genera, 
various ways of making sense. Since our bodies and senses differ so too do our poetic genera. 
These differences are reflected in our ‘true stories,’ autobiographical accounts of our 
commonplaces. In light of this I put forward the notion of commonplace texts—multi-modal 
texts that collate the ‘true stories’ by a subject on various topics. Commonplace texts allow us to 
represent our commonplaces and thus to share the means of discovering poetic genera. Last 
chapter this gave rise to the notion of a commonplace comic book, a didactic text that provides 
instruction through the multi-modal rhetoric of the comics medium.  
 In this chapter I posit the notion of a commonplace videogame. What distinguishes 
commonplace videogames from other media is that they are procedural and participatory. In 
terms of the former, I argue that whereas stories convey poetic genera, games are a means of 
procedurally generating stories. That is to say, I conceive of games as representing various 
sensory, social, and/or cultural places; in playing games we generate accounts of these places. 
These accounts, in turn, teach players the poetic genera that are inherent to those places. 
Working in concert with the procedural aspects of games is that they are also participatory and 
interactive in that they invite players to use the poetic genera inherent to a particular place in 
producing an account of that place. This reading is reinforced by noting that games function 
through procedural enthymemes (Bogost), arguments completed through interaction. By enacting 
the procedural enthymemes in a commonplace videogame, players bring forth an account of that 
place that makes sense. In this way commonplace videogames are a novel instance of didactic 
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new media in the way that they train players to understand that knowledge of the world is 
situated through various places or positions in the world. 
In what follows I define commonplace videogames and provide an overview of their 
common features. I then describe how these games function rhetorically through procedural and 
participatory arguments that involve various senses. I go on to note how games are particularly 
suited to creating a common sense of place through their unique blend of play, place, and poiesis. 
Videogames are, I suggest, topoietic media—they bring forth (poiesis) a sense of place (topos) 
and in doing so they foster the exchange of poietic genera that are inherent to those places. 
 
Commonplace Videogames 
By putting forward the notion of a commonplace videogame I mean to both build upon 
the conventional understanding of the commonplace book and, in some sense, demonstrate how 
digital media surpasses print in its capacity to represent the commonplaces. To review, a 
commonplace book contains various phrases, expressions, fables, and allegories on a particular 
topic. Students were instructed to study these commonplace books so as to develop their capacity 
to invent or discover various arguments and argumentative techniques. In this sense they can be 
thought of as an “information retrieval system” (Moss 53). But while this suffices for training in 
conventional discursive forms of invention, I want to develop a sensory and embodied invention, 
and thus the notion of an explicitly multimodal commonplace text is more appropriate. That said, 
I want to retain the notion that the topics depicted in commonplace books “represent the ‘forms 
and rules of things deep-seated in nature’” (Moss 54). These forms and rules are indeed deep-
seated but not so much within nature (whatever that might be) but within the body, the mind, 
society, and culture. Games are ideally suited to convey differences between topics or places in 
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that they are explicitly concerned with variations in forms and rules. But games do more than 
just play with rules, for in playing different games we produce different accounts or stories that 
have been shaped by those forms and rules. 31 
In describing videogames as a means of generating accounts I’m following Michel de 
Certeau when he suggests that cultural and social rules become embodied “in the specific games 
of each society” (22). He goes on to note that, “in replaying the games, in telling about them, 
these accounts record the rules and the moves simultaneously. To be memorized as well as 
memorable, they are repertories of schemas of action between partners…[and] these mementos 
teach the tactics possible within a given (social) system” (23).32 As seen last chapter, 
autobiographies and memoirs can be thought of as accounts of various commonplaces in which 
authors record their poetic genera through the multi-modality of the comics medium. 
Commonplace videogames extend this process in that they allow players to procedurally 
generate accounts of various places—be them sensory, social, or cultural. These accounts are 
themselves narratives of particular places, stories produced by performing the poetic genera 
inherent to that place. Such a relationship between player and game, it is worth noting, is not 
unlike the relationship between reader and text described by post-structuralist theorists such as 
Jacques Derrida33 and Roland Barthes. For instance, Barthes observes that “’playing’ must be 
understood…in all its polysemy: the text itself plays…and the reader plays twice over, playing 
the Text as one plays a game, looking for a practice which re-produces it…” (Barthes 162). 
                                                          
31 It is worth noting that the relationship between games and stories is a recurrent topic in the field of game 
studies, with some scholars believing that games are inherently narratological while others argue that the ludic 
aspect of games are obscured by adherence to stories and texts (see First-Person: New Media as Story, 
Performance, and Game). My approach is to take a very broad understanding of narrative as a description or 
account of the world.  
32 Katie Salen and Eric Zimmerman provide a similar observation when they write that, “games are social contexts 
for cultural learning. This means that games are one place where the values of a society are embodied and passed 
on” (Salen and Zimmerman). 
33 See, for instance, “Structure, Sign, and Play.” 
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When the text is about the ordinary, quotidian, or commonplace then the practice which re-
produces it is an everyday practice, a tactic or commonplace technique. Thus, it was argued last 
chapter that in sharing stories we are relating far more than mundane descriptions of the world; 
instead we are relating how we come to situate ourselves in the world through particular sensory 
practices or poetic genera. Games have their players enact these practices, producing knowledge 
of that situation or place in the form of a narrative account.  
By narrative I mean a very broad sense of the term. Narratives are the result of us making 
sense, a process which, as Vico noted, gives rise to ‘true poetic allegories’ or ‘true stories.’ These 
‘true stories’ begin as prelinguistic sensory metaphors, a kind of sensory story that helps us 
explain the world and our place in it. Here it might be helpful to recall Donald Phillip Verne’s 
description of the poetic genera as a means of “regarding sensibility, feeling, or expression as a 
form of thought” (92). In this way the poetic genera tell stories through an embodied and sensory 
language. Media, in turn, allow us to reproduce these stories through signs and rhetoric. The 
argument in this chapter is that the multi-modal affordances of videogames allow us to tell these 
stories in a language more commensurate with the originary language of the body and the senses. 
In fact, it is worth noting that when de Certeau suggested that games record the various 
rules and tactics of a society he was writing at a time when card games and boardgames were 
virtually the only kinds of games. That is to say, he was writing before the emergence of 
videogames as a cultural phenomenon and so it is important to recognize the sheer number of 
digital games that have emerged over the past thirty years. Such games span across cultures and 
platforms, including mobile phones, webpages, game consoles, tablets, and computers. Within 
this outpouring of videogames there is a specific genre which is ideally captures de Certeau’s 
interest on everyday practices, what I call commonplace videogames. The following table (Table 
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1) contains several notable commonplace videogames. The list isn’t meant to be comprehensive; 
rather it shows the breadth of topics being addressed by a diverse range of game designers.  
Title Description 
Alz A game that uses a glitch aesthetic—flickering, shifting images and sounds—
to represent the impact of Alzheimer’s disease on memory and cognition. 
Auti-Sim Play from the perspective of an autistic child at a playground who experiences 
auditory hypersensitivity. 
Beyond Eyes Players take on the role of a recently blinded child as she sets out in search of 
her missing cat. 
Depression 
Quest 
An interactive narrative informed by the game designers’ experiences with 
depression. 
Dys4ia A series of interactive game sequences intended to reflect the designer’s 
experience of gender dysphoria. 
Mainichi A representation of the day-to-day life the designer, Mattie Brice, and her 
experience as a trans woman. 
Papers, Please As a border guard of a fictitious country, you are tasked with balancing the 
draconian immigration laws you are paid to enforce with the well-being of 
your family that depends on your gainful employment. 
Stasis A simulation of verbal harassment directed at women on city streets, inspired 
by the game designer’s own experiences with street harassment. 
That Dragon, 
Cancer 
Parents Ryan and Amy Green depict their experience raising a child 
diagnosed with a terminal form of cancer at the age of twelve months.  
The Oldest 
Game 
A game intended to raise awareness of the lived experiences of sex workers in 
Canada, specifically in relation to new legislation that could adversely affect 
such individuals. 
Table 2. Commonplace games. 
Despite the broad range of topics there are a number of recurrent themes throughout 
commonplace videogames. Here I’ve outlined five by noting that commonplace games are 
uncommon, practical, personal, invitational, and accustomary. First, each game—implicitly or 
explicitly—addresses a topic in Western culture that is socially or culturally uncommon, by 
which I mean prone to being misunderstood, misrepresented, and/or under-represented. For 
instance, the makers of Depression Quest state that the game is intended to “illustrate as clearly 
as possible what depression is like, so that it may be better understood by people without 
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depression” (Depression Quest). The designers behind The Oldest Game intend it to inform 
Canadians about the practical impact that recently introduced legislation will have on sex 
workers—individuals who are frequently misrepresented in popular media as destitute, depraved, 
and/or helpless people who are at the same time somehow less deserving of respect, compassion, 
and understanding. In Mainichi Mattie Brice puts forward a representation of her everyday 
experiences as a transgender woman. She describes the game as, among other things, “a tool for 
a trans* person to share with their friends if they have the same trouble explaining like I did” 
(“Postpartum: Mainichi – How Personal Experience Became a Game”).  
 Another recurrent theme throughout these games is their focus on the practical, mundane, 
and personal. In this way commonplace games are similar to what Alexander Galloway calls 
realist games, which he defines as “those games that reflect critically on the minutiae of 
everyday life” (75).  Papers, Please, for instance, has you operating a border patrol booth—
stamping passports, verifying identification papers, scanning individuals for contraband, etc. 
Shifts in the booth are interspersed with moments in which you spend your wage to pay rent, 
heat your home, purchase medicine, and support your family. Since the game ties your wages to 
your performance and willingness to enforce discriminatory laws, simple mistakes like 
overlooking a typo or moral decisions like allowing individuals to (illegally) reunite with their 
spouses all exist within a practical, everyday context. In Mainichi—Japanese for ‘everyday’—
Brice set out to convey her quotidian experiences, describing the game as “an experiment in 
sharing a personal experience through a game system. It helps communicate daily occurances 
[sic] that happen in my life, exploring the difficulty in expressing these feelings in words. As 
well, it stands as a commentary of how we currently use game design for broad strokes of 
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universal experiences instead of the hyper-personal, and often exclude minority voices” 
(“Mainichi”).  
A third theme here is that many commonplace games are autobiographical (Dys4ia, 
Mainichi), based on personal experiences (Depression Quest, Stasis,), or created in consultation 
with those they represent (The Oldest Game). Such personal games carry with them unique 
representative characteristics where the rules, conditions, and mechanics of the game provide an 
additional means of representing experience. In Dys4ia game designer Anna Anthropy presents a 
series of mini-games—some novel in design, others repurposed versions of classics—that reflect 
her experience undergoing hormone replacement therapy. Each mini-game has its own style of 
representation, controls, and mechanics that are meant to reinforce a particular portion of the 
autobiographical narrative. For instance, the game opens with an oblong object next to a barrier 
with a narrow passage (Fig. 1). As indicated by an upward arrow on the other side of the barrier, 
players are led to believe that the object can be navigated through the passage. But in attempting 
to do so they find that its shape does not allow for this. As players discover this, the following 
message appears on the screen: “I feel weird about my body.” And with that a new mini-game 
begins. These simple interactions provide the player with just enough freedom of control to 
realize the underlying argument—in this case, the act of navigating an object through a 
discoherent space parallels the sense of gender dysphoria and its effect on the perception of one’s 




Fig. 5 Dys4ia. In one of the opening gameplay scenes the player is tasked with guiding a 
geometric shape (bottom) through a somewhat analogous gap in a wall (top). 
The fourth theme here is that commonplace games—like all games—begin by accepting 
an invitation to play. While this could be understood simply as an offer to engage in gameplay, 
invitation here can also be interpreted in the rhetorical sense given to it by Koss and Griffin. 
Invitational rhetoric “constitutes an invitation to the audience to enter the rhetor’s world and to 
see it as the rhetor does” (5). By accepting the invitation to play, players also accept the 
invitation to ‘see’ what is brought forth from a particular position in the (game) world. The game 
designers behind Depression Quest describe the game as “an amalgamation of the experiences of 
the developers and several people close to them” (Depression Quest); it is an invitation to enter a 
very personal and at times uncomfortable place. They go on to state that, “This game is not 
meant to be a fun or lighthearted experience.” Thus, unlike most conventional invitations to play 
for fun, leisure, or escape, commonplace games are invitations to play for a heightened sense of 
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awareness, understanding, and, ultimately, empathy. This is aided by the fact that invitations to 
play are voluntary, such that they foster an openness to difference on the part of the player—i.e. 
an openness to a different set of rules and relationships.  
A fifth commonality of commonplace games is that they establish a vicarious familiarity 
with lived-experiences through gameplay. Stasis is a game developed by Swetha Kannan to 
represent the toll everyday street harassment can take on women. The game starts with a woman 
missing her bus home. As she begins walking she passes various men, some of whom begin to 
verbally harass her (Fig. 2). Their words appear in comic book-style speech balloons, with 
phrases like “Great legs, sweetheart!” and “Don’t be rude, it was a compliment!” But while these 
messages might appear in a comic as static phrases, in Stasis they are given weight and lasting 
influence by actually preventing the player character from advancing. Gameplay involves 
‘deflecting’ the comments by dragging them out of the character’s way. Fail to do so and the 
balloons slow and eventually stop her progress. Kannan has stated that, “I wanted players to feel 
the growing sense of tedium, annoyance, and discomfort that women feel when facing street 
harassment” (qtd. in Joho). The repetitive and iterative nature of play within a predefined set of 
rules lends itself to communicating those aspects of street harassment that are otherwise 
imperceptible in other media—namely, the growing sense of frustration in which the weight of 
disrespectful, insulting, and aggressive comments influence the sense of space and time, which is 




Fig. 6. Stasis. Here we see speech balloons containing various phrases that men have uttered to 
the player-character. During gameplay the balloons prevent the player-character from advancing. 
Procedurally Generated Accounts 
What I want to turn to now is an examination of how these characteristics combine such 
that commonplace games can be thought to procedurally generate “accounts [that] record the 
rules and the moves” (23) of various sensory, social, and/or cultural situations. Since these 
games represent the commonplaces I want to think of these accounts as ‘true poetic allegories’ or 
‘true stories.’ Following Vico, sensory experience leads us to invent or create stories that make 
sense of our experience. Since our bodies and senses differ from one another, we necessarily tell 
different but nevertheless true stories. These stories are true not in a universal, unconditional 
sense, but in the localized and situated sense of feminist objectivity. It follows that in playing 
these games players become situated in various common places and their actions lead them to 
produce accounts of those places. In this way commonplace games teach players how to situate 
knowledges in various places. 
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In making this argument I am conceiving of games, and especially videogames, as a 
means of representing sensory topoi. That is to say, games create a sense of place in which one 
finds common relationships or enthymemes that are inherent to that place. But whereas written 
and graphic representations tend to imply enthymematic relationships, games ask players to 
perform or enact such relationships. Ian Bogost emphasizes this distinction in his concept of the 
procedural enthymeme: “Good games often use what I’ve called procedural enthymeme: the 
player literally fills in the missing portion of an argument by interacting with the game, through 
actions constrained by its rules” (“The Metaphysics Videogame - Part 1: Why a Videogame?”). 
For instance, in Super Mario World players encounter gaps that cannot be crossed using the 
normal jump function. But since Super Mario World is a linear, side-scrolling game where 
moving from left to right is the only means of progression, it’s implied that there is indeed a way 
to cross (See Fig 3). The gap, in other words, is a kind of argument that the player completes by 
using the available means of interaction to fill in the implied action. In this case, players interact 




Fig. 7. In the first set of screenshots the player tries to jump without holding down the run 
button. In the second set the player has discovered that the context calls for the run button to be 
pressed in order to make the jump. As readers we fill in the gaps between these images as we 
would fill in the space between comic book panels. As a player, however, the gap—in this case 
literally a gap between platforms—is filled in through an action that is also the discovery of a 
specific tactic. (Super Mario World) 
What this example illustrates is that games create interactive topoi, commonplaces in 
which players discover various enthymematic relationships through actions. A commonplace, as 
noted in the first chapter, is a collection of enthymemes or common relationships. By studying 
the commonplaces rhetors held that one could discover various techniques for making arguments 
based on those common relationships. Similarly, a game, as Bogost argues, is a series of “nested 
enthymemes” (Persuasive Games 43). This can be seen in the way that games are often 
composed of various levels, configurations, or scenarios in which players discover tactics based 
on the relationships inherent to those situations. In the case of Super Mario World, the rules 
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governing Mario’s movement, run speed, and momentum create a common set of relationships 
between avatar and world. The various levels then constitute numerous situations that draw on 
those common relationships in such a way that they foster the discovery of tactics or the poetic 
genera inherent to the game world. However, it can be added here that each act of discovery is an 
account of the game, a story that once read makes sense of the game world. For instance, the 
player’s attempts to cross the gap, and his/her eventual realization of the means of doing so, tells 
the story in which the run-and-jump tactic was first discovered or invented. In reciting this story 
as they play, players bring forth knowledge of the game world such that they no longer perceive 
untraversable gaps/incomplete arguments but instead they are persuaded to see a common set of 
procedures and actions that make the game world navigable and the argument complete. In fact, 
this story gets repeated throughout the game as the design of the levels prompt the player to 
recite the story at various points and in various ways, much like variations of allegories and 
fables tell the same story in different ways. In this manner it could be said that the player is 
“playing the Text…looking for a practice which re-produces it…” (Barthes 162). The practice of 
running and jumping reproduces a larger portion of the game’s narrative, its vera narration or 
‘true story.’ 
In commonplace games, however, the practice that re-produces the narrative takes on 
new meaning. Consider The Oldest Game, for instance, in which players engage in the various 
everyday activities of a sex worker, such as finding clients, evaluating risks, and managing one’s 
finances. While these same everyday practices are conveyed through the personal narratives of 
sex workers, The Oldest Game creates a place or situation in which players can invent or 
discover such tactics for themselves. For instance, it is one thing to hear from a sex worker 
who’s had to balance the potential risks some clients present against the potential fiduciary 
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compensation of engaging with such clients, but it is another to encounter such a scenario within 
a larger context in which the immediate value that money would provide is appreciable. The 
Oldest Game provides that larger, practical context, such that in playing a player can account for 
his or her actions. That account, whether it is vocalized or not, is a kind of poetic allegory, a way 
of making sense of one’s practical situation or place. 
That said, I am not suggesting that commonplace games are providing players with the 
actual experience being depicted; rather, the game is teaching its players the tactics needed to 
make sense of that experience.  For instance, players of The Oldest Game can better understand 
or make sense of the rationale behind taking on potentially dangerous clients without undergoing 
the experience themselves. Another example here is the difference between the game Stasis and 
the personal narrative that inspired its creation. Stasis creator Swetha Kannan related one such 
account of harassment to a journalist, Jess Joho, who provides the following summary: 
The real-life event that inspired Stasis was a particularly frightening experience Swetha 
had as she waited for the bus in a crowd of people. A man stood uncomfortably close to 
her while repeatedly asking obscene questions about her sexual history. But since that’s 
not uncommon, what actually stood out to Swetha was how “he kept saying things like 
‘don’t be scared, and ‘I’m not gonna do anything,’ and laughing about it. 
The article goes on to relate that Kannan eventually paid the man to stop harassing and 
humiliating her in public, a decision situated in the knowledge that if she took a more assertive 
approach the man may have become more aggressive and potentially violent. This narrative 
account captures a commonplace occurrence, but when presented as an isolated incident it risks 
being misconstrued as though it were not part of a larger cultural pattern. For instance, the 
journalist goes on to write that, 
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Swetha’s experience…reveals a prevalent misconception about street harassment: more 
times than not, it actually has little to do with sex or desire. It’s about male power. Street 
harassment is about men taking pleasure in exercising their privilege over women, and 
their assumed rights over their bodies. It’s about men inflicting patriarchal authority over 
us, because they can, and because they like to remind us that they can. (Soho) 
By presenting street harassment as something iterative rather than isolated, Stasis makes its point 
within the context of a larger pattern, the systemic sense of patriarchal authority men exercise 
over women in public. Indeed, Nivetha Kannan, Swetha’s sister who consulted on the game’s 
concept, remarked that “when we were developing the system, we wanted to really focus on that 
repetition. When the speech bubbles block your path once or twice, it's mildly annoying. The 
third and fourth time, it’s aggravating. But by the end, when the woman cannot walk very fast or 
far at all, it’s absolutely enraging” (qtd. in Joho). Street harassment might seem like an unnerving 
experience when presented as a single incident, but situated within a larger cultural context, 
players learn to make sense of the broader patterns at play. 
 These larger patterns at work in individual, practical situations can also be seen in 
everyday labour. In Papers, Please players take on the role of a border guard who must enforce 
the harsh immigration laws of a fictitious communist regime. The player character earns money 
for the number of persons processed in a day, payment that’s needed to provide food and shelter 
for his family. But the work is monotonous as it involves examining minute details of various 
documents, as well as scrutinizing the appearance, gender, and behaviour of applicants. 
Eventually, players realize that if they are to succeed they will need to invent or discover various 
tactics to facilitate processing applicants. These tactics are not readily apparent until after play 
has begun; rather the situation gives rise to them, creating a context in which they make sense as 
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reasonable courses of action. For myself, I developed various ways of organizing the documents 
to expedite the process, I learned to quickly skim for keywords and phrases in their rationales for 
traveling/immigrating, and I omitted details from my consideration that didn’t pertain to the 
immigration criteria. In short, I learned to dehumanize people, not because of a strategy I brought 
into the game but because the rules of Papers, Please (i.e. immigration laws, in conjunction with 
the practical consideration for my character and his family) created a situation in which I 
rationalized or made sense of this course of action. While we may decry such tactics for being 
unethical or immoral, I would suggest that in order to properly critique them, and their origins, 
we must first locate them in those rules, laws, and systems that bring them forth. 
 
Fig. 8. Papers, Please. On the top we see the immigration queue. Bottom left is the current 
applicant and on the bottom right are the various documents the player must review. 
What I want to look to now are the ways in which commonplace videogames can be 
thought to share tactics or poetic genera through rhetorics. Commonplace videogames, it will be 
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shown, participate in that aspect of embodied invention where we discover rhetorics and deploy 
them to facilitate empathy in the form of inter-cultural imagination.  
 
Games and Rhetoric 
In Rules of Play Katie Salen and Eric Zimmerman provide a comprehensive analysis of 
games, including various approaches to game design. One of these approaches is to treat games 
as cultural rhetoric: “Games…help to instill or fortify a culture's value system. Seeing games as 
social contexts for cultural learning acknowledges how games replicate, reproduce, and 
sometimes transform cultural beliefs and principles. This way of looking at games as ideological 
systems forms the basis of…Games as Cultural Rhetoric” (516). In making this claim the authors 
take as their inspiration the work of Brian Sutton-Smith who proposed various rhetorics of play. 
Sutton-Smith was interested in how play is depicted in culture and he identified seven prominent 
rhetorics: play as progress, fate, power, identity, the imaginary, the self, and frivolity. He 
remarks that: “The larger play rhetorics are part of the multiple broad symbolic systems—
political, religious, social, and educational—through which we construct the meaning of the 
cultures in which we live” (The Ambiguity of Play 9).  
In contrast to Sutton-Smith there is the concept of procedural rhetoric put forward by Ian 
Bogost, which he bases on the aforementioned concept of procedural enthymemes. As Bogost 
notes, whereas Sutton-Smith is “focused on the cultural role of play” Bogost seeks to explore 
“the culturally embodied practice of playing specific games” (Persuasive Games 52).  In 
highlighting the distinction between the two approaches Bogost looks to Salen and Zimmerman 
and their discussion of games as cultural rhetoric. Therein the authors describe two games—The 
Landlord’s Game and Monopoly. Both are board games, but whereas the former sets out to 
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depict the exploitative relationship between private landowners and renters, the latter celebrates 
the accumulation of wealth and the exploitation of tenants. For Salen and Zimmerman these 
games exemplify the distinction Sutton-Smith makes between the play rhetorics of (social) 
progress and (private) power. But for Bogost the differences in rhetorics “refer not to Sutton-
Smith’s cultural rhetorics, but to the procedural rhetorics of the two specific games…” (53). He 
goes on to write that “the more useful intersection between rhetoric and play is one that unpacks 
the particular rules of a particular game in a particular context, not the more general intersection 
between modes of play in general” (54). 
In talking about commonplace games and rhetoric I want to explore the relationship 
between these two approaches. And so I draw from Bogost’s theory of procedural rhetoric, 
especially insofar as it posits games as a series of procedural enthymemes, but I also want to 
explore the ways in which games embody and contest cultural rhetorics and therefore foster  
inter-cultural communication. Commonplace games serve as an interesting case study here as 
they frequently interrogate the incongruity between personal rhetorics and dominant cultural 
norms. For instance, the procedural rhetoric of a game like Stasis is perhaps best understood in 
relation to the rhetoric of play as power. For while the procedures of the game persuade players 
of the exhausting and demeaning effects of street harassment, it is important to situate this within 
patriarchal culture that normalizes and legitimizes the actions of men who are themselves 
playing a game. Take, for example, the specific account of harassment that prompted the game’s 
creation in which we are told that the man “kept saying things like ‘don’t be scared, and ‘I’m not 
gonna do anything,’ and laughing about it” (Kannan qtd. in Soho)—he was, in a manner of 
speaking, ‘just playing.’ Sutton-Smith defines the rhetoric of play as power as “the use of play as 
the representation of conflict and as a way to fortify the status of those who control the play or 
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are its heroes. The rhetoric is as ancient as warfare and patriarchy” (10). Understanding the 
relationship between personal and cultural rhetorics helps us come to terms with the ways in 
which culture invites certain players to enact particular kinds of play. 
As another example, one could also look at the rhetoric surrounding disability and the 
procedural rhetoric of commonplace games such as Beyond Eyes and Auti-Sim. In Disability 
Rhetoric Jay Dolmage outlines a number of disability myths in popular culture, such as disability 
as object of pity and/or charity. A game such as Beyond Eyes, where players take on the role of a 
recently blinded child as she sets out in search of her missing cat, risks playing into this rhetoric 
surrounding disability. This is because in an ableist culture people are encouraged to interpret 
such experiences of persons with disabilities as a diminutive variation of a more originary, able-
bodied mode of experience. For instance, reviewers have remarked how the player character in 
Beyond Eyes moves too slowly and that the game elicits frustration when objects reveal 
themselves to be something other than what they first appeared to be (Justin McElroy & Griffin 
McElroy). In other words, their expectations, which have been shaped by games featuring fast-
moving adult able-bodies and visually complex objects, precondition how they interpret the 
experience being represented, inhibiting a deeper recognition of the actual lived experience of 
being blind. Such games could be said to use the rhetoric of play as ableism where play is used to 
fortify the status of the able-bodied subject.34 
                                                          
34 Much more could be said about this topic. Indeed, scholars working in both disability studies and game studies 
have produced numerous works that delve into these topics more fully. See for instance, Carr 2014; Powers, 
Nguyen, & Frieden 2015; Gibbons 2015. It is also worth pointing out that commercial producers of videogames 
have, historically, considered the able-bodied subject as their primary and perhaps only player. The design of 
videogame controllers, the use of fixed colour schemes, the recurrent disclaimer regarding epileptic seizures, and 
diminutive font sizes are just some of the ways in which console producers and game developers make 
videogames inaccessible. That said, some companies have made progress in this area, such as allowing controller 
buttons to be remapped across games and interfaces that can be re-coloured. 
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Ultimately, the problem with eliding cultural rhetorics in favour of “the culturally 
embodied practice of playing specific games” (52) is that it inhibits the intercultural and 
intercorporeal affordances of play.  But, conversely, focusing exclusively on cultural rhetorics to 
the exclusion of personal, bodily and sensory rhetorics risks overlooking the agency individuals 
have in constructing their own representations of the world. For instance, while Salen and 
Zimmerman observe that “the formal and experiential structures of games echo and reinforce 
external cultural rhetorics” (517), it important to note that the inverse is also true; games can also 
introduce various rhetorics into and across cultures. Mainichi and Dys4ia, for instance, convey 
rhetorics keyed to the experiences of their authors. The former seeks to convey how one sign or 
thought brings forth another in the experience of Mattie Brice, the designer, but the game also 
seeks to share the relationships common to the experience of transgender women in general. 
Similarly, Dys4ia reflects Anna Anthropy’s personal experience of gender dysphoria. She 
describes it as “an autobiographical game about the period in my life when i [sic] started 
hormone replacement therapy” (Anthropy). But it also puts forward relationships that others 
undergoing such therapy might identify with, and in this way the procedural enthymemes of the 
game parallel a rhetoric that is common to those who have undergone such an experience. For 
those who are not themselves personally familiar with such experiences gameplay becomes a 
means of echoing and reinforcing personal, intercultural rhetorics.35 
 
Play and Place 
Rhetorics, as already noted, are inherent to particular places; they assist in making or 
bringing forth (poiesis) knowledge of a particular situation. But play, it should be noted, has a 
                                                          




unique relationship to both poiesis and place. This could be meant simply as “[t]he design of a 
game…is a representation of ideas and values of a particular time and place” (Salen & 
Zimmerman 517) but I want to suggest that games, and especially commonplace videogames, 
convey something more deeply phenomenological and ontological. To begin, play theorist Johan 
Huizinga has argued that poiesis is equivalent to play (Homo Ludens 119) and play always 
occurs in a particular place (10). If we accept that poiesis—as a bringing forth—is similar to 
rhetoric—as the way that one thought or sign brings forth another—then Huizinga’s description 
of play offers a topical and rhetorical approach to theorizing gameplay. This takes on new 
meaning when it comes to videogames as technologies of play. Martin Heidegger, for example, 
has discussed technology itself as a form of poiesis—it is the art of bringing forth into presence 
(10). Concurrently, Heidegger conceives of being as a means of bringing forth a place in the 
world.36 If poiesis is at the same time rhetorical and ludic, then technologies of play—i.e. 
videogames—are a means of bringing forth a persuasive sense of place. Taken together, 
Huizinga and Heidegger provide grounds for thinking of videogames as topoietic technologies. 
The word poiesis, as already noted, refers to the act of making, creating, or bringing-forth. The 
word topos means ‘place.’ To think of videogames as topoietic is to suggest that they bring forth 
a sense of place. Embodied invention takes place through a particular kind of topoiesis, where 
that which is brought forth is a sense of place that is common or familiar to a particular person, 
community, or culture. In order to unpack this claim, it is worth delving into the relationships 
between poiesis, place, and technologies of play. 
As Huizinga writes, “Poiesis…is a play-function. It proceeds within the play-ground of 
the mind, in a world of its own which the mind creates for it” (119). Understanding why 
Huzinga’s applies poiesis to play, however, involves understanding the relationship between play 
                                                          
36 See Malpas, Heidegger’s Topology. 
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and imagination. In Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play-element in Culture, Huizinga remarks 
that “The most we can say of the function that is operative in the process of image-making or 
imagination is that it is a poetic function; and we define it best of all by calling it a function of 
play—the ludic function, in fact” (25). In speaking of imagination as poetic Huizinga is referring 
specifically to poiesis as an act of making—hence imagination as image-making. He goes on to 
write that, “Nobody has grasped, or expressed, the primordial nature of poetry and its relation to 
pure play more clearly than Vico, more than two hundred years ago” (119). As we saw last 
chapter, imagination plays a crucial role in Vico’s theory of invention, but so does the concept of 
poiesis in that it introduces a praxical component to imaginative discovery. As one scholar puts 
it, “Vico’s poiesis was…a way of seeing” (Gavin 32), a kind of imaginative, inventive vision. 
Poiesis as a kind of making should be understood alongside Vico’s belief that ‘the true and the 
made are interchangeable’ (verum et factum convertuntur). As another scholar observes, “Vico’s 
notion here is quite simple: humans can only know what humans make. We make our own 
truth…” (Price 66). This applies to the senses in that knowing is a means of sense making; 
Vico’s imaginative and sensory invention refers to this process by which we discover knowledge 
through making sense. In this context, videogames appear to have considerable heuristic 
potential in that they use various modalities (e.g. visual, audile, haptic, and proprioceptive) in 
conjunction with a set of rules to establish common relationships (i.e. enthymemes) between the 
senses. In this way videogames represent various sensory places, groups of sensory enthymemes 
collected under a common heading. Given that the rules by which enthymemes are create are 
bodily and sensory as well as social and cultural, such places can be thought of as embodied. 
Hence the notion of embodied invention.  
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The relationship between play and place, it is worth noting, has long captivated play 
theorists. A common concept in play theory is the notion of the magic circle: that circumscribed 
play space in which players are asked to adopt a novel set of rules and practices while at the 
same time suspending some of the rules and practices of their own ordinary or commonplace 
lives. Thus, Huizinga describes place as one of the ‘main characteristics of play’ (7) for play is 
something that is “‘played out’ within certain limits of time and place. It contains its own course 
and meaning” (9). He goes on to write that,  
All play moves and has its being within a playground marked off beforehand either 
materially or ideally, deliberately or as a matter of course. Just as there is no formal 
difference between play and ritual, so the ‘consecrated spot’ cannot be formally 
distinguished from the play-ground. The arena, the card-table, the magic circle, the 
temple, the stage, the screen, the tennis court, the court of justice, etc., are all in form and 
function play-grounds, i.e. forbidden spots, isolated, hedged round, hallowed, within 
which special rules obtain. All are temporary worlds within the ordinary world, dedicated 
to the performance of an act apart. (10) 
Gameplay, in other words, is fundamentally topical in nature in that play is always grounded in a 
place or topos. In fact, it could be said that our bodies, situated as they are phenomenologically, 
socially, and culturally, set before us a ground in which we play out our lives. From this process 
we derive a sense of being in the world. 
However, I’d like to introduce a distinction here between being (i.e. existing as a being) 
and ‘being-in-place’ (i.e. being in a particular location in the world). In separating these two 
concepts I’m drawing on Heidegger’s understanding of poiesis. In defining poiesis Heidegger 
looks to Plato who refers to it as a bringing-forth of “what passes over and goes forward into 
121 
 
presencing from that which is not presencing” (Symposium; Heidegger’s translation 10). For 
Heidegger, being and poiesis share this bringing-forth into presence in that being is a realization 
of one’s place in the world. As Jeff Malpas writes in “Heidegger’s Topology of Being,” 
Heidegger’s conception of being can be understood as the “’place-ing of being’” (131). Malpas 
describes this as a kind of “topoi-esis—a gathering/opening of/into place” (131). He goes on to 
note that,  
although the place at issue here is not the idea of some abstract generality—we are 
always brought to place here/there, in this very spot—still there is no one place that can 
be given primacy here, no one place that is privileged in respect of being, no one place 
that alone allows us properly to dwell. The happening of place, as a gathering of world, 
and so as an opening and presencecing, does not distinguish between the Black Forest or 
a Greek island, between Times Square or the Australian outback. There may well be 
differences in the exact manner of the gathering and happening of place in these cases, 
but in each there is a placing, a gathering, an Ereignis. Aside from attentiveness to the 
different character of each such placing, the difficulty is to keep sight of the way in which 
the happening of being is always such a coming to place, and so is always concretely 
placed in this way and yet not exclusive to any one such place. Yet inevitably, of course, 
one will find oneself calling upon one’s own place, one’s vocabulary of place, in the 
attempt to talk about the happening, the place-ing, that is at issue here, and Heidegger is 
certainly no exception here. (131-2) 
What is of interest here is how we communicate those “differences in the exact manner of the 
gathering and happening of place” (131) but not merely between social, cultural, and/or 
geographical places—as Malpas suggests—but between bodies and senses as well. For instance, 
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it is worth noting that Malpas speaks of differences that arise from the same subject being 
located or situated in different spaces (Greek island, Times Square, etc.). But what of those 
differences that arise between different subjects that are located in the same space but 
nevertheless experience a distinct sense of place? Consider, for instance, Sinclair’s assertion that 
“Autism is a way of being. It is pervasive; it colours every experience, every sensation, 
perception, thought, emotion, and encounter, every aspect of existence” (Sinclair, emphasis in 
original). Sinclair’s remarks suggest that when an autist calls upon his or her own sense of place 
that this situation is distinct from that of the neurotypical—both phenomenologically (“it 
colours…every sensation, perception…”) and ontologically (“it colours…every aspect of 
existence”). The result is that even when two subjects are thought to occupy the same space they 
may in fact be situated in distinct places. Rhetorics, I submit, are our means of communicating 
between places. When Heilker and Yergeau speak of an autistic rhetoric they are acknowledging 
a “vocabulary of place”—that is to say, that our language is shaped by our situation in the world.   
Take, for instance, Auti-Sim, a commonplace videogame where players explore a 
playground from the perspective of an autistic child with auditory hypersensitivity. According to 
the game’s description, “Proximity to loud children causes sensory overload for the player, 
impacting cognitive functions. This impact is represented as visual noise and blur, as well as 
audio distortion. Participants described the experience as visceral, insightful and compelling” 
(“Aut-Sim”). The game begins on the outskirts of a playground where a group of children are 
playing in and amongst typical schoolyard equipment. At the outset their cheerful voices can 
faintly be heard in the background. As the player moves closer, the sound increases dramatically. 
Standing in the center of the crowd means the user is being bombarded with excited screaming 
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and the screen quickly fills with static, reflecting the overwhelming and multi-sensory nature of 
auditory hypersensitivity (See Fig 5).  
 
Fig. 9. Auti-Sim. The static on the screen is meant to reflect the impact of loud noises as we see 
abstract models of children obscured by white dots. 
Where Auti-Sim appears most rhetorical and topoietic is in its capacity to evoke a sense 
of place through play. This begins when the game positions the player within a culturally 
common space for play—a children’s playground—but with the simulated relationship between 
sound, sights, and space that accompanies hypersensitivity. In moving the player-character 
throughout the game space the player embarks on a process of discovering potentially novel 
enthymemes—that is relationships between signs such that they come to bring forth or supply 
one another. This occurs through the game’s use of different modal rhetorics to forge a 
relationship between sounds (as emitted by the exuberant children) and discomfort (as exhibited 
by the painful loudness of the sounds and the visual distortion of the screen). The result is that in 
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playing Auti-Sim players learn to supplement, incidentally, what they perceive with sensations, 
thoughts, feelings, and ideas that correspond with a particular situation in the (game) world. The 
game, in other words, teaches players to bring forth a sense of place shaped by auditory 
hypersensitivity. 
How effective Auti-Sim is in this task is reflected in the comments that players have 
posted on the game: 
I have Aspergers and this is exactly what it's like for me visiting a supermarket on a bad 
day. 
The use of the narrow depth of field and general busyness of the audio are a wonderful 
way of suggesting the overloaded feeling to someone more neurotypical. (steve_parkes) 
 
As a 30 year old with Asperger's Syndrome and sensory hypersensitivtiy, I would like to 
congratulate and thank you for this. It perfectly encapsulates what it is like.  
I would also say that while I know you included the visual distortion as a reflection of the 
cognitive breakdown that can occur due to overstimulation, it is in itself a pretty accurate 
rendition of visual hypersensitivity - everything gets incredibly distorted, fuzzy and 
“static-y” the more I am exposed to certain disruptive colours, lights, brightness levels, 
etc. 
Thank you so much for this, I very often get asked what it is like by people who find it an 
incredibly difficulty experience to understand. (darkmorgado) 
 
This is Great!! A whole lifetime of being unable to explain what it is like. This is a decent 
“simulation” for me, and for my wife for us to send to family and friends. 
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I think some people might get too caught up in the exactness of the simulation, but I think 
it is hard to simulate something like this realistically. For us, this game isn't about what 
the world looks like to us, but rather what it feels like. 
Overall, nicely done, love the idea, and I can see it being very useful in the future!! 
(Hamsterism) 
These positive comments from those self-identifying as autistic reflect two important aspects of 
Auti-Sim, and commonplace games in general. First, they uphold the mimetic outcome of 
commonplace games, where mimesis refers to the “imitation of the sensory experience of life on 
earth” (Auerbach 191). As one commenter noted above, the game succeeds in that it “isn’t what 
the world looks like to us, but rather what it feels like” (Hamsterism, emphasis added). The 
phrasing here brings to mind Verene’s characterization of the sensory commonplaces as “felt 
unities, felt places, or loci” (171). But whereas Vico and Verene emphasize that “Our ability to 
feel in common through our senses brings into being commonplaces of the human world” 
(Verene 171), the commenter’s remarks on Auti-Sim reflect a sense of place— a ‘felt unity’—
that is irreducible to our capacity to feel in common. Thus, our ability to feel uncommon—our 
dissensus—brings into being commonplaces that are, at the same time, uncommon places. That 
this distinct sense of place can be conveyed through a distinct form of play speaks to the capacity 
for play to bring forth a place or situation.  
The second point worth noting in these comments is the repeated emphasis on Auti-Sim 
as a means of communicating hypersensitivity to neurotypicals. It’s described as being a “useful” 
(steve_parkes) tool for people to “send to friends and family” (Hamsterism), one that could aid 
“people who find [autism] an incredibly difficulty experience to understand” (darkmorgado). 
These remarks speak to the capacity for the game to foster embodied invention—the means of 
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discovering knowledges located in various sensory places. Such knowledges are situated through 
rhetorics and in this respect Auti-Sim can be seen to capture some aspects of what Yergeau and 
Heilker have defined as autistic rhetoric. For instance, Heilker writes that understanding autism 
as rhetoric enabled him to better understand his son’s commonplaces and how they relate to his 
sense of self (488). Compare that with the following comment on Auti-Sim: “Definately [sic] 
gives me a better idea of why my son does some of what he does now..[sic] Need more like this 
to show from a [sic] autistic view” (kittykatandretti). In both instances there is an understanding 
of the relationship between a self and a sense of place in the world that brings about a heightened 
understanding and empathy. 
At the same time not every player had such a positive experience with the game. One 
wrote that, “I am Autistic and I think this is a terrible stereotyping. Since when did we have 
voices knocking in our heads like that? It has nothing to do with loud noises but with picking up 
very quiet noises very well and not sifting them in to the background.” (andrewkilroy5). Another 
commenter posted: “Terrible, as someone with moderate autism, this is bogus. No ones [sic] 
vision goes all static like this, and what is the point of all the children screaming. This is more 
likely simulator for brain tumor rather than autism.” (DKMan). Such comments from those 
identifying as autistic contradict some of the testimonies given above and together they reflect 
that autism is a spectrum in which a range of autists locate themselves; no one representation is 
going to capture the breadth of that spectrum. In this respect calling the game Auti-Sim (a 
portmanteau of autism and simulation) deservedly engenders criticism. And then there are 
comments from presumably neurotypical players that have played the game. These players report 
their experiences as being ‘scary’ and ‘horrifying.’ One player wrote, “the most creepy thing on 
gamejolt [where the game is hosted], also sooo sad. Nice” (Retsamuga). These comments from 
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presumably neurotypical players reflect the challenges and politics of simulating one aspect of a 
commonplace—namely autism as hypersensitivity that can lead to “sensory overload”—while 
leaving out others. Unlike masculine, able-bodied, neurotypical experiences, which are fairly 
widely represented, the varied experiences of autists are at best uncommon and at worst 
misrepresented. Thus, neurotypical players often lack the knowledge needed to properly 
contextualize such a simulation of autistic hypersensitivity such that a game like Auti-Sim risks 
portraying autism as a ‘scary’ variation of a more familiar neurotypical experience. 
A game like Auti-Sim also brings to mind Siebers’ remarks on disability simulators 
mentioned earlier. Here Siebers is not speaking of videogames but the kinds of simulations in 
occupational and rehabilitative therapy courses where students use a wheelchair for a day or 
walk around blindfolded. That said, the lessons hold true for games like Auti-Sim. As Siebers 
writes  
Disability simulations of this kind fail because they place students in a time-one position 
of disability, before knowledge about disability is acquired, usually resulting in emotions 
of loss, shock, and pity at how dreadful it is to be disabled. Students experience their 
body relative to their usual embodiment, and they become so preoccupied with sensations 
of bodily inadequacy that they cannot perceive the extent to which their “disability” 
results from social rather than physical causes. Notice that such games focus almost 
entirely on the phenomenology of the individual body. The pretender asks how his or her 
body would be changed, how his or her personhood would be changed, by disability. It is 
an act of individual imagination, then, not an act of cultural imagination. (“Disability and 
the Theory of Complex Embodiment” 292) 
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Such simulators are based on the notion of a transcendental sensus such that we can simply 
imagine the experiences of others directly through our own bodies and senses. While videogames 
are frequently designed under the same misconception, they also have the capacity to represent a 
particular sense of place and convey a particular rhetoric inherent to that place, and as such they 
have the potential to convey the “usual embodiment” of various persons, communities, and 
cultures in a way that unmediated experience cannot. Videogames, in other words, have the 
potential to teach us how to imagine the actual, practical lived situations that persons, including 
those with disabilities, experience.  What they need, though, is the recognition that there are 
already norms and cultural conventions at play in videogames and in culture more broadly. What 
aspects of our sensory commonplaces games choose to depict need to be able to account for 
those norms and biases.  
Ultimately, what many commonplace games seek to achieve is convey various ways of 
making sense across bodies and cultures. Depression Quest, Auti-Sim, and Mainichi all overtly 
state their ambitions to make players more familiar with and empathetic towards particular ways 
of being in and seeing the world. One gets the sense that the ideal outcome is for players to 
engage with these games in such a way that they can then articulate a true or accurate account of 
the experience represented. The idea is not to have players undergo such experiences directly, 
but to provide them with the necessary means to make sense of such experiences when they see 
or hear about them. That said, while the aforementioned commonplace videogames may 
exemplify embodied invention, I want to demonstrate how the concepts here can contribute to a 
design philosophy. And so in the final chapter I look at Allergies & Allegories, a commonplace 




Chapter 4: Allergies & Allegories 
 
In this final chapter I want to demonstrate how embodied invention can inform the 
creation of knowledge translation tools. Embodied invention seeks to foster the exchange of 
knowledges situated in bodies, communities, and cultures, and it conceive of media as tools 
capable of sharing the methods by which knowledges are situated. While I have looked at media 
that incidentally function in this way—such as comic books and videogames—I want to explore 
what a text founded explicitly on the ideals of embodied invention might look like. I designed 
such a text in the form of Allergies & Allegories, a commonplace videogame that seeks to raise 
awareness of life with a serious food allergy. In the game players work with Mia, a young girl 
with a peanut allergy, to navigate various social situations related to her allergy. Players meet 
Mia when she is on the verge of transferring to a new school where she will be the first student 
with a food allergy. Players help Mia build a sense of safety, community, and support at her new 
school so that she can make decisions with a sense of confidence and security. In what follows I 
situate Allergies & Allegories in relation to other types of knowledge translation games. I go on 
to describe how the game came together, its design and mechanics, what it is like to play, and my 
overall objectives in producing such a text. 
Following the preceding chapter, I define Allergies & Allegories as a commonplace 
videogame in that it seeks to represent a sensory, social, and/or cultural situation or place such 
that in playing the game one generates an account of that place. However, Allergies & Allegories 
is related to several other emergent genres of videogames. For instance, the terms serious games 
or persuasive/purposeful games have emerged lately to describe those games that seek to engage 
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players on more serious topics such as environmental, social, political, and/or cultural issues.37 
The distinction here is that whereas most commercial games are driven to entertain players and 
build a strong consumer base in the process, serious games leverage the affordances of games to 
educate players and raise awareness of particular issues in the public’s interest.38 In this regard, 
serious games tend to confront players with particular social, cultural, or political exigencies that 
players come to understand more deeply through the intricacies of ludic engagement. California 
Water Crisis, for instance, is a board game that provides both a contemporary and historical 
representation of the current drought in the state of California. The game helps players appreciate 
that the drought, far from being a natural ecological phenomenon, is related to a host of 
interacting systems, such as land ownership, environmental laws, taxes, civic responsibility, and 
the distribution of resources for public, private, and agricultural use. But serious games is a broad 
heading under which many different types of games might fall, such as Games for Health. These 
games seek to mobilize health research through games and game-like interfaces. For example, 
there are games that remind individuals to take their medication on time (Mango Health App), or 
those that offer physical or cognitive therapy (Circus Challenge). Again, these games are distinct 
from those strictly focused on developing a commercially successful game.  
Allergies & Allegories is both a serious game and a game related to health. It is a serious 
game in the sense that it seeks to raise awareness of a particular issue, in this case life with a 
potentially fatal food allergy. And it is a health game in that food allergies are related to the 
health and well-being of numerous persons. But I want to distance Allergies & Allegories from 
                                                          
37 See, for instance, Bogost, Persuasive Games, Bogost, Ferrari, & Schweizer, Newsgames, and McGonigal Reality is 
Broken. 
38 Another genre that comes to mind here is edutainment, which seeks to both educate and entertain players. 
Edutainment has its proponents and its critics. Serious games can be seen to emerge from the latter group who 
might see edutainment as missing one of the key aspects of games as tools for knowledge mobilization—namely, 
the capacity for games to represent complex issues or systems rather than to serve merely as a reward mechanism 
in a rote learning exercise. 
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many of the existing games for health, which tend to reinforce the paternalistic doctor-patient 
dynamic that those in the medical humanities have criticized. In fact, when it comes to food 
allergies, children and adults alike tend to be very cognizant of the health implications of their 
allergies. And so even though Allergies & Allegories is a game related to health, it is not the 
medical discourse that needs to be mobilized here but rather the research that clearly indicates 
the adverse role non-food-allergic persons play in creating risk, anxiety, and stress for persons 
with food allergies. Such an objective became apparent through my partnership with GET-
FACTS (Genetics, Environment and Therapies: Food Allergy Clinical Tolerance Studies), a 
Canadian Institutes of Health Research funded project that seeks to investigate food allergies in 
Canada. One of the main objectives of GET-FACTS is to translate scholarship—new and 
existing—on food allergies such that it becomes actionable information for various stakeholders, 
including the general public. Allergies & Allegories is a game that works in concert with the 
knowledge translation goals of GET-FACTS to engage with the Canadian public.  
The game itself is based on interviews conducted with food-allergic children, as relayed 
in the paper “Illustrating Risk: Anaphylaxis Through the Eyes of the Food-Allergic Child” by 
Nancy Fenton et al.39 The researchers were interested in the experiences of food-allergic 
children, especially in regards to their social and psychological well-being. During the study 
children drew illustrations of their experiences related to their allergies and these supplemented 
the interviews, selections of which were published in the paper. This makes “Illustrating Risk” 
particularly useful in light of the preceding conversations on the capacity for autographics—
illustrations of one’s own personal history conveyed through the medium of comics—to 
communicate aspects of lived experience. In fact, several of the illustrations in the study relied 
                                                          
39 Many of the authors of this paper are principal investigators on the GET-FACTS project, although the paper was 
published prior to the formation of GET-FACTS. 
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on comic book-like techniques to depict various moments in which food-allergies played a role 
in creating stress and anxiety for food-allergic children, most of which took place at school. 
These illustrations factored into the design of Allergies & Allegories, which takes place primarily 
in the classroom or cafeteria of a Canadian elementary school. I also drew inspiration from Joe 
Ollman’s “Otherwise, Arachis Hypogaea,” a fictional comic depicting the everyday experiences 
of an Indian-Canadian teen with a peanut allergy (See Fig. 1). Ollmann’s comic happens to 
represent a number of the anecdotes reported by those children in the “Illustrating Risk” paper. 
He also constructs a character that is neither defined by nor reducible to her food allergy; it is an 
important part of her identity but this is due in part to those around her who do not understand 
the logistics of having a food-allergy. 
 
Fig. 10. A fellow student (left) taunts the main character (right) with an allergen in the form of a 
peanut butter sandwich. This is a common experience for children with food allergies who are 
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often interrogated about their allergies by fellow classmates. (Happy Stories About Well-Adjusted 
People 223). 
What I want to turn to now is some specifics surrounding Allergies & Allegories, 
including its name, how it was created, and how it operates. The name Allergies & Allegories is, 
first and foremost, a play upon Dungeons & Dragons, a fantasy role-playing game that 
popularized the blending of dice and decision making to tell stories based on chances and 
likelihoods. But there is another meaning behind Allergies & Allegories and this has to do with 
the etymology of the word ‘allegory.’ As noted earlier, I want to think of media in their capacity 
to represent various commonplaces, for within them we discover various poetic genera or ways 
of making sense. Following the work of Giambattista Vico, the poetic genera give rise to ‘true 
stories’ or ‘true poetic allegories.’ These allegories express the relationship between an 
individual and his or her place in the world. They are stories that through our particular bodies 
and senses help us make sense of our embodied experience. In this regard the word allegory is 
particular fitting given its etymology. Allegory combines ‘allos’ meaning ‘other’ with agoreuein 
meaning ‘to speak publicly in the agora.’ The agora refers to a marketplace, a meeting place, or 
simply a commonplace. When we speak of allegories they are other (allos) tales, stories, or 
accounts from the commonplaces (agoreuein). Thus, I use the word allegory here, and the notion 
of ‘true stories’ in general, to refer to the way that stories enter the commonplaces of public 
discourse. Allegories are the means by which that which is socially or culturally uncommon or 
unfamiliar becomes common or familiar. What Vico adds to this understanding of allegory is 
that stories are originally sensory and bodily. Thus, when scholars remark that “the word 
[allegory]…preserves and entertains references to the public arena of discourse making; to a 
communal, myth-making kind of epistemology” (Bello “Etymology and Allegory” 39), we can 
134 
 
recognize not discourse-making per se but sense-making; allegories are a way for people to share 
how they make sense of the world. Sensory media, especially the new media of comics, video, 
web pages, and videogames, all of which are rather easily created and disseminated through 
computers, present an immense potential for communicating ways of making sense that have 
historically been marginalized from public discourse and thus they present an opportunity to 
radically expedite the process of diversifying social knowledge and public opinion. In calling the 
game Allergies & Allegories, then, I mean to discuss the ways in which food allergies, and the 
poetic genera of food allergic persons, can be made a part of public discourse and common social 
knowledge. This isn’t to suggest that players will recognize the rather archaic etymologies at 
work, but it does indicate an underlying design philosophy. 
Such a design philosophy can be seen operating in other aspects of the game as well, such 
as its web-based format, its comic book aesthetic, and its straight-forward interface. The game 
was programmed using a combination of HTML, Javascript, and jQuery. HTML is the basic 
design or infrastructure language of the internet, while Javascript is the common programming 
language that controls how web pages function. The former is concerned with displaying 
information while the latter performs functions and actions. jQuery is a Javascript library—a 
collection of various process and procedures that enable websites to perform more advanced 
operations. Allergies & Allegories was designed using these languages to ensure compatibility 
across platforms (e.g. Windows, Mac, mobile, etc.) and over time (i.e. since they are the basic 
elements of the web, they will likely be more stable and less likely to become obsolete).  The 
comic book aesthetic was adopted for numerous reasons, including my interest in the capacity 
for comics to communicate persuasively through numerous modalities. In terms of the actual art 
assets (the characters, icons, decorations etc.) I adopted a bricolage approach, blending 
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commercial clipart (the characters), with free iconography (icons, and decorations), as well as 
my own designs (typically the buildings and furniture).40 I also made numerous modifications, 
primarily to the character designs to offset gender norms and to increase the ethnic diversity of 
the cast of the game. The need for this came about because clipart tends to emphasize tropes and 
stereotypes in an effort to maximize the relatively small workspace. Putting all of the schoolgirls 
in skirts, for instance, allows for a quick way to differentiate between them and schoolboys. 
However, this would have been counter-intuitive to the project and so a number of changes were 
made (See Fi.g 2). I also embraced a rather simple interface of point-and-click interaction, pre-
set dialogue prompts, and dice rolls. I wanted the game to be accessible by a wide audience, as 
well as support a touch-friendly interface.  
 
Fig. 11. The title screen for Allergies & Allegories showing the cast of the game. 
                                                          
40 The variances in authorship mentioned here are clearly reflected in the credits of the game. 
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Rhetorically speaking, the game envisions a non-food-allergic audience. This follows 
from the fact that the exigence identified by the research is directly related to non-food-allergic 
persons and their understanding, or lack thereof, of food allergies. Food allergies are estimated to 
affect up to 6% of children (Branum AM, Lukacs SL.; Sampson HA.), and food allergies are the 
cause of an estimated 150-200 deaths per year in the United States (Sampson HA.; Bock SA et. 
al.) and 15-20 deaths per year in Canada (Hawaleshka D.). While risk mitigation is largely the 
responsibility of parents and food-allergic children, non-food-allergic persons, including 
teachers, classmates, parents, child caretakers, restaurant staff, and others, all influence the 
quality of life of persons with food allergies. I speak of quality of life because the potentially 
fatal consequences of food allergies necessitate a heightened sense of environmental awareness 
for persons with food allergies, and this sense of awareness is often accompanied by feelings of 
anxiety, stress, and sometimes fear. These negative feelings are exacerbated by those who are 
unfamiliar or indifferent towards food-allergies, such that children have reported feelings of 
exclusion and isolation due to their allergy, and even outright teasing and bullying (Fenton et. 
al.). The theory developed in this dissertation suggests that embodied invention may provide 
assistance in mitigating these negative social and cultural interactions. More specifically, by 
helping non-food-allergic children and adults become more familiar with the day-to-day 
experiences of life with a food allergy, including the various tactics and techniques developed by 
those with food allergies, individuals will be better able to recall the context in which their 
actions have meaning for various persons. 
 As for the game itself, Allergies & Allegories centres around Mia, a composite character 
of those children interviewed in the “Illustrating Risk” paper. Mia is a young child with a peanut 
allergy who has just transferred schools. Players work with Mia to help build friendships, 
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strengthen support networks, and establish safe and supportive spaces; in doing so players 
recreate those commonplaces that have a particular significance for food-allergic children (e.g. 
the school cafeteria, birthday parties, restaurants, etc.). By demonstrating how Mia needs to 
navigate these socio-cultural spaces by balancing her safety with her desire to be socially 
accepted, players learn to perceive how these familiar spaces constitute distinct places for food-
allergic persons. Like other types of commonplace videogames, the goal of Allergies & 
Allegories is to raise awareness of the food allergic commonplace. While many children and 
adults recognize their role in helping to mitigate risk (e.g. checking food labels, knowing the 
signs of anaphylaxis, etc.), through Allergies & Allegories they learn that they can help mitigate 
feelings of stress, anxiety, fear, and exclusion. In other words, there is no need for risk mitigation 
to come at the expense of the larger well-being of a food-allergic person.  
In order to accurately reflect the commonplaces of food-allergic children I drew not only 
from the testimonies that appear in “Illustrating Risk” but I also incorporated the analysis of the 
researchers as well. The authors themselves were interested in understanding how risk perception 
influences the personal and emotional well-being of food allergic children. What the authors 
refer to as risk perception can be thought of here as part of as the commonplace rhetoric that 
accompanies a food allergy. For instance, the authors note that “bringing [a practical] context” to 
the “institutional, personal, and emotional” domains “provided a means to interpret the array of 
information that influenced the construction of risk” (181). This construction of risk is essential 
in understanding how food-allergic persons construct their view of the world.  
Here it is useful to think of the construction of risk in rhetorical terms, such that the food 
allergy influences that which is brought forth by perception into a distinct, and potentially risky, 
situation. This coincides with the characterization of rhetoric here as a sensory and semiotic 
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process for locating oneself in the world. Fenton et al. note a similar process in describing the 
construction of risk: 
Weick argues that individuals make sense of situations based on how they notice and 
select information from their environments. Moreover, individuals actively interact with 
their environment, which relocates risk to health within the self, creating the risky self. 
These results demonstrate the crucial nature of understanding the specific conditions that 
shape perceptions of risk, which are embedded within different social environments. 
(181) 
Embedded and, one might add, embodied. In this way embodied invention is an ideal means of 
approaching the task of translating the “understanding [of] the specific conditions that shape 
perceptions” (181) between food-allergic and non-food-allergic persons. This is because 
embodied invention, as described thus far, is concerned with those conditions that shape 
perceptions, namely those set forth by the body, culture, and society. Furthermore, games are 
suited to this task as they allow us to explore various conditions as established by their rules. As 
with all forms of embodied invention, the goal here is not to convey the experience itself, but 
rather to facilitate an understanding of the strategies and techniques (i.e. the rhetoric) that emerge 
from various conditions, conditions that have shaped perceptions, as well as thoughts, ideas, 
feelings, etc. 
The first step in designing a food-allergy game, then, is to simulate those conditions, so 
as to create a facsimile of a commonplace in which food-induced anaphylaxis is a possibility. In 
this endeavour testimonies, including personal anecdotes and illustrated events. prove 
instrumental. By talking directly to food-allergic children, the authors of “Illustrating Risk” were 
able to “illuminate the commonalities and diversities of childhood as one phenomenon and 
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anaphylaxis as another and how they relate and interact in different contexts and at different 
stages of life” (181). Just as childhood in the North American context plays a factor in one’s 
commonplace, anaphylaxis constitutes another factor. Indeed, research indicates that income, 
age, sex, and cultural background also play a role in establishing risk (Minaker et. al.; Ben-
Shoshan et. al.). In choosing Mia—a young, white girl—as the central character in which to 
represent the commonplaces of food-allergic children, Allergies & Allegories is at the same time 
striving to portray a specific and intersectional commonplace. 
Another aspect drawn from the paper is the treatment of the emotional burden of 
responsibility: “The emotional burden of responsibility emerged when children and adolescents 
felt at risk when negotiating situations in their environments that had potential for exposure to 
allergenic substances, bringing to light the relational nature of emotion that moves in-between 
people and places rather than the objective view of emotion as statically residing within a 
person” (178). This interrelation between people and places is a key component of embodied 
invention, the outcome of which is to foster the exchange of practices and techniques that have 
emerged from various people navigating various places. Representing how these techniques 
develop is integral to perceiving how they bring forth a sense of place. In order for Allergies & 
Allegories to function in this way, it was necessary to first identify those techniques that emerged 
from food-allergic children situating themselves—emotionally, phenomenologically, socially, 
culturally, physically—within various spaces.  
Consider, for instance, the testimony of one adolescent who stated that, due to the 
numerous occurrences of food fights in his cafeteria, he chose to sit and eat his lunch next to the 
door (176). Fenton et. al. refer to this as a “coping strategy” (176) in relation to the perception of 
a “risky place” (176). What is particularly noteworthy here is how the food-allergic adolescent’s 
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perception of the cafeteria has yielded a distinct sense of place, one in which those tables and 
seats farthest from the exit are also farthest from consideration when it comes to choosing where 
to position himself.  
In Allergies & Allegories this example, and its related strategy, falls under the category of 
safety, one of three categories that I derived from the study. Each category—the other two being 
community and support—includes its own set of techniques and they are the cornerstones of 
gameplay in Allergies & Allegories. The game itself is broken into various commonplaces for a 
child—the school cafeteria, a birthday party, a camping trip, a pizzeria, and so on. In each 
commonplace Mia will be called on to make various decisions, each of which relates to one or 
more of the categories (described below). In order to perform a particular action—such as 
accepting an invitation to join a fellow student for lunch or to correct someone from ordering a 
group meal with an allergen in it—the player must roll a die or dice that corresponds to the 
category or categories involved. Accepting an invitation from a classmate relies on a sense of 
safety and community, for instance, and so the player would roll a die for each (See Fig. 3). Each 
decision also includes a minimum number required to make the decision. These minimums 
reflect the difficulty of the situation. For instance, there is a difference between being invited to 
join a trusted friend for lunch versus that of a complete stranger. To reflect these differences the 
former decision might have a very low minimum requirement, whereas the latter might have a 
very high requirement. Players can modify the difficulty of each situation by performing simple 
tasks that would be commonplace to food allergic children. For example, at any point players can 
open Mia’s backpack and check to see if her epinephrine auto-injector is there. This rather 
simple tactic provides a safety bonus point, indicating Mia’s increased sense of security, thereby 





Fig. 12. Top: Mia is being asked a question by a fellow student. Middle: The roll was not 
successful for both dice. Bottom: The outcome is reflected as a sense of insecurity. 
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Throughout the course of the game Mia’s status is reflected by her well-being. All of the 
decisions presented to her (and thus the player) have a potentially positive outcome. In deciding 
to accept an invitation to a birthday party or in confidently declining a snack Mia affirms her 
sense of self, improving her well-being, as represented by the meter in the corner of the screen. 
When she feels unsafe or a lack of support her confidence to make a decision that could make 
her happy also declines. In these instances her lack of confidence leads her to act out of 
insecurity and self-doubt, resulting in a decrease in her well-being. By using this concept of well-
being the aim is to represent Mia more holistically. While risk mitigation is crucial, it should be 
taken into consideration alongside other social and psychological factors that affect the quality of 
life of an individual. Thus, by tying Mia’s well-being to various decisions that are themselves 
based on her sense of safety, community, and support, Allergies & Allegories demonstrates the 
convergence of a number of factors that will be familiar to those with food allergies but perhaps 
unfamiliar to those without them. 
 
Safety  
Safety is related to the perception of risks in one’s environment, including one’s capacity 
to adapt to the environment. Fenton et al. noted that in regards to “unsafe situations” that 
“Adolescents expressed such feelings as fear, anxiety, and frustration, which were in contrast to 
younger children who described sadness, annoyance, and unhappiness” (180). In terms of 
strategies and techniques, one child described her experience thusly: “You are out on the safari 
by yourself. You go down to the cafeteria. You listen. That is the biggest thing. You look and 
listen” (180).41 Those decisions in Allergies & Allegories based on a sense of safety help players 
                                                          
41 This description brings to mind the notion of think-eye (Brueggemann) that was associated with d/Deaf rhetoric 
last chapter in which the attention to visual detail on the part of the deaf subject realizes a sense of place that is 
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recognize the way that food allergic persons ‘look and listen’ differently. Testimonies such as “I 
am constantly on the look-out for something” (179) and “I am to the point now; this is a box of 
cookies. I won’t put it in the cart, before I read through the whole thing, because it is just a train 
of thought” (180) attest to a kind of relationship between subject and environment that is perhaps 
uncommon for non-food-allergic persons. Whereas some might see a box of cookies and think of 
their taste or their effect on one’s diet, the first thing brought forth into the mind of a person 
perceiving the risk of food-allergies is likely to be, ‘what are the allergenic contents, if any?’ 
Similarly, the aforementioned adolescent who perceived the topography of the cafeteria 
differently based on his allergy attests to a distinct physical sense of space. In-game decisions 
based on safety are intended to evoke these perceptual habits that realize a sense of place 
characterized by risk assessment. 
 
Community  
Community refers to participating in group activities, building friendships, and generally 
feeling welcome and accepted. In looking at the psychological and emotional well-being of food-
allergic children, a lack of acceptance and understanding was often reported. As Fenton et al. 
observed, “All children (both age groups) identified various environmental and social barriers 
that left them feeling isolated, excluded, or teased. Social exclusion meant missing out on school 
activities, being deprived of time with friends, or being singled out” (177). This can be seen in 
various testimonies given by the children. One remarked that, “Like what I said about the parties, 
they won’t invite me, or they won’t hang around me, because they have something, but they are 
kind of like protecting me, because I won’t go near it. I kind of got a bit more anxiety and stuff 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
both an eye-space and an I-space. Through the comic, El Deafo, think-eye was seen as a rhetorical strategy that 
yields a distinct sense of place from that of a hearing person. 
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and I was more careful with everything that I did” (179). Of another participant, Fenton et al. 
noted that “kids were scared of her allergy and bugged her about it, which made her feel ‘not so 
good’” (175).  
In having players meet the main character of Allergies & Allegories as she attends a new 
school for the first time the game accentuates the emphasis on establishing friendships and a 
sense of community. While many children would find such a transition challenging, the lack of 
awareness surrounding food allergies exacerbates this. In making in-game decisions based on a 
sense of community players learn that what others know—and don’t know—about food allergies 
can limit the choices of food allergic children in terms of developing friendships, participating in 
social events, and feeling accepted. In other words, these decisions make it clear that food 
allergies are not an individual but a communal issue. 
 
Support 
Support is characterized here as a network of understanding and mutual trust from 
students, teachers, friends, & family. While similar to a sense of community and safety, support 
is used here to refer to a sense of security that arises from knowing that an environment, 
including those people in it, is accommodating of food-allergic persons.  Those persons who 
understand and are cognizant of food allergies, and their risks, can have a positive influence on 
the sense of well-being of food allergic children. For instance, one participant noted that, “There 
are some (teachers) that I trust, and some (teachers) that I don’t trust. I don’t trust my Math 
teacher. I don’t trust my French teacher. I trust my English teacher, and I am pretty sure I trust 
my Geography teacher, because her daughter has the exact same allergy” (178). In contrast to the 
sense of support brought about through understanding, other children reported negative 
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consequences brought about by misunderstandings. One child noted that a lack of awareness of 
her allergy made her feel “ like a baby because it is like people didn’t believe that [I] could 
handle something, so they would always try and get between me and the nuts—even though they 
maybe didn’t have to because it might be impossible for me to get hurt” (175).  
Thus, support here isn’t the dependence of food-allergic children on others but rather a 
mutual understanding of the risks associated with a food allergy. When players make a decision 
based on support they are learning to appreciate this relationship between their own 
understanding of food allergies and the impact of that knowledge on the well-being of a food 
allergic person.  
 
Rolling the Dice 
To provide an indication of what gameplay in Allergies & Allegories looks like consider 
the following example taken from the game (See Fig. 3 above). Here we can see various aspects 
of the interface, including Mia’s well-being and the number of bonus points to be added to each 
die (where yellow represents safety, blue community, and red support). In this particular scenario 
Mia has just entered the cafeteria at her new school for the first time. Her teacher has introduced 
her as their first peanut-allergic student. He then asked Mia if she had her epinephrine auto-
injector within reach. The player has sorted through her backpack and found the epinephrine 
auto-injector, providing a bonus point to her sense of safety and impressing her teacher in the 
process, increasing her sense of support, as reflected by the bonus point in the yellow and red 
icons. 
In the dialogue box pictured one of Mia’s new classmates has asked her to join him for 
lunch. The two icons next to the dialogue option are dice; the first indicates that the decision 
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involves Mia’s sense of safety (yellow) and the second refers to her sense of community (blue). 
Upon selecting the dialogue option a second prompt will appear indicating the minimum values 
the player will need to roll in order to accept the invitation. Since this is an unfamiliar and 
somewhat stressful occurrence—the first day at a new school as the first student with a peanut 
allergy—the minimums are quite high. If the roll is successful, Mia will join Tom, and feel an 
increased sense of community (adding a blue bonus point) and increasing her overall well-being 
as she is being accepted. If the roll isn’t successful, she will decline the invitation as she doesn’t 
feel safe and confident enough to accept, leading her to eat her lunch on her own, a choice that 
negatively affects her well-being.  
However, in neither case is the outcome reducible to Mia’s food allergy. While her 
allergy to peanuts is often the occasion for each commonplace setting, the decisions she makes 
are meant to reflect how she feels—as a child, a girl, a soccer player, a fan of Harry Potter books, 
and also as someone allergic to peanuts. This differentiates Allergies & Allegories from more 
straightforward attempts at gamifying experiences and scenarios for educational purposes, as 
typified in the genre of edutainment videogames. In these games decisions are often presented to 
players in a true/false binary with the objective of having players learn through trial and error 
what the “correct” answer is in any given scenario. This can be seen in Anaphylaxis Canada’s 
own interactive food allergy training website—Allergy Aware. Like Allergies & Allegories, this 
website involves clicking on various images and making decisions, however the outcome is to 
reveal through the choices made whether the player has correctly identified each potentially 
dangerous scenario.  
In contrast, the discussion here on commonplaces suggests that knowledge situated in 
various experiences is best recalled and deployed by perceiving such knowledge as a set of 
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strategies that has emerged within specific contexts. Mia’s emotional state on the first day of 
school is not ancillary to her allergy to peanuts. To separate the latter from the former such that 
the player encounters a binary decision—to perform the safest (‘right’) or least safe (‘wrong’) 
action—risks separating the choices food allergic persons have to make on a daily basis from the 
practical situations in which those decisions arise. When viewed in this way life with a food 
allergy appears simple enough: be ever vigilant, always be rational, and make the ‘obvious’ 
choice. By eschewing ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ answers and by basing each decision on various 
probabilities (via the dice rolls) that players can influence but ultimately not control, Allergies & 
Allegories is able to retain the complexity of practical, everyday experience, while at the same 







There are two outstanding issues that I want to address in this conclusion. The first has to 
do with the limitations of embodied invention. Throughout the preceding chapters I’ve discussed 
the emancipatory possibilities of engaging in embodied invention, especially in regards to the 
lives of those marginalized by what our culture holds to be ‘common’ or ‘normal.’ There is a risk 
here of over-simplifying complex and ingrained issues regarding sexism, racism, ableism, and 
heteronormativity, among other systemic biases. In the first part of this conclusion I 
contextualize embodied invention in light of these realities by describing invention as one of 
many components by which social and cultural change is enacted. The second issue I wish to 
address here has to do with the practical applications of embodied invention, by which I mean, 
the impact this theory might have on design and pedagogy. After all, I’ve described embodied 
invention as a design philosophy, a claim I’d like to unpack further by demonstrating how the 
theory might influence graphic and ludic designs. Meanwhile, the pedagogical applications of 
embodied invention have been largely implied but infrequently discussed in this dissertation. 
And so I will end by addressing how embodied invention figures into the modern classroom. 
 
Limitations of Embodied Invention 
In Art as Experience John Dewey outlines, among other things, the emancipatory 
potential of art. For Dewey, “The moral function of art is to remove prejudice, do away with the 
scales that keep the eye from seeing, tear away the veils due to wont and custom, perfect the 
power to perceive” (325). This is because art expands experience (325), training aesthetic 
imagination to perceive various possibilities (345) and how they might make for a better future 
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(346). In describing the emancipatory function of art Dewey isn’t predicting an end to social 
injustices and systemic inequality through artistic intervention, but rather he is noting the role 
that art can and often does serve alongside public discourse in changing values and mores over 
time. From this perspective, art and artists are often part of a collection of agents and actors 
including community activists, journalists, educators, policy makers, and socially progressive 
politicians, among others, who work towards changing the values and knowledges of society so 
as to better establish and uphold the rights of all peoples.  
Changing values and knowledges is not a simple, straightforward process, especially 
given the often divergent views on what the future should look like and how best to safeguard 
the rights of various individuals as we move towards those futures. Gillian Whitlock touches on 
this issue in her essay “The Seeing ‘I’ of Comics” cited throughout this dissertation. There she 
looks at the inter-cultural affordances of comics to foster communication, empathy, and 
understanding across borders and cultulres. In the essay she cites Salam Pax who, upon reading 
Marjane Satrapi’s Persepolis, feels “the urge to start translating [the comic] and throwing copies 
of it on the streets of Baghdad” (qtd. In Whitlock 969). As Whitlock goes on to write,  
“Translating comics and ‘throwing copies on the streets of Baghdad’ (as Pax enthusiastically 
suggests) is a euphoric gesture of cross-cultural communication that forgets the complex transits 
that must occur for comics to engage readers in very different contexts" (970). Similarly, reading 
comics like El Deafo and The Ride Together should not be considered as a means of eliminating 
systemic ableist biases. In fact, given how The Ride Together frames autism through discredited 
scientific theories there is a risk that these texts can and do uphold and perpetuate some of those 
very same biases. Thus, it is important to recognize autographics by and about persons with 
disabilities as texts that contribute to the ongoing discourse surrounding disability in our culture, 
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a discourse in which multiple stakeholders are participating for various and perhaps 
contradictory reasons.  
 The same goes for Allergies & Allegories and its aim of addressing biases surrounding 
food allergies. Here the risk of over-emphasizing the emancipatory potential of the medium is 
exacerbated by the techno-utopian rhetoric that surrounds digital technologies. For instance, 
much has been said about the assistive, rehabilitative, and empathetic potential of videogames, 
including my own comments in this very document. But as games like Auti-Sim prove, the goal 
of fostering empathy through representing a sensory experience comes up against the pluralistic 
nature of said experiences—autism is a broad spectrum, after all—as well as a larger 
neurotypical culture that often lacks the knowledge needed to contextualize such representations. 
Certainly those commenters who characterized Auti-Sim as a ‘horror game’ have either 
incorporated Auti-Sim into existing cultural narratives in which autism is a pitiable existence or 
the game itself has created such a narrative. In the case of Allergies & Allegories the goal of 
interrogating and dismantling biases regarding food allergies comes up against ingrained 
normative behaviours that treat virtually any difference from the normate identity as a curiosity, 
a concern, or even a cause for ridicule. Given that the primary audience of the game is 
adolescents the actual gains Allergies & Allegories makes regarding food allergy awareness will 
be tempered by these existing ableist dispositions. The game, then, needs to be part of larger 
conversations which not only address adolescents but those authority figures—parents, teachers, 
guardians, etc.—who are themselves involved in perpetuating ableist biases. Furthermore, these 
same authority figures need to be mindful not to speak for and over those with food allergies; 
such able-splaining, in which able-bodied individuals act as both authors of and authorities on 
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the experiences of those with disabilities, risks placing the interpretations of parents and teachers 
above and beyond those experiencing the practical realities of life with a food allergy.42 
All of this is to say there are very real risks of oversimplifying the various discourses on 
social and political change regarding disability. To suggest that anyone, myself included, has the 
correct or objective vantage on these issues would be disingenuous. Similarly, to believe that art, 
in this case autobiographical comics and videogames, operates outside of this network and can, 
in some sense, transcend the complexity of that network, would be disingenuous as well. Rather, 
I want to think of comics like El Deafo and games like Allergies & Allegories as part of that 
complex on-going process whereby common sense—meaning here common social knowledge—
changes over time to reflect the underlying dissensus of various individuals, communities, and 
cultures. As the title of Dewey’s aforementioned text suggests, art can function as experience. 
When this is paired with C. S. Peirce’s observation that, “common sense beliefs are subject to 
revision, but they are held firm until experience prompts that revision” (CP 5.444), then art can 
be seen as that necessary component of culture that challenges entrenched beliefs and values by 
providing experiences that call those beliefs and values into question.  
Thus, I read Dewey’s remarks that art has the capacity to “perfect the power to perceive” 
(325) alongside those of Lennard Davis when he writes that, “In theorizing disability…we must 
develop a different way of conceptualizing the visual field, of thinking about seeing, of 
perceiving thinking” (Enforcing Normalcy 15). A comic like El Deafo participates in this 
process, allowing Hearing readers to rethink the visual and thus to rethink deafness and disability 
in the process. Here the experience of reading the comic has the capacity to prompt readers to 
revise their common sense beliefs regarding deafness and Deaf culture, such that art can help 
                                                          
42 The paper that informs Allergies & Allegories—“Illustrating Risk: Anaphylaxis Through the Eyes of the Food 
Allergic Child” by Fenton et al—makes note of several instances where this occurs and ties that back to heightened 
feelings of stress and anxiety. 
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root out ableist biases that are entrenched in social knowledge. I say help as this process needs to 
be met with shifts in pedagogy, design, policy, and public discourse. As Dewey outlines, art 
plays a pivotal role in this process but it is one of many components by which change comes 
about over long periods of time. 
 
Design & Pedagogy 
The second issue I want to address in this conclusion is the practical applications of 
embodied invention in the contexts of design and pedagogy. Throughout the dissertation I refer 
to embodied invention as a design philosophy and the accompanying game was meant to 
exemplify this. But embodied invention as a design philosophy can also be articulated more fully 
here by connecting it with the New London Group and their work on multiliteracies. As noted 
earlier, the New London Group argues that the prevalence of multimedia in contemporary life 
requires new literacies that would facilitate interpreting and authoring meaning in this new media 
ecology. They make note of “the increasing multiplicity and integration of significant modes of 
meaning-making” (64), such that the notion of literacy needs to expand beyond that of the 
printed word. Embodied invention reinforces this argument insofar as it is based in the 
recognition that embodied experience produces enthymemes in and across various senses. These 
sensory and semiotic enthymemes—where an enthymeme is as a form of communication that 
relies on probable and familiar relationships between sensations, thoughts, ideas, etc.—can be 
thought of as important components of what the New London Group calls Available Design—
those diverse resources that we rely on for making meaning. In a manner of speaking, emergent 
forms of multimodal media open the range of multisensory enthymemes that authors can 
represent and that audiences can interpret. Being able to tap into these previously 
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unrepresentable enthymemes provides the basis for an inventive design philosophy that 
encourages designers to explore the range of sensory arguments at their disposal in portraying 
the embodied experiences of various subjects. In graphic arts this could involve emphasizing 
implied but absent relationships that operate between cultures.  
For example, consider the following webcomic from Matt and Kay Daigle’s That Deaf 
Guy series: 
 
Fig. 13. In this seven panel comic we see the main characters—one who is Deaf, the other 
Hearing—preparing to go to sleep. Each time they want to converse they turn the lights on so 
they can see each other signing. The final panel shows their neighbours, confused by the 
flickering lights. (That Deaf Guy) 
In the above comic the joke relies on readers discovering the relationship between sight and 
Sign. The humour here is implied in this sensory relationship endemic to Deaf culture and it is 
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supplied through understanding that relationship. In fact, moments like the above comic arise out 
of an explicit aim on the part of the cartoonists to engage in inter-cultural exchanges rooted in 
their everyday experiences—That Deaf Guy is a semi-autobiographical webcomic where Matt, 
the artist, is d/Deaf, and Kay, the writer, is hearing. As Matt Daigle states in an interview, “We 
knew that in order to go more mainstream, we needed to incorporate humor and language that 
crossed two cultures, so it is a hearing/deaf collaboration. We both come up with ideas and aim 
to find a happy medium. If the humor is too deaf, hearing people will not understand it and vice 
versa!” (Matt Daigle). This is not to suggest that all artists should be concerned with making 
inter-cultural art—there are tangible and intangible advantages to intra-cultural exchanges as 
well—but in those instances where broad and diverse audiences are envisioned, the artful use of 
multimodal enthymemes can serve as a useful heuristic for making arguments—broadly 
understood—be them social, political, humorous, or otherwise.  
Similarly, game designers can look to those procedural enthymemes that pervade their 
everyday lives or the lives of the persons they are seeking to represent. A procedural enthymeme 
is an argument where the implied but absent premise is supplied through interaction and praxis. 
In chapter three I suggested that game designers create places or situations in which players are 
encouraged to discover those implied but absent relationships through play. An embodied 
invention approach to game design would encourage game designers to 1) explore the procedural 
enthymemes that are endemic to the sensory, social, and cultural situation of various subjects and 
2) encode those enthymemes within the processes and procedures of their games.  
Indeed, designers are already engaged in this practice to varying degrees. Anna 
Anthropy’s Dys4ia, for instance, takes a very directed approach in its deployment of procedural 
enthymemes, using various mini-games where the potential actions are rather constrained, 
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making it relatively easy to discover the implied relationships. What could prove fruitful is the 
use of such personal procedural enthymemes within more open-world games, a genre which 
often embraces de-personalized, generic (read: normative) protagonists. For example, while role-
playing videogames often allow players to create a character with varying characteristics related 
to gender, race, and/or sexual orientation, the effect those decisions have on the player-
character’s experience of the game-world are frequently negligible. For instance, in Fallout 4, a 
post-apocalyptic role-playing game, players can choose from an array of races and sexual 
orientations but these serve more of an extra-ludic function, providing the player with the 
freedom to create a wide range of identities while simultaneously treating the differences 
between those identities as inconsequential. For example, the game itself never recognizes the 
race of the player-character, despite the fact that the overarching narrative of the game is an 
allegory for slavery.43 This post-apocalyptic world—a narrative premise that sees the game adopt 
the aesthetics of middle-class American culture circa the 1950s when the nuclear bombs first 
started to fall—is also, paradoxically, a post-racist society.  
Game designers could look to the various personal enthymemes that are often endemic to 
the processes and procedures used by various individuals and communities in order to create 
more dynamic, responsive, and mimetic game worlds. In Fallout 4, for example, the game could 
dynamically adjust procedural enthymemes based on the player-character’s identity such that for 
different characters the implied but absent process, procedure, or action varies in relation to who 
they are in that world. Perhaps the designers wished to acknowledge gender-based wage 
discrimination, for instance. Here the various quest givers—those who assign tasks to the player-
                                                          
43 In the fictitious world of Fallout 4 synthetic beings or synths have been created—animatronic creatures, some of 
whom exhibited signs of sentience. The player can choose to help liberate these synths from the creators and 
masters by working with The Railroad—a reference to the ‘underground railroad,’ a network that worked 
clandestinely to move enslaved Africans to safety. 
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character in exchange for compensation—could by default offer less compensation to those with 
female avatars than those with male avatars. This, in turn, would create a situation in which 
players with female avatars are persuaded to invest more heavily in the game’s speech and barter 
skills, which would come at the expense of leveling up other skills, such as those related to 
science or combat. In this way the game would capture meaningful differences between socio-
economic situations, highlighting the current injustice of wage disparity in a procedural manner, 
rather than contending itself with merely addressing discrimination through allegory and 
metaphor alone. More generally speaking, embodied invention encourages the designer to view 
the game world less like a universal sensory topos, as Vico suggested, and more like a space for 
creating numerous personalized topoi, places in which various enthymematic relationships 
pervade the sensory, social, and cultural spaces of the game in accordance with the player-
character’s identity.  
At this point I’d like to shift from talking about embodied invention in relation to design 
to addressing how the concept relates to literacy and pedagogy. As the New London Group 
notes, the relationship between design and literacy is quite strong; for them, multiliteracies are 
intrinsically about the multimodality of meaning-making. Embodied invention draws on this 
relationship in that both commonplace comic books and commonplace videogames emphasize 
the value of multimodality in the process of learning how to ‘make sense’ of a variety of 
embodied, social, and cultural situations. In terms of commonplace comic books, Dale Jacobs 
has written about the pedagogical affordances of multiliteracies in relation to comics (see 
“Beyond Visual Rhetoric” and Graphic Encounters). But one topic not explicitly covered in the 
multiliteracies manifesto is the subject of game literacy.  
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Just as the New London Group asserts the necessity for multiliteracies as we progress 
into the 21st century, game scholar Eric Zimmerman has provocatively dubbed the next hundred 
years the Ludic Century in which game literacy will be an instrumental aspect of work, play, and 
politics. In his “Manifesto for a Ludic Century” Zimmerman assert that “Games are a literacy” 
such that, while “New literacies, such as visual and technological literacy, have…been identified 
in recent decades…to be truly literate in the Ludic Century also requires gaming literacy. The 
rise of games in our culture is both cause and effect of gaming literacy in the Ludic Century.” He 
goes on to assert that  
The problems the world faces today requires the kinds of thinking that gaming literacy 
engenders. How does the price of gas in California affect the politics of the Middle East 
affect the Amazon ecosystem? These problems force us to understand how the parts of a 
system fit together to create a complex whole with emergent effects. They require 
playful, innovative, trans-disciplinary thinking in which systems can be analyzed, 
redesigned, and transformed into something new. (“Manifesto for a Ludic Century”).  
However, as Heather Chaplin—a collaborator on the Ludic Century project—notes, gaming 
literacy and systems thinking could come at the expense of empathy and compassionate 
understanding:  
If it’s true that we’re moving into a Ludic Century…what happens to emotional 
intelligence and empathy? Does too much focus on the whole create a danger of 
neglecting the human parts? Are we moving into a future in which plenty of people are 
logical, good at recognizing patterns, and analyzing the way things work, but in which 




Here embodied invention could be seen to bridge the gap between these two positions in that it 
approaches embodied experience as a kind of system itself, one composed of various sensory and 
procedural enthymemes. Thus, while Zimmerman sees the potential for games to represent the 
behaviour of global systems in which humans are one of many agents, there is equal potential for 
games to represent the sensory, cognitive, social, and cultural systems of various subjects; play, 
then, becomes a means of realizing how and why such individuals behave the way they do. Not 
only does this feed back into gaming literacy by suggesting games can help us become ‘literate’ 
in different human experiences, but it also indicates the pedagogical affordances of embodied 
invention.  
For instance, teaching students the situated nature of knowledges (Haraway) and 
practices (Haraway; New London Group) can be quite challenging. Games, and especially those 
that represent various sensory, social, and cultural commonplaces, can address this pedagogical 
challenge by clearly demonstrating the relationship between knowledge and praxis. As noted in 
chapter three, the act of playing a game can be seen as a process of using practices endemic to 
the player’s situation in the game world in order to reveal knowledge situated in that world. Even 
a game as abstract as Super Mario Bros. reveals the situated character of knowledge in that the 
various strategies and tactics players devise through playing the game are all routed through 
Mario’s avatar and his various capabilities. Commonplace games, such as those mentioned in 
chapter three, offer less-abstract, more concrete worlds or places in which knowledges and 
practices inhere.  
Embodied invention as a pedagogy also relates to much broader conversations regarding 
knowledge and instruction. This follows from the relationship between embodied invention and 
the pedagogy of Giambattista Vico. In his oration On the Study Methods of Our Time (De nostri 
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temporis studiorum), Vico addresses the value of an education that fosters engagement with the 
public and the arts. Scholars generally regard the text as a polemic against the Cartesian method 
that was quickly becoming a pedagogical standard in Italian schools at the time. Vico saw the 
implications of this method—which downplayed the role of the public and the arts in the 
discovery and dissemination of knowledge—as “distinctly harmful” (13) in part because it cut 
students off from the larger community, leading to “odd and arrogant behaviour” (13) as the 
students lacked the skills to communicate with those not familiar with their methods. Instead, 
Vico espouses the ars topica, the art of thinking, knowing, and speaking topically. 
More recently Ernesto Grassi (Vico and Humanism: Essays on Vico, Heidegger, and 
Rhetoric) has referred to these distinct pedagogies as critical versus topical philosophy. Critical 
philosophy, typified by Descartes, follows from the logico-rational tradition that seeks to 
produce knowledge of the world using a set of incontrovertible premises; from such a 
perspective the identity of the inquirer is negligible, the discourse is anonymous, and the truths 
universal (“Critical Philosophy or Topical Philosophy: Meditations on the De nostri temporis 
studiorum” 2). Topical philosophy, in contrast, follows from the rhetorical-pathetic tradition in 
which inquiry is primarily concerned with the discovery of premises themselves. These premises 
or ‘starting places’ (topoi) reflect the topical nature of this epistemology which treats the identity 
of the inquirer as discrete, the discourse as relative (i.e. to a particular time and place), and truths 
as probabilities (3).  
Now, it could be said that the mode d’emploi of critical philosophy is bon sens, that 
supposedly shared rational faculty that allows for an equivocation between inquirers despite 
differences in bodies and situations—hence, in critical philosophy differences between inquirers 
are treated as negligible and knowledge itself is considered anonymous and ahistorical. Topical 
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philosophy, on the other hand, is fundamentally based on invention, that process by which 
knowledge is discovered through a plurality of premises or starting places. Critical philosophy, 
as I have argued elsewhere,44 is best suited to intra-cultural inquiry as it relies on shared logico-
rational methods and practices amongst a community of inquirers. In our increasingly connected, 
inter-cultural world this philosophy leaves students ill-prepared to communicate with others 
when methods and practices are not common or shared.45 The pedagogy that accompanies 
critical philosophy, then, fails today’s students in that it cannot convey the value of being open to 
alternative methods and practices, a necessity as global communication networks increasingly 
put us in contact with people, ideas, and values that are situated in various geographical, social, 
cultural, and bodily situations.  
Thus, I see embodied invention as a means of extending and enhancing the pedagogical 
aims of topical philosophy at an opportune time—both in light of the increasingly interconnected 
nature of everyday life and the technological affordances of the media that undergird that 
interconnectedness. As Grassi notes of the rhetorical-pathetic method, it begins by recognizing 
that “…the passions, the pathetic element in the human mind, cannot be reached by reason, for 
only sensible schemata, visual or auditory schemata, have influence over them. Hence the 
importance of images, gestures, the rhythm of the discourse, which have no rational value 
whatsoever” (3). Contemporary technologies allow for the creation and distribution of various 
and diverse ‘sensible schemata’ across a broad range of modalities. Crucially, by mediating these 
sensible schemata we “facilitate the acceptance of rational truths” (3). Thus, it is beneficial to 
teach students the value of commonplace media—that is to say, the value of representing, 
sharing, and engaging with various depictions of social, cultural, and bodily places. Unlike the 
                                                          
44 Wilcox, Steve. "On the Publishing Methods of Our Time: Mobilizing Knowledge in Game Studies." Scholarly and 
Research Communication, 6.3 (2015): n. pag. Web. 15 Apr. 2016. 
45 On social media, for instance, belief in universal truths and privileging of anonymous criticism is prevalent.  
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abstract, disembodied discourse of logico-rational philosophy, embodied invention follows from 
that recognition that multimodal media are indispensable in exchanging knowledges between 
bodies and places.  
And it is on this point that I will bring things to a close as these issues in particular 
emphasize the overall aim of this project; namely, to foster understanding between bodies and 
across cultures through sharing stories about our lives with one another. Our capacity to tell and 
share these stories in a variety of ways will prove instrumental in creating more inclusive, 
compassionate, and understanding cultures. At the same time we must not only become literate 
in the various modalities that allow us to author these stories in new ways, but we must also learn 
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